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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE."

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Parameters is a journal of ideas, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

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Adjusting to Post-Cold War Strategic Realities

GEORGE L. BUTLER

Classic national military strategy formulation begins with analysis of broad security objectives and potential threats to those objectives arising from the unfolding international environment. For present purposes, however, let us begin simply with the proposition that while fundamental US security objectives remain largely constant, the global arena in which these aims find their context is undergoing such a profound transformation that virtually all of the givens that have shaped our national military strategy for four decades have been called into question. As President Bush recently reminded the nation, "Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. . . . We know that our forces can be smaller," he acknowledges, but we "would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or a shrunken-down version of the ones we possess. . . . What we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring."[1]

I am keenly aware that a number of serious-minded critics have questioned whether any in the defense establishment really believe in the desirability of significant force reductions and are prepared to deal constructively on the issue. They can rest easy on that score. Obviously, the war in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia has put a hold on many aspects of our military draw-down and strategic reorientation, but sooner or later the Gulf situation will be resolved and the nation will resume its long-term response to the end of the Cold War. Energized from the topmost rung of government, the defense establishment has been laboring mightily to produce the framework for a new national military strategy and its supporting policy tenets.

My purpose in this essay is to sketch my own appreciation of this brave new world which has so challenged the nation's military planners, strategists, and policymakers. What follows is the distillation of more than two years of reflection, study, and conceptual borrowing from professional

colleagues during my tenure as the nation's chief uniformed strategic planner. Let's begin with a glance at the factors that make global security an entirely new ball game.

The New Global Security Context

The historic shift in the tectonic plates of the Cold War, to use Joseph Nye's wonderful metaphor, has unleashed at least six forces that are reshaping the strategic landscape. Each of these forces has enormous implications for US national security policy and military strategy. First, we are witnessing the astounding advent of a Second Russian Revolution in this century, one which may well terminate the bizarre and tragic Marxist-Leninist experiment set in motion some 70 years ago. Second has been the astonishing advancement of the German question to the forefront of the European security agenda, with its attendant implications for the future of alliances both East and West. Third, we now see the prospects for a 21st-century Concert of Europe, a promising reprise of an earlier, less-structured collective which foundered on the rocks of rising nationalism. Fourth is the intensification on the world's stage of intractable conflicts between mortal enemies, in some cases centuries-old quarrels now fueled by arms of enormous destructiveness. Fifth, we are seeing the consequences of catastrophic failures in the human condition in the Third World, with the creation of vast reaches of misery and ecological ruin which blight the global village and benumb the global soul. And, finally, we must note the rise of new centers of power, with agendas which, unless carefully nurtured or in some cases checked, may abort the nascent era of cooperation stirring in the ashes of the Cold War. These six fundamental forces will condition every security initiative undertaken in the foreseeable future.

Within this tumultuous sea of new and historic forces emerge two bedrock strategic postulates. First, the character of the US-Soviet relationship is undergoing a remarkable and long-sought metamorphosis. We are reaping the

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fruits of a historic strategic success—containment of the most virulent strains of communism, thus validating George Kennan's brilliant perception that this false ideology would eventually collapse under the weight of its inherently flawed vision of man and society. Let there be no doubt that those of us responsible for the nation's strategic planning not only applaud this success, we are bending every effort to accommodate to its sweeping consequences.

Second, and conversely, this is not a transition we can nor should make overnight. While there is much to hope for in the new US-Soviet relationship, there is also much that remains unseen. As a strategic planner, I would emphasize that whatever the degree of impending revision in our long-standing security calculus vis-à-vis Soviet military capabilities, some crucial constants remain. The most enduring concern is that despite its evolving ideology and the apparently benign intentions of its current leadership, the Soviet Union remains the one country in the world with the means to destroy the United States with a single, cataclysmic attack. Consequently, until and unless the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is vastly modified, whether through arms control agreements or unilateral action, the cornerstone of US military strategy must continue to be a modern, credible, and survivable nuclear deterrent force which can render a devastating reply to any nuclear aggression, even while retaining a stable, non-threatening peacetime posture.

Regional Strategic Survey

With the broad parameters of the world's security climate in mind, we can now reexplore the familiar terrain of regional tensions from a post-Cold War perspective. With respect to Europe, it is crystal clear that we are dealing with an extraordinary realignment of the strategic context. Soviet retrenchment, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, German unification, and the prospect of economic integration embody both the fruits of collective defense and the imperatives for undertaking new approaches toward it. In the future, NATO will doubtless field restructured active forces—smaller, more mobile, more versatile. The alliance will also rely increasingly on multinational corps. Readiness of active units can and will be scaled back. We have struck, in my estimation, the right balance between enduring strategic principles and the self-evident need for far-reaching changes in NATO's operational practices and postures.

On the opposite side of the globe, the Cold War clouds on Korea's horizon stand in stark contrast to the emerging sunshine in Europe. The one ray of optimism is sparked by the upward surge of democracy, economic growth, and military capability in the South. This burgeoning self-sufficiency has prompted a considered review of the US-South Korean security relationship. It is evident that the United States is in a position to undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce modestly its force presence in Korea, as well as in Japan and the surrounding region. The United States can transition

gradually toward a partnership in which the South Korean armed forces assume the leading role.

Looking at still another point on our well-worn strategic compass, the Middle East, we find new realities again emerging to force change. By the fall of 1989, we had been engaged for over two years in tanker escort operations in the Persian Gulf, thus clearly establishing the principle of US military intervention to protect the free flow of oil. However, as the twin specters of Soviet hegemony and Iranian adventurism dissipated, and as the specter of Iraqi aggression rose to replace them, new approaches to preserving regional stability and access became mandatory.

Iraq emerged from its eight years of war with a messianic zeal, an appetite for weapons of mass destruction, and a shattered economy. Consequently, in late 1989, USCENTCOM was directed to develop a new regional defense plan for thwarting potential Iraqi aggression aimed at dominating the Arabian Peninsula. Of course, we did not begin with a blank page, but rather built on years of planning for this type of regional threat. Obviously, the assessments, assumptions, and concepts of operation in the CENTCOM plan have been put to a severe test by recent events in the Gulf. We will return to this subject later, but suffice it to say here that, on balance, the thrust of our strategic judgments was largely on the mark, thus providing sound conceptual footing for the remarkable success to date of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Finally, we need to glance at "the rest of the world." That term is not intended to diminish nor denigrate the importance of US interests, friends, and allies in regions beyond Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Rather, from a planner's perspective, the nature and urgency of threats outside of those I have earlier specified are simply less compelling and can be dealt with by a modest and judicious mix of forces, including units with specialized capabilities for operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Getting Down to Brass Tacks

Let us turn now from the realm of strategic assessment within a broad regional survey to the more concrete aspects of national military strategy: force structure, force posture, operational planning, and force potential.

The linchpin of our new military strategy has already been articulated by our Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin L. Powell. His base force concept, now widely reported,[2] is founded upon a clear and realistic vision of the post-Cold War world. It refers to that basic, minimal level of forces below which we cannot prudently go without reducing our commitments or defining our national interests more modestly. The concept of a base force serves two essential purposes for strategic planners, programmers, and field commanders. First and foremost, it puts a mark on the strategist's wall identifying the cross-over point between enduring tasks and the shrinking resources to perform those tasks. It

"The thrust of our strategic judgments on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was largely on the mark." Shown above, Abrams tanks from the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) in the Saudi Arabian desert.

represents a capability below which forces may no longer be adequate to underwrite vital strategic objectives. The base force is a floor, not a goal. Indeed, at any given point in strategic time, the base force may entail considerable risk, much like a whole life policy that needs to be supplemented by term insurance to cover a period of unique personal vulnerability or commitment.

The second key purpose served by the base force is to provide the flexibility for meeting both new and enduring strategic realities. General Powell envisions an Atlantic force that is equipped, postured, trained, and exercised for the threats characteristic of Europe and Southwest Asia. With respect to Europe, the base force concept exploits the prospect of longer response time, in the unlikely event of post-CFE Soviet aggression, by building into the Atlantic force structure an appropriate active-reserve mix, supported by the ability to reconstitute larger forces should the need arise.

The base force also includes a Pacific dimension, structured and postured according to the dictates of what is essentially a maritime theater. The Pacific force places a premium on naval capabilities, backed by the minimum essential air and ground forces required for continuing deterrence and immediate crisis response. Notwithstanding the dramatic growth in US trade in the Pacific Basin, with a corresponding increase in our stake in regional stability, the US military profile can be cautiously reduced as our most important security partners become more self-reliant.

Additionally, the base force concept makes allowance for what I earlier referred to as "the rest of the world." Through the lenses of a military

strategist, this is the world of lesser regional contingencies, low-intensity conflict, insurgencies, anti-drug wars, anti-terrorism, and noncombatant evacuations. It is the come-as-you-are world of 48-hour response times to spontaneous, often unpredictable crises calling for a contingency element of highly trained and ready forces, air deliverable and largely self-sufficient.

The contingency element of the base force would be composed of Army light and airborne divisions, Marine expeditionary brigades, special operations forces, and selected Air Force assets, buttressed as necessary by carrier and amphibious forces. The contingency element is the tip of the spear, first into action, followed as required by heavier forces and longer-term sustainment.

The base force is underpinned by strategic nuclear forces of appropriate size and posture, as shaped by estimates of opposing arsenals, arms control outcomes and prospects, and the dictates of fiscal reality. Equally important are America's mobility forces, the long pole in the tent of power projection, now under rigorous scrutiny as we draw early lessons from Operation Desert Shield.

We need not be concerned here with the exact shape, size, or cost of the base force. What is important for the sake of this discussion is the *concept*—a force tailored to the perceived realities of a world undergoing a sea change in political power and power politics. It anticipates the prospects for a smaller force, with an appropriate mix of active and reserve elements, highly mobile, well equipped and trained, competent to underwrite America's unique, enduring global obligations. The base force is not sized for today's world—it is rather the "don't go below force" for a future world largely relieved of the vestiges of superpower competition. This is why a measured approach to reductions in defense expenditures is so essential. Should the bright promise of a new, more cooperative era in East-West relations be dimmed by unwanted outcomes or the rise of significant new threats to our security objectives, we would sorely regret imprudent earlier cuts in American military strength.

New Directions in Strategic Planning

During the tortuous process of developing a new concept of operations for combined defense of the Arabian Peninsula, it became apparent that our traditional planning construct was increasingly ill-suited to such a complex contingency environment. Face to face with the reality of powerful new adversaries, shrinking forward presence, and reduced resources, planners could no longer make reliable assumptions about the numerous variables in the equation relating military responses to military outcomes. Foremost among these variables are warning time, reserve call-up, resort to commercial lift assets, and the precise nature of the military response chosen by political authorities. With respect to

warning time, the most critical and elusive factor in operational planning, there are only two legitimate answers to the question of how much warning will be available in a given crisis. The short answer is, "I don't know;" the second and slightly longer is, "It depends on how the crisis arises and unfolds."

But there are some things with respect to warning that we can be sure about. First, to guess wrong when dealing with a powerful adversary is to lose. Second, warning time isn't warning time unless you exploit it; otherwise it is wasted time. And, third, the propensity to avail oneself of warning time is inversely proportional to the amount of time perceived to be available. In other words, we move out with alacrity when we think the enemy can strike out of the blue, but we tend to dawdle when we think we'll learn of his intentions well in advance. This tendency arises because crisis response always entails a high degree of risk, encompassing far-reaching political and economic as well as purely military considerations. It follows, therefore, that warning time is far more likely to be exploited by key decisionmakers if they have a large menu of discriminate response options from which to choose. Faced with the single choice of one large contingency response option, involving tens of thousands of troops and perhaps a requirement to mobilize reserve forces, any senior decision authority would wisely pause for thought.

Such considerations have led to a new contingency planning strategy which puts a premium on what I call "graduated deterrence response." Its premise is that a crisis can arise under a variety of circumstances that will in turn condition a variety of likely or possible responses. Its most operative feature is that regional planners, where appropriate, will be tasked to develop not one but several response options—or "concepts of operation," as planners call them—with each keyed to specified conditions of crisis onset: warning time, response timing, reserve call-up, and lift availability.

This new planning construct underscores the importance of early response to a crisis. It also facilitates early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths which begin with bite-sized, deterrence-oriented options carefully tailored to avoid the classic response dilemma of "too much too soon or too little too late." I would emphasize that this approach is *graduated*, not gradual. In a fast-developing crisis, which leaves little or no time for elaborate deterrence choreography, plans will certainly encompass appropriate response options, but based on precise tailoring.

The final piece of the new strategic game plan can be labeled "graduated mobilization response." In my judgment, the issue of mobilization represents the toughest problem we have as a nation in transitioning to a new strategic posture as the Cold War fades from center stage. If warning time or, as I would prefer to call it, "available response time," is truly increasing with respect to any future conflict in Europe, that fact may well prove to be a curse as well as a blessing. Clearly it is a blessing in that NATO has been enabled

to begin reducing its force posture, readiness levels, and other Cold War defense burdens. Increased warning time will be a curse, however, if it lulls us and our alliance partners into failing to sustain the potential for reconstituting large, competent forces as a hedge against a fundamental threat reversal in Europe or elsewhere. This means that in planning for graduated mobilization responses we must pay careful attention to the management of the vital elements of military potential, to wit, our scientific, technological, and industrial base, manpower pool; and strategic materials. In other words, we are going to have to think and act strategically, with the intellectual and political courage to invest in hedges that may not always be precisely measurable in terms of explicit future dividends. For me, this is our greatest challenge, and in the long run it may also prove to be the most important.

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Such, then, is how I visualize the new directions in American military strategy. This revised strategic blueprint contains approximately equal measures of change and continuity. Even as we applaud the historic success of containment, we must recognize that its success is not yet complete. Despite the bright promise of a Europe free from the specter of war, the shadow of residual Soviet power will continue to loom large, and ages-old enmities may well emerge from the receding tides of the Cold War.

More acute reminders of the enduring demands for strategic continuity emerge daily from the Gulf war, and episodically from the DMZ in Korea where long-standing regi nal strife could at any moment directly engage our military forces. Thus, even as we adapt the size, posture, and deployment planning for America's armed forces to the dramatic changes of our strategic center of gravity, the broad thrust of long-familiar policy tenets will still obtain. Nuclear deterrence, collective security, forward presence, power projection, security assistance, counter-terrorism, anti-drug support, and arms control will continue to describe the central thrusts and concerns of national security strategy.

In many respects, the recasting of military strategy has been very much like painting the proverbial moving train—the cars are familiar, but they refuse to stand still as powerful new forces fuel the boiler of the strategic locomotive. But we know where this train is headed, and that the passengers are in competent hands.

NOTES

1. Speech by President George Bush at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., 2 August 1990.
2. See remarks by General Powell to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 22 June 1990 (*Defense Issues*, Vol. 5, No. 30); and his remarks at the National Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Ind., 30 August 1990 (*Defense Issues*, Vol. 5, No. 41).

Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited: Working with the Media

RICHARD HALLORAN

After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in his book, *Crusade in Europe*: "The commander in the field must never forget that it is his duty to cooperate with the heads of his government in the task of maintaining a civilian morale that will be equal to every purpose."[1] The principal agency to accomplish that task, the general said, was the press. He asserted that the commander should recognize the political leaders' mission in the war and assist them in carrying it out. Throughout his military campaigns, General Eisenhower said, "I found that correspondents habitually responded to candor, frankness, and understanding."[2]

Relations between the military forces and the press have come a long way since those thoughtful and temperate words, and most of it has been downhill. In the Gannett Center for Media Studies at Columbia University, Liz Trotta, a veteran television reporter who conducted assessments of military-media relations, said in April 1990 she had concluded "that the relationship between the military and the media is at its most distant and cantankerous since the Civil War."[3] That was before the deployment of American forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where coverage, in the early days at least, seemed balanced. In Washington, the press occasionally sniped at President Bush's policy but generally the coverage reflected the public's support for him.

Even so, the ill will between the military and the press will probably continue unabated. One reason is that the Vietnam generation has come of age in journalism, as in the military service and other sectors of American life. Newspapers and television in the United States today are run largely by people

who sat out the war in Vietnam or actively opposed the American engagement. This generation is either apathetic about American soldiers and sailors or openly antagonistic to anything connected with military power. Consequently, even as many correspondents seek to play it straight, some of today's military reporting and editing borders on intellectual dishonesty.

Nevertheless, soldiers cannot avoid dealing with the scribblers of the press or the talking heads of television. To think otherwise would be naive. After a dinner with senior officers at Fort Leavenworth several years ago, a colonel challenged a correspondent: "Why should I bother with you? My job is to train troops to go to war." It was a pertinent question. On the positive side, as General Eisenhower pointed out, the press is a vital channel of communication within Clausewitz's trinity of government, the army, and the people. The scribblers squirt grease into that machinery to help make it go. On the negative side, the scribblers can also throw sand into the machinery. If military officers refuse to respond to the press, they are in effect abandoning the field to critics of the armed forces. That would serve neither the nation nor the military services. In this situation, the initiative must come mostly from military officers because the scribblers own the presses, buy ink by the 55-gallon drum, and have shown little inclination in recent years to develop professional relations with soldiers.

As Elie Abel, the TV correspondent and later dean of Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism, once wrote about the press: "Its instinctive rejection of self-improvement schemes as far back as the Hutchins Commission in 1947 leaves little room for hope of wholesale reform."[4] Thus officers should accept the press as it is, whether that seems fair or not. They should learn to work with this flawed institution and seek over time to persuade journalists to be aware of military concerns. What follows, then, is one scribbler's suggested guidance to military officers on dealing with the press and television. Most of these suggestions apply in war, contingency operations, and peace.

• **Quit Bellyaching**. An anti-press bias akin to the mindless hostility of anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism runs through much of the officer corps today. Part of the cause is, obviously, the search for a scapegoat for the defeat

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in Vietnam. Curiously, that antipathy is often more virulent among younger officers who never served in Vietnam than among more mature officers.

More disdain is generated by the traditional suspicion of soldiers for civilians, in this case for civilians who write critically or expose things that soldiers would prefer to be kept secret. Still more appears to arise from ignorance among officers of the First Amendment and the role of the press in America. And not a small amount is a reaction to excesses in certain elements of the press and television.

Like other citizens, military officers are surely entitled to their opinions. But the constant outpouring of vitriol upon the press does little to protect the armed forces from the abuses of the press or to provide for a professional working relationship with journalists who play it straight. In sum, bellyaching about the press is much like cursing at a Sunday school picnic: It sounds like hell and doesn't do a damn bit of good.

• **Never Lie**. In a luncheon address to the National Press Club in October 1988, General Colin L. Powell, then the President's National Security Adviser, said: "I do not believe a public official, . . . having sworn an oath to the Constitution and the people of the United States, has any part in any set of circumstances to lie, either to Congress or to the press."[5] The General was right, idealistically and practically. Lying to the press is not important in itself. But an officer lying through the press to the people he has sworn to defend soils his uniform and violates the time-honored code dictating that officers do not lie, cheat, or steal.

Moreover, the liar will most likely get caught sooner or later, as witness Rear Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. No good reporter takes information from one source; rather, he checks with as many sources as possible to confirm and round out the story. Further, there is always tomorrow for a reporter to discover and correct today's lies or bad information. When that happens, the liar can expect to see his name in print. The fact of his lie will spread and he will lose his credibility, rendering him useless to his service and the armed forces as a source of information. Nor should an officer lie if asked about classified information; he can say: "I'm not at liberty to discuss that subject." The standard policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons could be used as an example in other cases.

Since deception is a basic principle of war, what about lying to deceive the enemy? That is not permissible when it goes through the press and deceives American citizens. The lie would not only be dishonorable but would erode the credibility of the military service once the lie has been discovered. But what if a lie is deemed necessary to save the lives of troops? I suggest taking the reporter aside to tell him the truth, warning him of the clear and present danger to life if he prints the story in question. Avoid the tired catchall "national security." It is vague and has been abused so often that

no reporter worth his salt will pay attention. If that warning does not work, get a senior general or civilian official to call the top editor or producer. The history of the American press is replete with examples of sensitive information being voluntarily withheld for good reason, though this fact is not widely known. If a publication refuses to withhold the information—and there are a few that would refuse—the only recourse is for the military to change its operational plans. In such cases, the operation has probably already been compromised anyway.

What if an officer is ordered to lie? Treat that as any other illicit order, pointing out why it would be wrong, appealing to higher authority if necessary, and being prepared to take the consequences if the · rder stands. It is a sad commentary on the state of military ethics that this issue need be addressed at all. But it is necessary because many officers have suggested that lying to the press would be permissible.

• **MYOB**. The time-tested advice to mind your own business, often applied in other contexts, works here. Officers will rarely misstep if, in interviews with the press, they stick to what they know and to subjects appropriate to their rank and position.

The unfortunate case of General Michael J. Dugan, the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is instructive. General Dugan, interviewed by three reporters aboard a plane returning from Saudi Arabia, got fired because Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney thought the General had overstepped the mark. Mr. Cheney asserted that the General, who spoke on the record, had discussed strategic decisions that were not his to make, had disclosed classified information, and had commented on the operations of other services. Senior Air Force officers said later the journalists had abided by agreed ground rules and normal journalistic practices, and even checked with the general's staff to ascertain that he had been quoted accurately and in context.

General Dugan's remarks, which appeared in Sunday editions of *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*, were promptly disavowed on a television news program by Brent Scowcroft, the President's National Security Adviser. The next day General Dugan was dismissed in a penalty that, in this writer's view, was unduly harsh. The nation, the military services, and the Air Force lost because General Dugan had come to office armed with a plan intended to tell the Air Force's story better. His approach was a breath of fresh air after the stifling policy of his predecessor, General Larry D. Welch.

Ironically, in the same Sunday edition of the *Los Angeles Times* containing the report on General Dugan was an interview with Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono, who was also confronted with some sensitive issues. But General Vuono, asked about a residual force staying in Saudi Arabia, said, "I'm not going to get into that." Queried on a political issue, the General said, "I'm not going to comment." But asked about the shape of the

Army over the next five years, General Vuono gave an answer that many in Congress might not like: "If we're forced to take some of the deep cuts that some folks have talked about, and you're not going to have a trained and ready Army, the nation is going to be the loser."[6]

The lesson to be drawn from this comparison—a comparison intended not to be invidious in any way—is this: Do not avoid the press, but when talking with correspondents stick to what is proper for soldiers to talk about.

Some years ago, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, not wanting to answer a question I had asked, leaned back in his chair and said: "Dick, the First Amendment gives you every right to ask that question. But there's nothing in the First Amendment that says I have to answer it."

• **Develop an IFF.** With devices known as "Identification, Friend or Foe," soldiers determine who is an ally and who an enemy. In the same way, an officer should always know to whom he or she is talking in the press. Is the reporter experienced in military matters or a novice? Do the reporter and his editors play it straight, or do they have their own agenda? It's easy to get a line on a reporter and publication or TV station because the track record is there for everyone to see. If the reporter is not known in Camp Swampy, a few phone calls into the network of public affairs officers should produce a clear picture.

Many officers, infected with the pervasive anti-press virus, fail to distinguish between journalists who play it straight and those who don't. Therefore they needlessly antagonize those who seek to render honest accounts. Officers should thus respond to experienced, reputable reporters in a courteous, straightforward manner. Approach a novice or sloppy journalist carefully. Refuse to truck with hostile muckrakers unless you absolutely must.

• **Differentiate.** During the deployment of battalions from the 82d Airborne and 7th Divisions to Honduras in March 1988, the Army herded a gaggle of print and TV reporters, still photographers, and cameramen into a chopper and dropped them on a hapless company in the field. It was a mess. Reporters stumbled over one another, cameramen and photographers shoved each other, and the troops were bewildered by the turmoil. It would have been far better to have sorted the gaggle into groups with similar interests and spread them out among different units.

Too many officers, including public affairs officers who should know better, lump all journalists together whether they are from print or television, from general papers or trade magazines, from the newsroom or editorial board, or from the ranks of columnists or straight reporters. In reality, journalists are as different as paratroopers and tankers, soldiers and sailors. They have different needs and ways of working. In simple terms, newspaper reporters need to talk to people while a television team needs pictures. Too often officers are so caught up in getting camera positions for television people that they don't have time to answer real questions from the print reporters.

• **Set Firm Ground Rules**. Before you begin talking with a journalist, have a specific understanding on the rules of engagement. Since no two journalists or officials agree on the exact meaning of code words, be precise. "On the record" means you can be quoted by name, rank, and serial number. After that it gets fuzzy; perhaps the most misunderstood term is "off the record." For many officers, it means merely: "Don't quote or identify me." But "off the record" really means the correspondent may not report the information nor use it to pry out information elsewhere. Go off the record only with a reporter you trust; never go off the record with a group of reporters. Off the record should be confined to private conversations intended to clarify a point, to explain something that cannot be made public, to keep the reporter from stumbling into a mistake. Most good reporters will not agree to go off the record except with sources they trust not to sandbag them.

"Background" usually means something like "a senior Army officer" or "a policymaking Pentagon official." "Deep background" was crafted to permit reporters to use information without leaving any trace of the source; this insidious form of sourcing allows officials to float viewpoints without taking responsibility for them. But it has become ingrained in Washington, largely because the press acquiesces.

If you violate ground rules to which you have agreed, expect to see your name in print. Sources cannot speak without attribution one day and then deny the story the next day. If a reporter violates the ground rules, chew his butt, report it to his superiors and competitors, and never speak to him again.

• **Speak English**. Every profession has its own jargon—law, medicine, military service, even journalism. Specialized language may ease communication within a profession, although that is debatable when acronyms intended to speed communication become so arcane as to require dictionaries.

Jargon, however, impedes communication with the outside world. Thus, speak to the press in plain English and be prepared to explain the meaning of military language. Be especially alert to inexperienced reporters who may be diffident about showing their ignorance. But be prepared for more seasoned correspondents to interrupt you in mid-sentence to ask for an explanation.

Be particularly careful in briefings for journalists. Military briefings are intended to transmit large doses of information in a compact time. But that format sometimes overwhelms the listener, especially if he or she is not experienced in such briefings. It can go a long way toward ensuring accuracy if the briefer provides a hard copy of the slides. This allows the reporter to concentrate his note-taking on the briefer's remarks.

Robert Sims, a top Navy public affairs officer and later Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, gave the best advice in a book about the Pentagon press corps: "Precision is the vital ingredient in the relationship."[7]

● **Anticipate.** At the public roll-out of the M-1 Abrams tank, the vehicle was put through its paces, including a run up a steep ramp. When the tank stopped just below the lip of the ramp, some reporters thought it had stalled. That sent Army officers, who had failed to anticipate the question, scurrying about explaining that the test had come off as planned.

Journalists do not see the world as soldiers see it. Yet officers who spend their careers making estimates of the situation get caught off guard by the press every day. Officers for whom making contingency plans is second nature are rarely ready to combat leaks or unfavorable publicity. For all senior officers, I suggest a check: before you sign off on a decision, ask yourself what it will look like on the front page of tomorrow's newspaper. If it will look good, fine. If not, reconsider the decision. If it's necessary nonetheless, prepare to defend it if it becomes public. Do not wait until it becomes news to start dealing with adverse reactions.

In addition, be prepared for leaked or adversarial accounts to be incomplete and out of context. In some cases, the best defense may be a preemptive strike by announcing the decision. Even if it is not of immediate interest to the press, which is a hard judgment for soldiers to make, you will have erred on the side of prudence. If the decision later becomes controversial, you can point to the earlier effort to make it known.

Public affairs officers should advise their commanders to anticipate. But too many PAOs sit on their duffs waiting for things to happen instead of gathering intelligence on news about to break.

● **React Faster.** It is an imperfect world and even officers who anticipate will sometimes get blindsided by an adverse leak or a critical report. Responsible reporters will call the military for a defense or rebuttal; responsible officers will make sure the reporters get it before the sun goes down. If not by then, any rebuttal will be lost in the wind. One afternoon in Washington, critics of the Navy put out a report asserting that the new Aegis cruiser was top-heavy and might capsize in a storm. Calls to the Navy for comment or evidence to refute the charge went unanswered for more than 24 hours. By that time, the story had come and gone and the Navy never caught up with it.

If an irresponsible reporter prints a story without getting your side of it, a simple denial the next day will not do. Find a way to plow new ground and thus warrant another story with fresh information, including your side of yesterday's story. When something goes wrong—a training accident, for example—don't wait for the first phone call. Get the facts, work up the best explanation you can at the time, and go public. Announce that not all the information is in and tell reporters that the episode will surely look different as it develops.

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, did a masterful job of briefing the press a few hours after the cruiser *Vincennes* mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner. Throughout his briefing,

the Admiral warned that the findings were preliminary and that many questions remained unanswered. Unsophisticated accounts later tried to make much of what proved to be erroneous information, but the good reporters noted only that the account had changed as better information came in.

• **Leak.** At a seminar with the National Security Fellows at Harvard, an Air Force officer asked: "You say that officers should be ethical and not lie to the press. But you advocate leaking to the press. Isn't that contradictory? Isn't leaking a form of lying or cheating?" It was an incisive question and the answer is a tough call. A fine line runs between educating journalists and leaking to them. The first means giving correspondents the general background they need to improve their coverage. Leaks, however, are connected with specific issues and are intended to influence the course of events.

Judicious leaking is permissible; otherwise, you leave the field to critics. A permissible leak is straightforward, factual, in context. Understand that a good reporter will not run with just what you tell him but will use the leak to pry out more information elsewhere to round out the story. It is impermissible to leak if the information is false or misleading, would slander someone, or would be personally self-serving. It would also probably get the leaker into trouble once the checks have been made and the leak proven false.

• **Yell About Mistakes.** Journalists, being human and fallible, make mistakes, some more than others. Do not let them pass. If mistakes are allowed to stand, they will be compounded by later stories and in data banks. More important, editors and reporters learn no lessons when mistakes are allowed to go by. The first step is to ask the reporter to run a correction, either in a place set aside for that or in the next day's article if it is a running story. The correction is more likely to be put into context in a story than in the corrections column. If the reporter refuses, go to his boss. If that doesn't work, go to the top editor. If you are still not satisfied, call up the competitors. There's little one reporter would rather do than catch his competitor in a mistake.

• **To Pool or Not to Pool?** After the ruckus over the exclusion of the press from Grenada in 1983, the Pentagon organized a press pool that was to be called out to cover contingency operations. From the beginning, the concept was flawed by basic differences in the way the press and the Pentagon looked at the pool. Those flaws surfaced in Panama in 1989 and left serious doubts as to whether the pool should survive. Most journalists see a pool as a temporary expedient when access is limited. For example, a small pool travels with the President on Air Force One because the entire White House press corps can't fit aboard. A pool is set up for a single mission. The task of the members is to gather information and to pass it on to the rest of the press as soon as possible. Most important, the pool self-destructs as soon as full coverage begins.

From the Pentagon's perspective, however, the pool has been a way to limit access, to control coverage, and to minimize the burden of having

reporters around. Communications, the lifeblood of correspondents in the field, have been largely ignored. All of that came out in Panama, where the pool was a miserable failure. When it was over, Fred Hoffman, the former Associated Press correspondent in the Pentagon and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in the Reagan Administration, was asked to determine why the pool had failed.

His report was scathing. Mr. Hoffman laid much of the blame on Mr. Pete Williams, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, for "less than effective leadership and performance."[8] There was no public affairs plan when the operation was mounted, the pool was called out too late to cover the decisive assaults, and unit commanders in the field "had no idea" of what the pool was all about.

Mr. Hoffman said military leaders played no part in the decision to delay activating the pool and quoted General Maxwell R. Thurman, the SOUTHCOM commander, as saying: "I think we made a mistake by not having some of the press pool in with the 18th Airborne Corps so they could move with the troops."[9] Pentagon officials said later that General Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unhappy with the pool arrangement in Panama and had taken a strong hand in seeking to put things right. But when Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia was mounted in 1990, the Pentagon delayed again in calling out the pool because the Saudi government was not keen on press coverage. After that was straightened out, the pool worked fairly well until its dissolution when full coverage began.

Conclusion: The entire concept should be reexamined from top to bottom. Mr. Hoffman suggested such scrutiny in his report, but the response from the Pentagon was lukewarm and the prospects for the pool ever working are dim.

• **Forget Media Days.** The "media days" held by the war colleges and intermediate military schools in which reporters are invited to discuss military-press relations have been, with rare exceptions, a waste of time. Officers posture by wrapping themselves in the flag and journalists do likewise by standing on the pedestal of the First Amendment. The sessions end in mutual bloodletting with no communication, no one's mind changed, and more ill will when the antagonists are pulled apart.

Moreover, the wrong people are talking to each other. Lieutenant colonels and commanders on one side and frontline reporters and television producers on the other can't do much to improve matters. The people who need to get into this struggle are generals and admirals and senior editors and producers, the people with the authority to change things.

A suggested substitute for media days would be to have a service chief invite ten or a dozen top editors and producers to Washington for a day. The Chief, the Vice Chief. and the senior staff, including the Chief of Public Affairs, would air their concerns about the press and television in a calm and

professional manner. They would then invite the senior journalists to bring up their problems in covering the military services.

To follow up, the commandant of the service's war college could invite managing and assistant managing editors for a similar session at Carlisle Barracks, Maxwell AFB, or Newport. Still another follow-up would have the service's Chief of Public Affairs meet with press and television bureau chiefs in Washington. The whole process could be repeated every year or two.

• **Educate Officers.** In a moment of pleasantry before beginning an interview, a three-star general asked a reporter whether he got paid by the word or the article. The general was surprised to learn that staff journalists are paid salaries, just like soldiers, and that they are paid whether they write that day or not. Many military people haven't the foggiest notion of how the press and television operate and why. (In fairness, neither do some journalists.) Little is taught about the press in the military academies or ROTC programs and even less as the officer progresses through his military education.

To rectify this situation, the services might insert a three-hour block of instruction into courses for junior officers. It would cover the First Amendment, the press as a diverse institution, and what a public affairs officer is. At mid-level courses, a four-hour block would expand on the role of the press in peace and war, on differences in dealing with the press and television, and on how to talk to a reporter. Handling classified or sensitive information vis-à-vis the press would get particular attention.

At the war colleges. instruction would include an eight-hour block on political issues, practice sessions in working with reporters, and case studies in which officers did well or stubbed their toes. Lastly, generals-to-be would get some constructive indoctrination on press relations when they attend charm school before having their stars pinned on, certainly more than a few hours coaching on the tactics and gamesmanship of dealing with reporters.

• **Educate Journalists.** Defense industry executives who assembled at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington were wailing the usual litany about press coverage. Finally a reporter asked how many of them had ever invited the editor of the local paper out to the plant for coffee. Only a half-dozen raised their hands.

Since military officers and defense executives do little to educate the journalists assigned to cover them, their first encounters often come only after all hell has broken loose. Then the executives or officers are confronted with a bunch of demanding, competitive, and often rude strangers. How much better it would be if a post commander or chief of staff invited the editor for lunch to talk over what was going on at Camp Swampy and to learn what the editor had on his mind—all before a crisis; or if the public affairs officer had invited a reporter out for a day of briefings and informal looking around, with neither expecting a story to come out of the visit.

That sort of education generates more understanding of military life, makes for better stories, and, when the crunch comes, produces a journalist willing to listen before rushing to judgment in print or on the tube. Such educational sessions are best done one-on-one or with a small group of compatible people. A large gaggle of reporters from newspapers, television, radio, and the trade magazines usually doesn't work because the briefings get to be canned, a schedule must be followed, and everyone has a different set of questions.

• **Support Public Affairs Officers.** Journalists are sometimes asked which service has the best PAOs. Truth, and a sense of survival because a correspondent must work with them all, dictates this answer: Each service has its share of first-class, competent, dedicated public affairs officers. Unhappily, each service also has its share of time-servers who go through the mechanical motions of public affairs.

The most important element in the relationship between a journalist and a PAO is the policy of the PAO's commander. A commander with an open attitude communicates that tone to his subordinates and enables the PAO to do his job. A commander who wants a palace guard will get it, and with it, most likely, a bundle of bad press clippings. The commander should demand the assignment of a competent PAO and listen to him as with any other staff officer. Equally important, when things beyond the PAO's reach go wrong, and they will, the commander must protect him against wrath from above, just as he would protect another staff officer.

A final observation: The Army and Marine Corps require young officers to spend time with troops before becoming public affairs officers. That seasons them and gives them credibility. The Navy and Air Force, in contrast, make PAOs out of young officers who, while they may be fine people, lack the feel of the deck or the flight line. They are too inexperienced to do much more than pass out press releases.

NOTES

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Crusade in Europe" (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p. 299.
2. Ibid., p. 300.
3. Liz Trotta, Seminar Transcript, Gannett Center for Media Studies, Columbia University, New York, 11 April 1990, p. 40.
4. Elie Abel, "Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits? At What Cost?" Twentieth Century Fund Paper (New York: Priority Press, 1987), p. 68.
5. As quoted in "Gen. Powell Says NSC Again 'Moral Operation,'" *The Washington Post*, 28 October 1988, p. A3.
6. As quoted in the *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1990, p. M3.
7. Robert B. Sim ., *The Pentagon Reporters* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1983), p. 150.
8. Fred S. Hoffman, "Review of the Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989," Memorandum for Correspondents, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 20 March 1990, p. 1.
9. Ibid., p. 3.

Embargoes in Historical Perspective

ROBERT A. DOUGHTY and HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR.

Much of the analysis in open sources has been extremely optimistic about whether the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations against Iraq could have succeeded. Many analysts believe that the embargo eventually would have weakened Iraq, compelling Baghdad to accede to the UN's wishes without the necessity for armed intervention by Kuwait's allies. Operation Desert Storm launched by the multinational forces against Iraq in the early morning hours of 16 January 1991 has made a complete test of the embargo impossible. Historical experience, however, suggests that optimistic assumptions concerning the embargo may not be valid. Most blockades and embargoes have failed to force an opponent to yield, and states establishing an embargo—in an attempt to make it more effective—have been drawn on some occasions toward an undesirable strategy or course of action that otherwise may not have been chosen. To make matters more complicated, the effects of an embargo or the threat of an effective embargo have sometimes triggered acts of desperation from a state that believed it had no alternative.

Thus, history suggests that the United Nations' embargo would not have reduced Iraq's will to resist, particularly over a short period, and would not have compelled Hussein to leave Kuwait docilely. Instead, the embargo may have pulled the United States and its allies in unanticipated directions or may have contributed to Hussein's choosing an aggressive or radical action such as the surprise use of chemical weapons.

Leaking Embargoes

Though used frequently throughout history, embargoes or blockades have provided very uneven results. Economic sanctions have achieved the most success when the goals of the state imposing them have been modest and have achieved notably less effective results when the goals have been ambitious.[1] As

the historian Frederic Smoler pointed out recently, embargoes have not always forced a belligerent to yield, even when they have had significant effects on its economy.[2]

For example, while the Union naval blockade of the Confederate States during the American Civil War had a devastating effect on the South's economy, it did not weaken the South's war effort as much as is sometimes thought. The Union blockade sharply curtailed the South's importation of manufactured goods and caused severe inflation. The most ruinous effect was on the export of Confederate cotton, which fell from 2.8 million bales during the 11 months from September 1860 to August 1861 (when the blockade was actually established), to some 400,000 bales during the remainder of the war.[3]

While this extreme disruption of the South's economy was occurring, significant amounts of military materiel managed to slip through the Union naval forces. During the six months preceding December 1864, the Confederate seaports of Charleston, South Carolina, and Wilmington, North Carolina, alone received from Europe over 500,000 pairs of shoes, 300,000 blankets, 3.5 million pounds of meat, 1.5 million pounds of lead, 2 million pounds of saltpeter, 50,000 rifles, and 43 cannons, plus large amounts of other essential items.[4] The South imported numerous other items during the war, including more than 60 percent of its total weapons, one-third of the lead required for its bullets, and three-fourths of the saltpeter required for its gunpowder. The Union naval blockade of the Confederate States was, therefore, of limited success. In a recent study of Southern blockade running, Stephen R. Wise concluded: "The Confederate soldiers had the equipment and food needed to meet their adversaries. . . . Defeat did not come from the lack of material; instead the Confederacy simply no longer had the manpower to resist, and the nation collapsed."[5]

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Another embargo that failed, but for different reasons, was that imposed upon Italy during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935.[6] After Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, 50 of the 54 members of the League of Nations agreed to embargo exports to Italy of arms, rubber, iron ore, and important metals. The League's members also agreed to prohibit Italian imports and to provide her nó loans or credits. Despite these sanctions, other important commodities—especially oil, pig iron, steel, and coal—were not banned from export to Italy, primarily because of the unwillingness of the British and French to tighten the economic noose further. Moreover, supplies continued to flow to Italy from Germany. Though the League considered imposing an oil embargo, sanctions were finally abandoned in 1936 when it became clear that Abyssinia could not be saved and that League members were unwilling to take the more assertive step of placing oil and other key materials on the list of embargoed items.[7] Ultimately, the embargo failed because self interests prevailed over collective interests. The end of sanctions against Italy marked a severe weakening of the League's influence in international affairs.

Similarly, the Allied blockade in World War II failed to drive Germany to her knees even though it severely disrupted her economy. Shortly after the war began, the Allies recognized that a blockade would deprive Germany of essential war supplies, and they quickly closed the North Sea to all enemy shipping. Within weeks the vast majority of Germany's overseas trading had been halted by the Allies, particularly by the Royal Navy.[8] Nonetheless, the Germans continued to receive raw materials and food, and their economy continued to produce sufficient equipment and supplies for the war effort. Until the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, important grain and petroleum supplies came from that source,[9] and after the invasion raw materials and goods continued to flow into Germany from the areas under Berlin's immediate control and from nearby neutral nations. Even the massive strategic bombing offensives by the Allies failed to choke off the expanding German economy, which did not reach maximum levels of production until the autumn of 1944.[10]

The most important reasons for the blockade's having fallen so far short of the high hopes placed on it have been offered by Alan S. Millward, who has pointed out that the "tools" for implementing the blockade were not as "efficient" as envisaged.[11] The Germans proved to be exceptionally adept at developing synthetic substitutes for those items—such as oil—that were curbed. Synthetics provided 32 percent of Germany's total oil supplies in 1940 and 47 percent in 1944.[12] Even after weaknesses in the German economy—such as the shortage of oil—were discovered, the Allies failed to focus sufficient effort on these weaknesses to compound their effect. Of 509,206 tons of Allied bombs dropped by May 1944, only 5670 tons (or 1.1 percent) were directed against German petroleum targets.[13] Another factor in the Nazis'

favor was that they recognized their vulnerability and accumulated large stores of strategic materials. Finally, the German economy and the international economy proved to be far more complex than initially recognized by Allied planners. Most notably, international trade continued despite the division of most of the world into two armed camps, and the Germans continued to receive small but important supplies. Thus, despite a strong blockade and a heavy bombing campaign, the German economy continued to produce or obtain critical war supplies until the very end. Perhaps the most important effect of the blockade and the strategic bombing campaign was that it caused the Germans to divert resources into air defenses and to disperse their factories and means of production, thus preventing their arms production from being even greater than it was.[14]

Other instances abound. During the two World Wars, the Germans attempted to restrict the flow of food into Great Britain, but despite shortages the British war effort in both instances remained essentially unscathed. When the United States established an embargo in 1973 on the export of wheat to the Soviet Union, the main result was greater sales by Canada and Australia.[15] Other recent embargoes, such as those against Rhodesia, South Africa, and Cuba, have also had limited effect. As Professor Smoler has noted, "Greediness, neediness, misplaced loyalty, and fear make embargoes and blockades leak."[16]

Sealing a Leaking Embargo

When embargoes begin to leak, leaders of the imposing side may decide to seal the leaks, even though preventing or sealing leaks can become an extraordinarily onerous task. Ultimately, they may find themselves in a worse situation than when they established the embargo. An example occurred during the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. Following the declaration of war against the British by the French National Convention in 1793, the British blockaded France and her allies. Since the area under the control of France and her allies permitted her to remain self-sufficient in food and armaments, Great Britain did not attempt to destroy her enemy by starvation or by depriving her of essential war-making goods. Rather, her objective was to weaken France's economy and reduce her commerce and shipping by chasing the French merchant marine from the high seas.[17] By doing this, Great Britain sought simply to reduce the war-making powers of France and to improve her own position in the world's markets.

Partially in response to Great Britain's blockade and the near total destruction of the French fleet by the British at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon established the Continental System in November 1806. His system was essentially a countervailing "landward continental blockade against British commerce."[18] By preventing Great Britain from exporting her goods to the continent, Napoleon sought to increase France's economic influence throughout Europe and

> *"Greediness, neediness, misplaced loyalty, and fear make embargoes leak."*

to weaken Great Britain's commerce, credit, and revenues. He believed that the Continental System could enable Europe—under the hegemony of France—to become economically more powerful and self-sufficient, thereby enabling France to expand her influence at the expense of Great Britain.

The ineffectiveness of Napoleon's Continental System can be demonstrated by an assessment of Great Britain's imports and exports during this period. Between 1808 and 1809 British domestic exports to northern Europe increased from £2.2 million to £5.7 million, and exports of colonial produce rose from £3.3 million to £8.9 million.[19] During the first few years of the Continental System, agricultural production in Great Britain, especially of wheat, was very good, but a series of poor harvests, starting in 1809, required huge wheat imports. In 1810, Great Britain's wheat imports reached a record high figure of 12.5 million bushels, with 1.8 million bushels being imported, ironically, from France. Throughout the Napoleonic wars, the import of raw cotton and export of cotton products remained a major component of Britain's industrial economy. During the period 1803-1806, immediately preceding the imposition of the Continental System, imports of raw cotton averaged 58.4 million pounds per year; in the period 1807-1812 cotton imports averaged 83.1 million pounds per year, an increase of 42 percent. Exports of cotton goods during 1803-1806 averaged £8.2 million in value per year, and increased to £14.3 million per year during 1807-1812.[20] Napoleon's Continental System was thus very unsuccessful in its attempts to instigate Great Britain's internal economic collapse.

Even though difficulties existed with both the British blockade and the French Continental System from the moment they were established, the problems were most serious for the French, leading Napoleon into several disastrous military campaigns. To ensure that British goods could not be brought into Europe, Napoleon was drawn into bloody fighting on the Iberian Peninsula from 1808 to 1813 and into the fateful invasion of Russia in June 1812. His decision to invade Russia occurred after Russia formally withdrew from the Continental System in December 1810 and resumed commercial relations with Great Britain. This action infuriated Napoleon, who saw it as a challenge to his authority and prestige. In June 1812 he led his *Grande Armée* into the vast spaces of the east. Of the more than 600,000 troops who followed Napoleon into Russia, fewer than 100,000 returned.[21]

Thus, maintaining the "landward continental blockade" drew Napoleon into a series of subsequent decisions and campaigns that he undoubtedly never envisaged when the original decision was made. Had he foreseen the difficulties of the Iberian Campaign and the Russian invasion, he may never have established the Continental System.

Choosing a Desperate Course of Action

In those cases when an embargo is effective or appears to have the potential to be effective, a state suffering from the embargo may adopt a radical strategy and embark on a desperate course of action. Forced to choose between the slow strangulation of their country or an extremely risky operation, leaders have sometimes chosen seemingly undesirable alternatives. Viewed most positively, this could be considered an indicator of an embargo's success, for the selection of a radical alternative has usually pushed the embargoed country down a disastrous path. On the other hand, reckless actions clearly raise the stakes for all belligerents, and their outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty.

An example can be found during World War I, when the Allied embargo created conditions that led German leaders to launch the unrestricted U-boat campaign of 1917 and the desperate spring offensive of 1918. The blockade, which began on 20 August 1914, quickly reduced the supply of important items normally shipped to and from Germany.[22] Partially as a response to the British blockade, the Germans launched their own blockade and began, in October 1914, the indiscriminate laying of mines on the high seas and the mining of the entrances to Allied commercial harbors and naval bases. In February 1915 the Germans initiated their first submarine warfare campaign on commercial vessels, and the British reacted the following month by expanding their embargo and bringing into British ports any goods for which the destination, ownership, or origin was presumed to be hostile.[23] In March 1915, the British added food to the list of contraband materials, and thus the naval blockade of Germany became total. Although Germany began achieving success with her U-boats against British shipping, the sinking of several ships which carried American citizens outraged the United States, which threatened to hold Berlin to "strict accountability" for its violation of American neutrality rights. Germany saw no choice in September 1915 but to abandon unrestricted submarine warfare.[24]

Meanwhile, the effects of the blockade began to strangle Germany's economy and war-making effort. She was dependent on imports of food, fats, oils, and chemicals such as nitrates. As vital war-making goods became scarce or unavailable, German scientists developed substitute materials to take the place of supplies unavailable to the German war economy. Due to a lack of imported fertilizers, however, the yields of German harvests diminished

greatly. The wheat harvest fell from 4.4 million tons in 1913 to under 3 million tons in 1916, and the rye harvest also fell sharply, from 11.2 million tons in 1913 to 8.9 million tons in 1916.[25] In addition to price controls, two meatless days a week were decreed, and a system of rationing was established. The winter of 1916-1917 became known as the "turnip winter" because German citizens were required to eat turnips which were usually fed to cattle.

The civilian German population suffered severely, with well over 50 food riots occurring at different locations throughout Germany in 1916. One analyst has attributed to the blockade the deaths of more than 750,000 German civilians during the war.[26] As the huge losses and costs of the war mounted, and as the pressure of decreasing food supplies took its toll, war weariness intensified among the public. German leaders soon concluded that desperate actions were necessary if Germany was to achieve victory before she was completely paralyzed by the blockade.[27]

As German leaders considered the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, they recognized that the United States would probably be brought into the war, but they chose to risk American intervention in exchange for the use of a strategic weapon they believed could provide victory. In January 1917, Germany notified the United States and the Allies of the resumption of unrestricted submarine attacks, and after several attacks on American ships, the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Despite huge losses in Allied shipping, Great Britain continued her important role in the war, and thousands of American soldiers soon began disembarking in France. To the dismay of German leaders, the use of convoys and other defensive measures by the Allies prevented the U-boat campaign from achieving decisive results.

The worsening strategic situation encouraged the German High Command to undertake a great offensive on the western front in the spring of 1918. General Erich Ludendorff believed that Germany had to achieve a major victory and thus force the Allied powers to recognize that continuing the war offered no chance of success, even if the Americans were beginning to arrive. He concluded that there was no alternative except to launch a final desperate offensive with the hope that a great victory would quiet the despair in the German population.[28] The 1918 offensives failed, however, as huge numbers of American soldiers arrived to participate in the final Allied counteroffensives. An exhausted Germany surrendered in November 1918, months earlier than some of the Allies' most optimistic forecasts. Thus, through a series of unforeseen ripple effects, the German gamble to overcome the embargo yielded ultimate disaster rather than success.

The American embargo against Japan on the eve of World War II also seems to have stimulated a radical strategic choice on the part of Tokyo. The conflict between the United States and Japan in the Pacific was rooted in the

juxtaposition of their interests and in Japan's pursuit of what was called the "New Order in East Asia" or the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Tensions between the United States and Japan steadily increased in the late 1930s until the United States began in July 1940 to limit the export of selected strategic materials to Japan—scrap iron, steel, and most oil products. After the Japanese announced in July 1941 the establishment of a protectorate over Indochina, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States and cutting off all exports of oil to Japan.[29] The Japanese depended on the United States for more than half of their imported oil, and their situation was worsened by the quick agreement of the British and Dutch to support the freeze and the embargo. The Japanese came to view themselves—to use the analogy of Robert H. Ferrell—as a patient who was certain to die if nothing was done, but one who could be "saved by a dangerous operation."[30]

By depriving Japan of her vital oil supplies and metals, the United States and her allies placed Japan in the position of having to choose between fighting for additional oil reserves or abandoning her scheme for a "New Order" in the Pacific. B. H. Liddell Hart has said that the future allies recognized that their action would "force Japan to fight."[31] Just as she had begun her wars in 1894, 1904, and 1914 without a formal declaration of hostilities, Japan attacked American naval forces at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 without warning, inflicting an unprecedented naval disaster on her opponent. Though blockades or embargoes do not always result in an act of recklessness or miscalculation of such apocalyptic consequences, Japan in this case faced the specter of serious materiel shortages.[32] She thus chose a desperate option rather than the abandonment of her grandiose scheme.

In his important work on Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange searched for an explanation for the success of the Japanese surprise attack. While crediting the Japanese for the excellent preparation and execution of their plan, and while acknowledging the Americans' general awareness of the imminence of hostilities, he found nonetheless a "fundamental" American disbelief in the likelihood of a bold Japanese strike. He concluded, "Pearl Harbor demonstrated one enduring lesson: The unexpected can happen and often does."[33]

To Sum Up

The experience of the past thus clearly suggests that blockades or embargoes do not always produce the results originally sought when the decision for action was made. In those cases such as the American South during the Civil War or Germany during World War II, a blockade may leak, or a belligerent may have access to sufficient goods in the area under its own control. History also indicates the improbability of conducting an embargo

that has an immediate effect or attains decisive results by itself within a few months. In particular, the case of Germany during World War I demonstrates that some nations may suffer terribly from a blockade and still continue to resist. One recent study concluded that embargoes with ambitious goals require an average of nearly two years to achieve success.[34] And as a state becomes frustrated with the lack of progress its embargo has imposed on an opponent, its efforts to increase the effectiveness of the embargo—as illustrated by Napoleon's efforts to maintain the Continental System—may also lead to unanticipated results.

On the other side of the equation, shortages or suffering inflicted by an effective embargo, or the threat of such effects, may trigger an act of desperation. As the noose tightens on a state's economy, the victim may pursue a highly risky course of action—such as Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare or Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor—that it otherwise would not have hazarded. While it is true that the consequences of such actions may well be disastrous for the state that makes the gamble, it is also true that the costs will likely be much greater for all concerned. That an opponent could be driven to an act of desperation by an embargo is arguably a sign of the embargo's potency, but it must be borne in mind that the fruits may also be an escalation of the conflict in undesirable and unpredictable ways. Today, with the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, any such escalation could be extremely problematic if not outright dangerous.

The study of the past, however, is not like gazing into a crystal ball, for history provides us insights, not firm and precise visions of the future. Consequently, history does *not* demonstrate conclusively that the United Nations' embargo against Iraq would have failed, that the United States would have taken unwise action to increase its effectiveness, or that Iraq would have lunged out in an unanticipated act of desperation. Given the tightness of the sanctions and the breadth of international support for their continuance, it is conceivable that the embargo may have induced Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or weakened his dictatorial control over Iraq. Nevertheless, historical experience argues against overly optimistic assertions that the United Nations' embargo would have succeeded. It also argues for the prudent maintenance of military readiness to provide a hedge against an embargoed state's resort to rashness and irrationality. Above all, historical experience suggests that embargoes may include actions or reactions that are neither orderly nor predictable and that they are not simple, safe, and controllable substitutes for war.

NOTES

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The Soldier as Ambassador: Maxwell Taylor in Saigon, 1964-65

DOUGLAS KINNARD

On 2 July 1964, 62-year old Maxwell Davenport Taylor stood on the steps of the White House, taking the oath for still another position of public service. In the previous three years he had served as Military Representative of the President (Kennedy) and, under Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, as the dark cloud of Vietnam overshadowed this bright, hot day in Washington, it was Secretary of State Rusk who held the Bible as Taylor became our Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Why had the four-star general exchanged his uniform for a diplomat's suit? And why was he bound for Saigon?

The incumbent Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, had been part and parcel of the Diem overthrow the previous November; since that time the South Vietnam government had been floundering and the Viet Cong had become more of a threat than ever. But the Republican Party needed Lodge to participate in the 1964 presidential campaign, and Johnson needed a new ambassador for this crucial post. Volunteers came, interestingly from members of his cabinet: the Secretary of State himself, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. When JCS Chairman Taylor, somewhat reluctantly, also put his name in the hat, LBJ decided to appoint him. Taylor accepted on the basis that his Saigon assignment would be for only about a year.

Mr. Ambassador

Taylor's letter of instructions from President Johnson—drafted by Taylor himself—was the most powerful charter given an American Ambassador to Vietnam. It read in part:

> As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States Government in South Vietnam. I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate.[1]

Saigon in that summer was not yet overpowered by the American presence, as it would be, say, two years later. Truly the Pearl of the Orient with its tree-lined boulevards, French architecture, and Western culture, it still reminded visitors of Paris. The city of perhaps one and a half million would soon expand dramatically as the war stepped up. Taylor's downtown headquarters (later, when replaced, known as the old embassy) was in a nondescript building, something like a furniture showroom in lower Manhattan. His residence, though, was an impressive white stucco villa in the old residential part of the capital.

Shortly after arriving in Vietnam, Taylor held a staff meeting at which General Westmoreland, the MACV Commander, was present. The new Ambassador set forth these basic goals: achieving political stability in South Vietnam, preventing the enemy from taking over the country, and preparing the government of South Vietnam (GVN) for a counteroffensive against the Viet Cong. And he added:

> The Sino-Soviet bloc is watching attentively the course of events in South Vietnam to see whether subversive insurgency is indeed the form which the "wave of the future" will take. In stating the US objectives in South Vietnam, it is important to note . . . we are not seeking to reunify North and South Vietnam—our objective does not extend beyond enforcing the Geneva Convention of 1954. Failure in Southeast Asia would destroy US influence throughout Asia and severely damage our standing elsewhere throughout the world. It would be the prelude to the loss or neutralization of all of Southeast Asia and the absorption of that area into the Chinese empire.[2]

One thorn in the side of American decisionmakers following the death of Diem, and for several years thereafter, was the so-called revolving door government of South Vietnam. It was particularly painful at the time of Taylor's arrival. The government at the moment was that of General Nguyen Khanh, the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, and the four

generals who served as his principal assistants. Technically, General "Big" Minh was Chief of State, but Khanh had deprived him of any real authority after seizing power in January. Constant changes kept the new Ambassador on a merry-go-round.

On 2 August 1964 came an event that would have a dramatic impact on the war: a North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacked the US destroyer *Maddox* in international waters. Then, on 4 August, North Vietnamese craft were reported to have again attacked the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*, which had joined it. In retaliation, President Johnson decided to strike at the base of the attacking boats, with American carriers launching 64 sorties.

But the more far-reaching result of the North Vietnamese attacks was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed by Congress on 10 August. The vote in the House was 416-0; in the Senate, 88-2. It empowered the President to use whatever force was necessary to assist South Vietnam and the other allies of the United States in Southeast Asia. The resolution, which the National Security Council had been preparing since June, was sitting on the shelf awaiting the proper occasion. It reads in part: "The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."[3] But the Commander in Chief was in the middle of an election campaign. For the moment he put the resolution in his pocket, but it was to reappear with telling effect the following year.

The Autumn Debate

How to maintain political stability in Saigon was still the most crucial issue that autumn of 1964. American decisionmakers felt that in order to make the South Vietnamese government confident of American resolve, we needed to hit the North. Leaders in both Washington and Saigon started debating just what kind of action to embark upon. The principal action officers in Washington were William Bundy at State and John McNaughton at Defense—and in Saigon, Maxwell Taylor.

Just before mid-August the officials in Washington had prepared a draft memorandum that considered a variety of military actions, including sustained air operations against the North. These would begin at the lower end of the

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spectrum and gradually work up—at first tit-for-tat air strikes in reprisal for major communist actions and then, by January, dramatic bombing of targets in North Vietnam, along with the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Taylor favored this strategy on the whole. He did not want any heavy action until January, when the Khanh regime would have had time to stabilize. (And, one supposes, he had in mind that the American presidential election would be over.)

When Taylor made his first return trip to Washington in early September of 1964, he stressed how shaky the Khanh government was.[4] Although fairly pessimistic about the war, he felt that we could not turn back now. After hearing Taylor, the President approved on 10 September NASM 314. The document gave priority to actions within South Vietnam but also approved resuming the clandestine activities along the North Vietnamese coast that had been suspended after the Tonkin Gulf incident. Moreover, it provided for reprisal air raids against North Vietnam in the event of significant actions by the enemy.

During October the 1964 presidential election kept Vietnam policy decisions on the back burner. Then, on the eve of the election, the Viet Cong mortared the airfield at Bien Hoa, destroying or damaging 27 B-57s and killing four Americans. Cabling from Saigon, Taylor urged retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam. He considered this enemy action—deliberate targeting of a major American installation—a turning point in their tactics. Johnson, about to be reelected by a landslide against Goldwater (who was alleged to be trigger-happy), rejected the Ambassador's recommendation.

The President did, however, intervene a couple of days later by establishing an interagency working group chaired by William Bundy of State and John McNaughton of Defense. He asked them to review the situation and, by late November, to come up with an appropriate strategy to discuss with the NSC principals: Rusk, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, John McCone, and JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler. They were to consider these three options: to continue along present lines; to embark quietly on systematic military pressures against the North designed to cause them to opt for negotiations; or to follow an in-between program of more limited and gradual military pressures.[5] During the November review, Ambassador Taylor cabled his own views. Just after mid-month Michael Forrestal went to Saigon to show Taylor the papers being developed, thus giving him a chance to feel out Washington thinking before his next trip there.

Taylor's own summation found a "mounting feeling of war-weariness and hopelessness," particularly in the urban areas of South Vietnam. Yet, for their part, the Viet Cong had shown "an amazing ability to maintain morale" and extraordinary staying power in the face of heavy losses. Without trying to explain reasons, such as ideology, for this Viet Cong toughness, Taylor focused on support from the North.

> We need to do three things: first, establish an adequate government in SVN [South Vietnam]; second, improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; and finally, persuade or force the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] to stop its aid to the Viet-Cong and to use its directive powers to make the Viet-Cong desist from their efforts to overthrow the government of South Viet Nam. If, . . . as hoped, the government maintains and proves itself, then we should be prepared to embark on a methodical program of mounting air attacks. . . . We will leave negotiation initiatives to Hanoi.

Taylor suggested three principles to which the United States should adhere whatever the course of events:

• Do not enter into negotiations until the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is hurting.

• Never let the DRV gain a victory in South Vietnam without having to pay a disproportionate price.

• Keep the South Vietnamese government in the forefront of the campaign and the negotiations.[6]

Reinforcing the work of the Washington group, the Taylor memorandum went at once to LBJ, who was in Texas. Perhaps more than any of the Washington papers, it influenced the President's decisions of early December.

Taylor arrived in Washington on Thanksgiving Day, 26 November 1964. The following afternoon he had a full meeting with Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, Forrestal, and Bill Bundy. The Ambassador told them that he must have a strong message to take back to Saigon. It should combine an expression of American resolve and readiness to take military action with specific stabilizing tasks for the South Vietnamese government to carry out. He felt that this combination, correctly implemented, would bring improvement, though slowly. In this, Taylor differed from Mc-Namara, who was doubtful that the military situation would improve and who was pessimistic about the political side.

The group then turned to Taylor's military approach, consisting of two phases. In the first, to last for a month or two, we would expand American military actions and be prepared to conduct reprisals. In the second phase, we would move to a systematic but gradual program of bombing and other military pressures.

What had to be determined presently, though, was the message for Taylor to take to the leaders in Saigon. The President made clear above all else that he would never consider stronger action against the North unless he was sure that we had done all we could to help in the South. In effect, the President was saying to Taylor: If you want this bombing program, you must get the Saigon political leaders in line. (It was typical of LBJ to give a personal charge to his guidance.) These 1 December discussions were reflected in the instructions to Taylor approved by the President on the 3d. In addition, the

approved document proposed that both South Vietnam and the United States should be ready to execute prompt reprisals for any enemy action of an unusually hostile nature.[7]

Key to the President's message was the statement that the United States was "prepared to consider" a second phase of direct military pressure on Hanoi, to be carried out after the Saigon government was firmly in control of itself. The conditional American intent to start bombing of the North was a big step—going much further than LBJ had previously gone in committing the United States to actions against the North.

After the 1 December meeting came a formal White House statement of a very general nature. Intended to convey a firm basic posture but no more, it said that the President had instructed Ambassador Taylor "to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects."

The Ambassador's subsequent conversations in Saigon carried out to the full Johnson's instruction to "get the message across to everyone." Taylor met first with President Suu, Prime Minister Huong, and General Khanh as commander of the armed forces; then in separate groups with the senior civilians and top military men. Now, more than ever, the United States seemed to be Big Brother, calling the shots; undoubtedly, there was some wounding of South Vietnamese pride.[8]

A Shaky Domino

The month after his return from Washington was a tough period for Ambassador Taylor. Another crisis in the Saigon government resulted in more political upsets. The military was split, and some young generals even kidnaped their older colleagues. All this seemed such a direct repudiation of President Johnson's message that the Ambassador gave the miscreants a severe lecture. But he soon had to concern himself with other matters.

As the political crisis went on, the Viet Cong were continuing their activity, while desertions abounded in the South Vietnamese forces. Then, on 24 December, a violent action against Americans tested the pledge of retaliation made by LBJ earlier that month. This Christmas Eve catastrophe occurred right in downtown Saigon at the Brinks Hotel, quarters for American officers. A Viet Cong squad detonated explosives that killed two Americans and wounded 52 Americans and Vietnamese.

Taylor promptly cabled his recommendation: use the new policy for an air strike just above the 17th parallel. But the President, who was in Texas when the cable arrived, deferred a decision. By the end of December, when Secretary Rusk journeyed to Texas to see LBJ on this, the answer he sent to Taylor was no.

The beginning of 1965 meant the end of the 30-day testing period for the South Vietnamese political climate. Taylor's strong view was that,

notwithstanding Saigon's political weakness, we should go ahead with the gradual bombing program against the North—the second phase of the plan decided on in early December. His point was that we might help stabilize the South Vietnamese government if its leaders saw us taking strong action when needed. Taylor's case for bombing, then, rested on morale and on political performance in the South. He did not feel that either the military results of the bombing or the effect on Hanoi's will would soon lead to a settlement or to putting down the Viet Cong threat.

On 5 January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out to the President that, although the 30 days were up, they had no orders for stronger actions leading up to bombing the North. But LBJ was not ready to make such decisions. He was busy on his domestic program and on messages to go to Congress in late January and February. All other energies were reserved for the celebration of his inauguration on 20 January—Lyndon Johnson's final moment of glory before the darkness of Vietnam enveloped him.

Pleiku and Its Aftermath

In early 1965 a sense of crisis was building in South Vietnam. Clearly gaining in strength, the Viet Cong began operating as battalions and larger units employing Russian- and Chinese-made weapons. The embassy estimated that the Viet Cong had about 30,000 regular troops and 70,000 part-time guerrillas. South Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces were dispirited, and the government in Saigon had become a mélange of factions, all maneuvering for control but none exercising it. To defer American military action while awaiting greater political stability in Saigon seemed less and less a good idea.[9]

Early in January, Westmoreland had sought and received the President's permission for American jets to support South Vietnamese troops on combat missions in border regions. By now the North Vietnamese had deployed up to six main force regiments there. The American involvement was beginning to accelerate. On 27 January, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy met with LBJ after they decided that we needed more of a punch to prevent a knockout in South Vietnam. They saw two alternatives: use American military power to force North Vietnam to change policy, or, in some other way, convince the other side to begin negotiations. They favored the first.[10]

The President agreed that it was time for us to get tough militarily. First, though, he wanted to take stock of the Vietnam situation once more to demonstrate that he was considering every option. Earlier, Taylor had suggested that McGeorge Bundy come out to get a better grasp of Saigon's plight. An outcome of the 27 January meeting was the President's approval of this visit: thus, on 2 February, McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton from Defense, and General Andy Goodpaster from JCS left for Vietnam.

What Bundy saw in Vietnam led him to propose a steady and continuing reprisal program instead of the tit-for-tat reactions that followed the Tonkin Gulf episode. Actually, although LBJ needed very little convincing at this point, events themselves, rather than any particular report, were pushing him into directing a new strategy for Vietnam. One such event was the incident at Pleiku.

When Bundy was preparing to return to Washington early on 7 February, the Viet Cong made a mortar attack on an American base at Pleiku in the central highlands. They killed eight Americans, wounded more than a hundred, and destroyed ten aircraft. Bundy, Taylor, and Westmoreland—all together in Saigon—decided that we must retaliate, and Bundy telephoned that to Washington. About four hours after the attack, LBJ presided at an extraordinary meeting that included House Speaker John McCormick and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. Only Mansfield was opposed to retaliation. The President ordered an immediate attack on preselected targets, with more in the works. Taylor, delighted, wrote to his son that same week: "We finally seem to have turned a corner and adopted a more realistic policy to the conduct of the war. I have been working and waiting for a year and a half to get to this point."[11]

NSC members huddled frequently during the days after the Pleiku incident. At an 8 February meeting President Johnson summarized his position: in December he had approved a program to pressure North Vietnam but had delayed implementing it until the South Vietnamese could stabilize their government. "We are now ready to return to our program of pushing forward in an effort to defeat North Vietnamese aggression without escalating the war." After the meeting LBJ had a message for Taylor: "I have today decided that we will carry out our December plan for continuing action against North Vietnam with modifications up and down in tempo and scale in the light of your recommendations as Bundy reports them, and our own continuing review of the situation."

Taylor's 12 February response offered his thoughts about the strategy of graduated air reprisals: "In review of the rationale for concept of graduated reprisals we are of the opinion that, in order of importance, it should have the following objectives: the will of Hanoi leaders; GVN morale; and physical destruction to reduce the DRV ability to support the VC."[12]

About the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responding to an earlier McNamara request, came forward with an air strike schedule. They also proposed deploying a US Marine brigade to Danang for securing an American air base from which to launch the attacks.

On 13 February 1965, President Johnson set in motion Rolling Thunder, a program of measured and limited air action against selected targets in North Vietnam. The first bombs fell on 2 March and would continue, with frequent pauses, for the next three and a half years. The Administration called Rolling

Thunder a response to "continued acts of aggression by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese." But it was a new direction in American policy. The United States was, in fact, now at war with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Would bombing provoke Chinese Communists to march into Vietnam? With that fear in mind, the President and the Secretary of Defense kept close control over the air strikes. A dispute between LBJ's military and civilian advisers revolved around what the bombing was all about. In general, the civilians wanted gradualism—more than the Joint Chiefs did—both in pace and targeting; they believed that Hanoi would "get the signal" that the United States was serious about the war in Vietnam and would accordingly stop supporting the Viet Cong.[13]

Taylor, the four-star general in a diplomatic suit, was not for heavy bombing of North Vietnam. In that sense he was a gradualist, trying to pressure—but in a controlled way—Hanoi's leaders to negotiate. He did, however, become annoyed with the long pauses between strikes and with the concerted behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvering against the bombing by the British and French in particular ("our friends," as Taylor called them). An early March cable from Taylor to Washington gives the flavor:

> In my view current developments strongly suggest that we follow simultaneously two courses of action:
>
> (1) attempt to apply brakes to British and others in their headlong dash to conference table . . . .
>
> (2) step up tempo and intensity of our air strikes in southern part of DRV in order convince Hanoi they face prospect of progressively severe punishment. I fear that to date ROLLING THUNDER in their eyes has been merely a few isolated thunder claps.[14]

Taylor's other expectation in connection with Rolling Thunder was, unfortunately, not met—that is, his desire to slow down committing American ground forces to shore up the deteriorating tactical situation in South Vietnam. The Ambassador felt that the South Vietnamese should, if possible, fight their own war; further, to commit American troops was also to commit American prestige—in a very tenuous situation indeed. This may seem at odds with his recommendation in the Taylor-Rostow report about three and a half years earlier, but there is a bureaucratic reality to consider. Maxwell Taylor was no longer a kibitzer from the White House staff on a field visit; he was the senior American in Vietnam, chartered by the President to take charge of our effort.

Ironically, the earlier decision to use American close air support in the South was, when combined with the Rolling Thunder decision, what triggered the American ground force deployment. It was clear after Pleiku that

airfields with American aircraft could be secured only by ground troops—and that these would have to be American. Of our three major air bases in Vietnam (Saigon, Bien Hoa, and Danang), the one at Danang was the most vulnerable to enemy action.

Though Taylor continued to oppose introducing US ground forces, he had to admit that some American troops were necessary to protect the Danang field. But when he agreed, the JCS cabled that they were sending an entire Marine brigade of more than 5000 troops armed with artillery, tanks, and their own aircraft. Taylor objected. Washington compromised, reducing the contingent to two Marine battalion landing teams composed of about 3500 troops. Almost immediately, on 8 March 1965, they came ashore in battle dress, with flags flying and full media coverage. American prestige was now definitely on the line.

Meanwhile, the Washington bureaucrats were taking potshots at soldier-statesman Taylor. McGeorge Bundy's memorandum to the President on 6 March said that if it were up to him and McNamara, they "would bring Taylor back and put Alex Johnson in charge with a younger man [as deputy]."[15] (The younger man was presumably John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense). Although nothing came of the recommendation, it shows that some Washington insiders were getting frustrated with Ambassador Taylor.

While Taylor's desire for air strikes had now been realized, he was still trying to hold back the push for introducing sizable numbers of American ground troops. That push came from the JCS and others in Washington—helped along by a recommendation from Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief and a Vietnam visitor at LBJ's request. On 16 March General Johnson advised committing an Army division to Vietnam for security, plus up to four divisions of US and allied SEATO forces along the demilitarized zone.

Moreover, Westmoreland was no longer in tandem with his old boss Taylor. The general was recommending that an Army division and a separate brigade, besides the Marines, be sent to Vietnam. Earlier, Westy and his former chief had bumped heads over the 8 March landing of the Marines. To hear it in Westmoreland's words:

> Word of the time of the landing got to me from the Joint Chiefs before it reached the Embassy, and even though I notified the Embassy, the word apparently failed to get to the ambassador in advance. He was visibly piqued, his upset accentuated because the Marines had arrived with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and other heavy equipment he had not expected. "Do you know my terms of reference," Ambassador Taylor demanded sharply, "and that I have authority over you?" "I understand fully," I replied, "and I appreciate it completely, Mr. Ambassador." That ended the matter.[16]

For the moment Taylor parried the pressures for troops. He cabled the President his "devout hope that we were not about to rush in and take over

the conduct of the war from the Vietnamese." But events were moving rapidly, and LBJ called his Ambassador back for Washington consultations at the end of March.

The April Days

About the time Taylor descended on Washington, McGeorge Bundy wrote to LBJ about the scheduled 31 March meeting between the President and his Ambassador: "The three problems on Max's mind are these: (1) The timing and direction of attack on the North; (2) The timing, size, and mission of any US combat deployments to Vietnam; and (3) The terms and conditions of a political resolution of the problem. He has done more thinking on (1) and (2) than on (3)—and so have we."[17]

LBJ gathered his Vietnam advisers around him on the 1st and 2d of April 1965. He wanted to talk over many matters, such as nonmilitary programs, the bombing campaign, and—what most concerned Taylor—whether we should send more troops to Vietnam. To that the Ambassador was still opposed, despite urging from Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson and MACV commander William Westmoreland, who was requesting two divisions.

Taylor succeeded—or felt that he had—in preve.iting that commitment, but he did go along with two more Marine battalions and more logistical troops. What really counted, though, was the President's decision to let the Marines

Home from Saigon in September 1964, Ambassador Taylor confers with President Lyndon Johnson in the White House.

patrol beyond the airfields they were guarding. On the surface, this was just a sensible precaution; but on a deeper level it was a change of mission.

On 7 April LBJ made a major policy statement. Speaking at Johns Hopkins University, he declared, "Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack." Now events began to move rapidly. On 13 April, McGeorge Bundy informed Taylor, who was back in Saigon, that "additional troops are important, if not decisive." The next day Taylor picked up a JCS message that had been sent to him for information. It contained startling news: a US Army airborne brigade was to be deployed to Vietnam as soon as possible. Alarmed, the Ambassador cabled Washington immediately:

> I have just learned . . . that the immediate deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade has apparently been approved. This comes as a complete surprise in view of the understanding reached in Washington that we would experiment with the Marines . . . before bringing in other US contingents. . . . I should think that for both military and political reasons we should all be most reluctant to tie down Army/Marine units in this country.[18]

In a 14 April memorandum to the President, Bundy noted the Ambassador's sensitivity. He cautioned about a cable that McNamara was planning to send to Taylor (which LBJ had approved the day before), detailing the troop deployments:

> Bob McNamara may bring over a cable to Taylor this evening which will rack up a number of instructions to the field. . . . My own judgment is that direct orders of this sort to Taylor would be very explosive right now because he will not agree with many of them and he will feel that he has not been consulted. . . . I am sure we can turn him around if we give him just a little time to come aboard.[19]

Then, on the next day, came the message from McGeorge to Max, telling him that in effect he had been overruled by his Commander in Chief: "President's belief is that current situation requires use of all practicable means of strengthening position in South Vietnam and that additional US troops are important if not decisive reinforcement."[20]

Taylor was not quite finished. On the 17th of April he sent two more cables off to Washington. One noted his deputy Alex Johnson's observations against American troop commitment. The other, summarizing the instructions received over the previous ten days, expressed astonishment at developments since the 1 and 2 April meetings with the President.[21]

To calm the Ambassador, Bundy responded that after hearing Taylor's concerns, the President was suspending action until after a high-level meeting in Honolulu on 20 April. Taylor would be there, along with McNamara, Wheeler, Westmoreland, Bill Bundy, and others. In his diary Taylor tells about what transpired at the conference:

We first considered the question of the introduction of additional US and third country combat forces. There was no disagreement in estimating the situation. We all considered that since we could not hope to break the will of Hanoi by bombing alone, we must do better in the campaign against the Viet Cong in SVN [South Vietnam].

He relates that no one expected an end within six months, no matter how the pressures were combined, and that "no one advocated attacking Hanoi." Air strikes on present targets plus other vital targets in the north would suffice for the present. He stressed that "repetition of the same level of attack" was itself a form of escalation. He then turned to the subject most on his mind—US troops:

With regard to the need for additional US combat troops . . , we agreed on a Phase I which would call for the introduction into SVN of nine US battalions and four third country battalions between now and the end of summer. With the present in-country strength of about 33,000 this reinforcement would bring the US personnel to about 82,000, with something over 7000 third country troops in addition. We recognized that it might be necessary to follow with a Phase II and III. . . . Final totals in that case would be 123,000 US and about 22,000 third country combat forces.[22]

Powerful charter or not, Ambassador Taylor was now, after the Honolulu decisions, a background figure in Vietnam. Coming to the fore was the MACV commander, General Westmoreland.

The July 1965 Decisions

On 28 April, Prime Minister Quat informed Taylor that South Vietnam went along with the American troop increase, and in early May, LBJ sent a message to Congress requesting more money for our growing military requirements in Vietnam. But would there be any Vietnam left to support? By late May, that was the real question. The long-awaited Viet Cong summer offensive had jumped off on 11 May. Everybody's nightmare of a speedy and total collapse of the South appeared possible. In June the communists pushed ahead on the central highlands, trying to cut the country in two.

By 3 June, Taylor was cabling Washington his latest assessment of Hanoi's determination. If we were to bring the North Vietnamese around, bombing alone would not do the trick: "Such a change in DRV attitudes can probably be brought about only when, along with a sense of mounting pain from the bombings, there is also a conviction on their part that the tide has turned or soon will turn against them in the South."[23] Taylor was back on the team.

Westmoreland, wanting to take the offensive with large-scale reinforcements, asked for a speedy deployment of US and third-country combat forces. The MACV commander was clearly in charge in Saigon, while Ambassador

Taylor was by now playing for time; his agreed-upon one-year tour was almost up—much to his own relief and that of some others.

With Taylor now supporting Westmoreland's program, there was a general call to arms. Only a few Washington leaders were still holdouts, most prominently Undersecretary of State George Ball. Then, there were those, such as Bill Bundy at State, who were in between Ball and Westmoreland. Before Honolulu, Taylor may have supported the in-between position effectively, but now he was silent. The old soldier saw the handwriting: the movement toward war was inexorable, and nothing was going to stop it. The question was how many troops and how soon.

On 16 July the President dispatched his top advisers to Saigon. Besides McNamara and Generals Wheeler and Goodpaster, the visitors included Henry Cabot Lodge, Taylor's predecessor and now soon to be announced as his successor. But the purpose of the visit was suddenly overtaken when, on 17 July, McNamara received a cable while in Vietnam: the President had decided to go ahead with McNamara's earlier proposal to strengthen the military to 44 battalions. Moreover, Johnson ordered McNamara to return home and complete his recommendations immediately. As Westmoreland later wrote, "Our July discussions turned out, in a way, to be moot." Lyndon Baines Johnson had already decided how to save South Vietnam.[24]

Now it was time for Taylor to depart from Saigon and to file the customary evaluation of the situation. He felt that the United States had during his tenure as Ambassador developed a coherent strategy; if we persisted in it, we could attain an independent South Vietnam free from attack. But when Taylor left Saigon, we had begun an actual American war. By its end the number of Americans killed in action would be exceeded only by the two World Wars and the Civil War. And it would be the only war we ever lost.

Just before he returned to Washington and a new assignment, Taylor was off to Cam Ranh Bay to witness the arrival of his World War II outfit, the 101st Airborne Division. It was an inspiring day, clear and with the wind whipping in from the South China Sea. In an atmosphere heavily laden with ironic symbolism, Taylor gave the welcome speech. Talking sternly of the traditions of the great division, he concluded with a World War II punch line relating to Bastogne: "The Germans have nine divisions surrounding us—the poor bastards." The scene was so much like a movie—all slightly unreal—that it could have been great fun, except for the reality of Vietnam.

Observations

The tour as Ambassador to Saigon in 1964-65 was Maxwell Taylor's high noon in relation to Vietnam. That was also the most important year for presidential decisions leading to the US combat role. In the summer of 1964

most options were still open for Lyndon Johnson; by the following summer there were none—except to escalate the war.

When Taylor arrived in Saigon in July 1964, his charter was the most powerful ever given an American ambassador. In effect, he was in control of American military forces in that country. Had this charter been granted to a bona fide civilian, the American military undoubtedly would have objected. Actually, Taylor never made full use of the charter. Instead, he created a Mission Council composed of the senior US officials of the various government agencies represented in Saigon, including MACV. In theory this council was the forum for working out decisions. In fact everyone looked to his own fiefdom in Washington for guidance and instructions.

As for Ambassador Taylor's strategic views, two should be stressed: the role of bombing, and the employment of American combat troops. Taylor's views on both matters were not exactly what one would suppose given his background, and he did not fully prevail in either. Still, he had become a kind of icon for the President to display when LBJ needed credibility on Vietnam, at least with a certain constituency.

Taylor as JCS Chairman earlier and as Ambassador strongly advocated the efficacy of bombing the North. He saw it both as a deterrent to Hanoi's aggression in the South and as a way to prod the foe to the negotiating table. This explains the Ambassador's early attempts, albeit unsuccessful, to get LBJ to bomb the North as retaliation for the VC mortaring of the Bien Hoa air base and the dynamiting of the Brinks Hotel. Particularly noteworthy was his delight when the President finally did approve bombing after the Pleiku incident in early February; for this, Taylor had been "working and waiting for a year and a half." Although a gradualist, to a point, in the application of bombing, he did not support the notion of the bombing pauses. In this sense he was his own man, somewhere between the JCS—who wanted all-out bombing—and the Defense civilians who viewed it as a kind of faucet to turn on and off; their assumption was that Hanoi leaders understood what their Washington counterparts were doing and would respond in a reasonable way—which they did not.

Taylor's real *bête noir*, however, was the ground force commitment. As the spring of 1965 wore on, it was clear that American bombing had not broken the will of the North Vietnamese; thus the US Marines, introduced to protect the airfields from which Rolling Thunder was launched, were permitted to maneuver in the countryside.

During the April 1965 trip to Washington when the decision was made to allow the Marines to operate out of their enclave, Taylor resisted the commitment of additional American ground forces that Westmoreland was urging. But as it turned out, such a commitment was also desired by "Highest Authority," meaning, in the lexicon of cable traffic, Lyndon Baines Johnson. Up to the end

of his trip, Taylor felt that he had carried the day. At this evidence that LBJ was assuming the initiative, the Ambassador was caught short. He had a brief sparring match on the issue with McNamara and Westmoreland during the Honolulu meeting later in April. Taylor los:. It was a momentous defeat that wrote finis to the fiction of the all-powerful Ambassador. But always flexible in the long run, Taylor later modified his position, coming to feel that perhaps the United States had waited too long to commit American ground forces.

Despite defeat on the matter of troop commitments, Taylor finished his year as Ambassador and was still willing to serve the President. His letter of resignation indicated that he was ready to assume new responsibilities for his Commander in Chief, and indeed he became a consultant to LBJ on Vietnam and a public advocate of the Administration's war policies. But that is another story.

NOTES

1. Letter quoted in *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), III, 79.
2. Pape with title "US Objectives in Southeast Asia," contained in Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, National Defense University Library (hereafter NDUL).
3. Public Lawr 88-409, passed 10 August 1964.
4. Taylor tells his version of the trip in his book *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 320-21; and in chapters 25-28 he discusses at some length the personalities of the South Vietnamese government leaders with whom he had to deal at that point.
5. From the unpublished manuscript of William Bundy, which he made available to me at the Council of Foreign Relations Building in New York and is now deposited in the John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidential libraries. It is of considerable assistance in clarifying President Johnson's actions on Vietnam during the 1964-1965 period.
6. *Pentagon Papers*, III, 666-73.
7. William Bundy, unpublished manuscript (see note 5), pp. 9-13, 14, 15.
8. Taylor's message to the South Vietnamese leadership is contained in *Report on Washington Attitudes*, Taylor Papers, NDUL.
9. An interesting Vietnamese perspective of the Quat period is in Bui Diem, *In the Jaws of History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), chapters 17, 18.
10. William Conrad Gibbons, *The US Government and the Vietnam War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), III, 47-51.
11. John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 308.
12. Gibbons, III, 67
13. Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War* (San Francisco: Presidio, 1988), pp. 336-42.
14. *Pentagon Papers*, III, 335.
15. Memorandum to President Johnson, 6 March 1965. See Gibbons, III, 153, especially note 67.
16. William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 125.
17. Memorandum to the President, 31 March 1965. NSC History, Deployment of Major Forces to Vietnam, Vol. II, LBJ Library.
18. Cables, American Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, 5 p.m. and 8 p.m., 14 April 1965. Cited in Gibbons, III, 226-27.
19. Memorandum for the President, 14 April 1965. Cited in Gibbons, III, 228.
20. Gibbons, III, 228.
21. Ibid., pp. 228-30.
22. Diary entry, 18-22 April 1965, Taylor Papers, NDUL.
23. Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), pp. 64-65.
24. Cyrus Vance, Cable to McNamara 172042Z, 17 July 1965, cited in John Burke and Fred Greenstein, *How Presidents Test Reality* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989), pp. 214-15. Westmoreland's comment is in *A Soldier Reports*, p. 143. There is some doubt, however, whether LBJ had really made up his mind yet or not. This is discussed with additional documentation in notes on page 215 of Burke and Greenstein.

Soldiers and Legislators: A Common Mission

ROBERT R. IVANY

Two hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville commented on the unique relationship between the American people and their government. "In democratic eyes, government is not a blessing," he wrote, "but a necessary evil."[1] Americans today would heartily concur. They have traditionally mistrusted politicians and the big government they symbolized. In a recent Harris poll, 53 percent of Americans queried said that Congress was not effectively fulfilling its responsibilities.[2] In a 1989 Gallup Poll, only 32 percent of those polled expressed "quite a lot" of confidence in Congress as an institution. For the past several years, Congress has consistently ranked near the bottom of major institutions in public confidence.[3]

If asked, soldiers would probably echo the sentiments of their countrymen. To a much larger degree than their civilian counterparts, soldiers feel the impact of legislation. Laws regulate every facet of military service. Professional officers generally understand the need to control the expenditure of tax revenues. While they may disagree with the square footage allocated for living quarters or the authorized weight allowance for the shipment of household goods, they accept such rules with a sense of resignation and a touch of humor that marks military service.

What has increasingly begun to rankle the nation's military leaders, however, is the growing propensity of Congress to use its constitutional mandate for regulating the military services as a pretext for micromanaging them. Last year Congress changed 60 percent of the line items in the Department of Defense's budget request.[4] In effect the legislators claimed that on 60 percent of everything the Pentagon wanted to buy, develop, or manage, they knew a better way to do it.

Congressional responsibilities stem from Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution, which requires the legislature "to raise and support armies" and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." During every working day in 1989, legislators on average made 2500 phone calls,

sent 450 letters, and demanded three separate reports each requiring over 1000 man-hours from the military services.[5] This intensive oversight has engendered a deep frustration among the military's senior leaders. In a recent interview Secretary of the Army Michael Stone flatly stated that congressional micro-management "makes an absolute mess out of what we [the Army] are doing here."[6] Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, meanwhile, in his report on stream-lining the defense acquisition process, pointed tellingly to the existence of "30 committees, 77 subcommittees, and four panels" with "overlapping and duplicative jurisdiction over DOD affairs."[7] Newspapers such as *The Wall Street Journal* have joined the growing ranks of critics in urging a public presidential campaign to stop congressional meddling in military budgets.[8] At the heart of this uproar lies the perception that congressional tinkering benefits only a district or state while flagrantly harming the national good.

Legislators and soldiers share a common mission. Both have the responsibility, in their own way, for maintaining the national defense. But despite the deep inter-involvement of the two institutions, serious misconceptions cloud many senior officers' understanding of Congress's role in national defense. Most officers can vaguely recall their youthful civics classes that described the process by which a bill becomes law, but they are often unprepared to face the powerful clash of interests that forms the modern legislative process. Military officers must be willing to shed their cynicism, naïveté, and even hypocrisy by learning how the constituency, modus operandi, and professional bias of legislators must necessarily differ from those of the military. By arriving at an understanding of the uniquely American legislative process and by appreciating the complex pressures on Congress, senior military leaders will more effectively contribute to the nation's defense.

Conflicting Constituencies

Nowhere do legislators and soldiers differ as radically as in the constituencies which they represent. Military officers have virtually no ties to their home districts or states. The dictates of military service have moved them over the entire United States and often over the world. Ties to their place of birth become blurred with each new assignment. Legal residences are more

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apt to reflect a posting where state income taxes were low or where a home purchase made sense. When retirement time comes, a favorable climate and the presence of jobs are likely to influence the serviceman's decision.

Throughout their service, military officers view security issues from a national perspective. They see their nation as a competitor or ally of other nations, not as a kaleidoscope of individual states, regions, or interests. This global view, however, does not exempt admirals or generals from answering to powerful constituencies. One's armed service exerts a professional, emotional, and financial hold over its members. Often these orientations conflict with the positions of the Defense Department. Professional staff members who prepare legislation for members of the Armed Services Committees point out that the military establishment is not a monolith speaking with one voice. Even after the Secretary of Defense submits the President's budget to Congress, discordant voices flow through staff cubicles. Staff members claim that although the majority of service representatives loyally support the Department of Defense position, mavericks often appear pushing individual service programs or even branch programs within the services. In fact, staffers attribute numerous changes in the DOD budget request to service initiatives to circumvent the Secretary's decisions. In addition the reserve components and countless retired military "consultants" promote their respective points of view.[9]

After Secretary of Defense Cheney assumed his position at the Pentagon, he quickly served notice that he expected the service chiefs to sing in harmony with the DOD chorus. One of his first acts was to admonish the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch, for overzealous "free-lancing" of Air Force programs on the Hill.[10] Later, when Mr. Cheney slashed from the 1990 budget the V-22 Osprey, a hybrid airplane-helicopter ordered for the Marine Corps, some politicians questioned whether or not the cut would hold in the face of powerful service and industry opposition. "Don't ever underestimate the persuasiveness of the United States Marines," quipped Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It's amazing what 'a few good men' can do."[11]

Congressmen look at security issues from a far different perspective. They are painfully aware of the simple fact that voters elect representatives to look after their own interests, not someone else's. A legislator's report card often becomes a reflection of the number of federal projects he has funneled into the home district or state. The more aggressive he is, the better—at least in the eyes of his constituents. Senators and representatives even venture to the boundaries of ethical conduct in their zeal for pork barrel projects. Senator Alfonse D'Amato from New York, for example, recently came under scrutiny for allegedly improperly channeling Housing and Urban Development funds to his home state. Vigorously defending his right to go to "bat for every single thing that had merit," he promised to continue fighting for New York, insisting

"that my state elected me to go for it."[12] When the Republican National Committee attempted to capitalize on the ethical difficulties of several Democrats in 1989, their effort fell flat. "Republicans won't learn," claimed Democratic congressional campaign spokesman Howard Schloss, "that congressional elections are decided by local people on local issues."[13]

Obviously, not every national security issue before Congress has a local constituency. But even where hometown jobs are not affected, Political Action Committees or PACs exert a strong financial pull on congressmen, especially on those who hold seats on key committees such as Ways and Means. In 1988 over 3500 national organizations had registered as PACs. They contributed more than $148 million to candidates in the 1988 congressional elections, almost a third of the total of nearly $476 million raised by the candidates.[14] Washington observers point out that representatives who run for election every two years are more susceptible to fund-raising concerns than senators who campaign every six years. "A representative never stops running," says one veteran Hill staffer. "Every defense contractor or dedicated interest group within the representative's 500,000 voter constituency must be addressed." Senators, meanwhile, enjoy the advantage of more numerous interests spread over their entire state.

Interest groups need not be financially strong to make themselves heard. Civil rights groups, churches, and minority organizations command large blocs of voters among the typical congressman's constituency. When the Reagan Administration, for example, sought to sell the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes to Saudi Arabia in 1981, it was vigorously opposed by several American Jewish organizations. One of them was the American Jewish Committee, whose Washington representative, Hyman Bookbinder, explained his organization's strength in this manner: "What we have going for us, and that's really the essence of the Jewish lobby, is an organized, committed, concerned Jewish community in America."[15] Unlike the military, members of Congress answer to a diverse and often contradictory constituency.

Whence the Beef?

An excellent example of an issue with conflicting constituencies is the legislation mandating the sale of US meat in military commissaries in Europe. At first glance, the meat issue appears to be a straightforward case of pork barrel politics, no pun intended. From 1970 to 1987, per capita consumption of beef and pork in the United States declined by 12 percent and 4 percent respectively.[16] In an effort to boost sales, the House Armed Services Committee in 1986 directed the Department of Defense to conduct a test in its European commissaries to determine whether fresh US beef and pork could compete with its cheaper European-raised counterparts. The six-month test revealed that European meat outsold the US product by a five to one ratio.[17] An accompanying survey pointed out that the price differential was key. The American cuts of meat cost nearly

twice as much, prompting most customers to choose the European brands.[18] The study further indicated that it would cost the Defense Department $30 million to $35 million to handle, transport, and build facilities for the exclusive sale of US meat in its commissaries. After the conclusion of the test, Assistant Secretary of Defense Chapman Cox reported to the House Armed Services Committee that he did not believe "legislation which would limit competition of meat products to US products . . . would be in the best interests of the US service member or US taxpayer."[19]

With that reply the issue lay dormant until 1988 when the European Economic Community (EEC) dealt a significant blow to American ranchers. It claimed that hormone-treated beef, which characterized the vast majority of US products, constituted a health hazard. Consequently, on 1 January 1988 it banned the sale of hormone-treated beef within the 12-nation community. At the same time, the EEC continued to subsidize the sale of more than $60 million of its beef to US commissaries.[20] The subsidy allowed the American soldier in Europe to put a slightly less tender but much less costly slice of beef on the dinner table.

In Washington the EEC's salvo against American meat products raised cries for retaliation. In January 1989, the House Armed Services Committee again asked the Defense Department to study the effects of limiting meat purchases to US sources. The services studied the issue and reported that if proposed legislation pertained only to beef rather than all meat products, and if only the commissaries north of the Alps were included, the Defense Department could comply. DOD, however, requested an additional authorization of $10 million for transportation costs.[21] One thorny question lingered. US beef would still cost military families 35 percent more (totaling about $12 million per year) than the European beef they were buying. Would American serviceman have to pay an extra $12 million to subsidize American ranchers in a trade war with the EEC?

An astute observer once described a statesman "as a politician who is held upright by equal pressure from all directions."[22] The beef war gave several politicians the opportunity to demonstrate their statesmanlike skills. Legislators showed their constituents as well as military families their ability to compromise and thereby to solve a complex issue. Professional staff members on the House Armed Services Committee got the process rolling by enlisting the support of the House Agriculture Committee. The latter agreed to provide $12 million to subsidize the retail price of US beef products on a sliding scale for the following three years.[23] Military families in Europe would gradually pay the same amount for American beef as their counterparts in the United States. The House Armed Services Committee further recommended the authorization of $10 million for increased transportation costs. This resolution of the beef issue sailed through the House with little debate.

The beef issue generated far more controversy in the Senate, where Senator Tom Harkin from Iowa introduced a more ambitious amendment. The Harkin Amendment required all meat and meat products for the entire European theater to be purchased from US producers.[24] A modified Harkin Amendment ended up in joint conference. The conferees compromised on this issue by restricting the ban to beef rather than all meat and by dropping the House language authorizing $10 million for transportation costs.[25] The outcome did not please everyone. On the one hand, cattle ranchers increased their sales and Congress fired another shot in the economic war with the EEC. On the other hand, the legislators forced DOD to pay for the new shipments out of its hide, but at least they allowed DOD the flexibility to control the funds for transportation. Meanwhile, the US taxpayer, who already heavily subsidized farm products, would contribute another $12 million to existing subsidies. The US soldier, who already found life overseas to be an expensive undertaking, would pay higher beef prices. Service members stationed in Europe would understandably bemoan the bill's passage. But tempering their disappointment would be the knowledge that congressmen annually appropriate millions of dollars to provide those overseas with a wide variety of US products at stateside prices. In the end, the trooper stationed in Fulda, Germany, would pay no more for his steak dinner than his counterpart at Ft. Bliss, Texas. Thus were the interests of a broad diversity of constituencies reconciled.

Structure and System

Although legislators and soldiers differ significantly in their respective constituencies, they carry out their responsibilities in much the same way. Military leaders are accustomed to giving and following orders. As officers advance in experience and maturity, however, their decisionmaking methods change as well. While orders are orders in any military organization, consensus-building becomes an increasingly important skill at higher levels of command. A wise commander knows that although he can change his unit's operating procedures, he will achieve far better results if he incorporates the recommendations of his subordinates and technicians. In the Pentagon, officers soon realize that if they approach strategic or budgetary issues from a nakedly parochial view, they will not please policymakers who attempt to find the best solution for the entire service. Ideally, as the various branches or components jostle for position and attempt to persuade their superiors on the merits of their views, the best solution emerges. Congress is no different except that there is no higher authority beyond the voting tally itself to decide the issue.

In Congress, 435 representatives and 100 senators answer only to their constituents. Consensus-building, compromise, log-rolling ("I'll vote for yours if you'll vote for mine"), and the allocation of influential positions

form the tools of the trade. The entire legislative system has become a lengthy, cumbersome, and often inefficient consensus-building process. Its principal product, the federal budget, emerges only after prodigious effort. The budget's painful birth results largely from the numerous committees and subcommittees that assist its lengthy labor.

After the Secretary of Defense submits his portion of the budget to Congress in January, both the Senate and the House begin their scrutiny. The budget first travels to the Budget Committees. Established by the Budget Control Act of 1974, these committees attempt to solve one of Congress's chronic problems—overspending. The Budget Committees set ceilings and priorities for different categories of expenditures. After the respective Budget Committees complete their budget resolutions, they report them to the full House and full Senate. Following a floor debate on the resolutions, the bills move to the Authorization Committees for individual line-item analysis. In the case of the Department of Defense, its bill travels to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Here 54 representatives and 20 senators begin their simultaneous scrutiny. Assisted by a force of nearly 80 professional staff members, they attempt to mold defense expenditures within the limits and priorities established in the earlier budget resolution. In the past these committees kept "open authorizations" for most items, allowing the Appropriation Committees to specify the amount spent on each item. Now, however, the Armed Services Committees specify the amounts and, at times, limit the time period for the expenditure.[26] Although the Armed Services Committees cannot require funding, their power lies in the publicity generated by their hearings and by their agreement with the Appropriations Committee, under which the latter normally will not require the funding of an item not previously authorized.

The last committees to receive the bill are the Appropriations Committees. Traditionally, the Senate Appropriations Committee sits as an appeals board for federal agencies or special interest groups dissatisfied with the House's figures.[27] Inevitably, the Senate and House budgets differ, requiring a joint conference to resolve the differences before the budget travels to the Oval Office for the President's signature. The precarious journey requires consensus-building at each stage. It is important to remember that the ratio of Republicans to Democrats on the committees mirrors their relative ratios in the House and Senate. Along every step of the budget process, legislators work to garner the majorities needed to get authorizations or appropriations for their desired item or policy.

Rather than worrying about whether Congress slights the national interest in its zeal to promote hometown issues, military leaders might become more effective participants in the process of protecting the national interest by concentrating on how they manage issues before Congress. Let us consider the case of a brigade's deactivation.

Causing Sparks in Colorado

In April 1990, Secretary Cheney announced a series of measures to reduce the military budget. Included in his list of cuts were the F-14D fighter, the V-22 Osprey helicopter-airplane, and the 2d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mech), which was scheduled for deactivation. Justifying the decision before the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary stated that the 4th Infantry Division, located at Ft. Carson, Colorado, was the only heavy division in the United States that still retained three active combat brigades. Other heavy divisions with a reinforcement mission to NATO consisted of two active and one reserve or forward-deployed brigade. Despite this rationale, the potential loss of 3300 soldiers generated tremendous concern in the division's hometown of Colorado Springs. Senators and representatives soon began to echo their constituents' displeasure at the expected loss of jobs in a community where the military generated $250 million in annual income.[28] At first, the Colorado legislators pushed for a delay of the deactivation, contending that the cuts had not been studied in sufficient detail and that the Defense Department should first cut forces in NATO. While giving due consideration to these arguments, the Army's leadership pressed on with the deactivation, which began in May and ended in December of 1989. Unable to sway the policymakers in the Pentagon, Colorado legislators inquired about the possibility of "backfilling" the brigade with the 10th Special Forces Group from Ft. Devens, Massachusetts. When the powerful Massachusetts delegation learned of this attempt, they in turn pressured the Army leadership to make no changes.[29] In early June, a Colorado Springs citizens group consisting of leading community members and a retired general officer visited Washington to meet with key members of Congress, the Department of the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[30]

These meetings allowed the constituents to express their feelings and gave the Colorado congressional delegation an opportunity to show their constituents that they were fighting on their behalf. Their combined efforts, however, proved fruitless, as the deactivation continued.

Undaunted, the legislators turned their attention to the Authorization Committees. Representative Joel Hefley, a junior member of the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced an amendment to prevent the Army from deactivating the brigade in fiscal year 1990. Representative Hefley was unable to generate much enthusiasm from fellow Colorado congressmen or from other legislators. The Readiness Subcommittee wrote two "senses of Congress" into the budget bill suggesting that reductions be taken from European-based units. A "sense of Congress" provision does not carry the force of law, but simply allows members to articulate their views officially for the public record. The two senses of Congress remained in the bill as it moved to the full committee session and onto the floor.[31]

On the Senate side, the Colorado delegation met with more success. Senator Tim Wirth, a liberal Democrat, took the lead by raising the Ft. Carson issue before the Senate Armed Services Committee. There he proposed an amendment that would prohibit the Army from deactivating the brigade until the completion of a Total Force Policy Study on 1 December 1990. With strong support from Senator Nunn, Senator Wirth won unanimous approval of his amendment. Inserted in the wording of the Senate version of the budget, the Nunn-Wirth Amendment met no opposition on the Senate floor.[32] Backed by his amendment, Senator Wirth called upon the Secretary of the Army to halt the ongoing stand-down of troops and tanks. Secretary Stone refused. Calling such efforts to save the 2d Brigade "parochial," he stressed that to halt the process would "cause turbulence and personal hardship for our soldiers and their families, and . . . ultimately undo what has been done."[33] In early October, the differences between the House and Senate budget bills ended up in joint conference for resolution. Since the House version contained only a sense of Congress on the deactivation, while the Senate version was actually written into the budget, the deactivation issue was thrown in the laps of the joint conferees. At this point the Army leadership used every opportunity to inform the conferees about the necessity to continue the deactivation.

Regulations allow the military services to provide Congress with information concerning the President's budget. This responsibility to provide information and answer questions gives military liaison officers and senior military leaders access to legislators. The line between providing information and lobbying is a fine one. Some professional staff members scoff at the idea that the services don't lobby, but they all highly value service representatives' opinions and proffered information. In the Ft. Carson case, the Army leadership from the top down hastened to clarify and amplify the rationale behind the ongoing deactivation to members of the joint conference. The Army also opened the door for support from legislators from Oregon and Idaho by announcing that the 4th Infantry's new reserve brigade would come from these states.[34] While the joint conferees debated the various issues on which the House and Senate differed, the brigade continued turning in its vehicles and reassigning its soldiers. By October the cost to reactivate the now largely defunct brigade approached the $400 million mark. In the end, the Nunn-Wirth Amendment disappeared in joint conference, and the bill that emerged made no mention of it.

A number of factors contributed to the amendment's demise. First, the Defense Department and the Army presented a strong rationale for the brigade's deactivation and vigorously defended their authority to deactivate. Second, the Colorado delegation, especially on the House side, failed to build a strong consensus for the amendment. Conspicuously absent from the debate on the issue was Colorado Representative Pat Schroeder, a Democrat and Chairwoman of the powerful Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee of the House Armed

Services Committee. On the Senate side, Senator Wirth's strong stand to maintain conventional forces undoubtedly drew a skeptical response from fellow lawmakers who were aware of his lukewarm voting record on defense issues.[35] Third, despite the Nunn-Wirth Amendment, the Secretary of Defense continued the deactivation so that by the time the issue reached the joint conference the deactivation was a virtual fait accompli.

As the nation approaches a period of severe defense cutbacks, the pressure to eliminate pork barrel projects is rising dramatically. During the 1990 budget hearings, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, took great pride in excluding most of his fellow representatives' pet projects, which totaled $6.8 billion! "There's no room for even the deserving add-ons," he stated, "let alone the ones that go 'oink.'"[36] The responsibility to trim the fat and not the muscle of national defense rests with the Congress. If the military professional presents a strong rationale for his view, fits it into a strategic framework, and supports it with a realistic threat assessment, he has satisfied his professional obligation and can take pride in that fact, regardless of how Congress ultimately reacts to his proposal.

Life Along the Potomac

Even if officers understand the legislative process, they often feel uneasy working in a political environment. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's attitude about politics reflects those of many senior leaders today. In 1943 he confided to a friend his feelings regarding the political maneuvers of allied leaders. "In fact" he wrote, "once this war is over, I hope never again to hear the word 'politics.'"[37] These ironic words flowed from the pen of the man whom the American people would elect to the presidency nine years later. Another war hero, General Douglas MacArthur, spoke in a similar vein to the cadets assembled at West Point in 1962. "Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our process of government," he intoned, listing the ills of deficit financing, federal paternalism, power groups, politics, crime, and morals. "These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution."[38] These words came from the officer who had addressed all these problems when he directed the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Japan after World War II.

Today the defense portion of the budget consumes 25 percent of the nation's tax dollar, and the defense establishment employs 61 percent of all federal employees and 5.3 percent of the national labor force.[39] The Defense Department's policies and budgets affect the national deficit, inflation, and unemployment. Decisions on base closures, weapon purchases, and enlistment policies directly affect millions of Americans. If voters are disadvantaged by policies from Washington, they will appeal to their elected representatives. Legislators dislike defending unpalatable acts of government before their

constituents, especially if it was a "bureaucrat" who performed the act. Thus, in fighting the closure of Chanute Air Force Base, Senator Alan Dixon from Illinois predictably assailed this favorite congressional whipping boy: "It would be an outrage," he exclaimed, "if a fine community of 20,000 people in my state were torn asunder because of mistakes made by the government—by faceless, nameless people who have nothing to answer to."[40] Representative Les Au Coin from Oregon took a similar tack in describing Secretary Cheney's chances for success on the Hill: "He'll have a lot more credibility than some intellectual yahoo who's never been elected to anything."[41] By training, military officers believe that politics is something to avoid, while many legislators ridicule the federal employee who never faces the rigors of an election. Both prejudices inhibit the orderly functioning of government.

Military officers must appreciate the diverse pressures brought to bear on legislators and remember that their own responsibility lies simply in offering the best military advice possible. Congressional rejection of that advice may be based on economic, social, or political reasons. Unless the issue raises ethical implications, however, the military officer must accept the decision or resign. Most issues facing the nation's lawmakers are not moral ones. Today military and civilian leaders are grappling with the enormous federal deficit, dwindling sources of energy, and a rapidly changing national security environment. The resolution of these complex problems lies in intelligent and practical recommendations rather than in a scramble to seize the moral high ground. Just as a congressman must be cognizant of the impact of political decisions on the military's ability to defend the nation, so too must the military leader understand the wide-ranging political and economic consequences of his advice.

Senior military leaders who deal with the Hill are often surprised to find legislators and staff members who are very knowledgeable about military hardware and policies. Senators and representatives frequently hold strong ideas about the nation's defense needs, and their views are informed by the experience of wrestling with the same issues year after year. Representative Marvin Leath from Texas, a 12-year veteran of Congress who served in the Army from 1954 to 1956, rejects the idea that the House Armed Services Committee should rubber-stamp the Pentagon's requests. "Some of us have been in the defense business longer than [Cheney] has," he points out.[42] Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, with 19 years' experience on defense issues, is even more outspoken:

> I view the Department of Defense as management of a portion of a large corporation, and I serve on the board of directors. . . . I feel that I and other members here who have a long continuum with dealing with some of these problems have a little bit more understanding of the process than the people who are just passing through desks in the Pentagon.[43]

Backing up these veterans of the budget wars is a well-paid and highly educated professional committee staff. Committee staffers, in contrast to a legislator's personal staff, are older (average age 40) and more often possess advanced degrees (63 percent), particularly in the law.[44] Many have previous government experience in the Congressional Budget Office or in the executive branch. Their numbers in recent years have soared. In 1960 the House Armed Services Committee employed 15 staff members; in 1990 it had 74 on its payroll. In the Senate Armed Services Committee, meanwhile, professional staff members grew from 23 to 49.[45] Lawmakers are also supported by legislative assistants. Each of these assistants orients his efforts toward a committee on which the legislator sits. As a result of these staff increases, legislators may deploy considerable expertise on major defense issues and procurements. As the congressional staff grows in number, experience, and expertise, military leaders can only benefit from establishing closer working relationships with its members. Congressmen face historic foreign policy challenges, sizable defense problems, and rising domestic needs. When clashes among these three imperatives occur, lawmakers will need from the military accurate information and a clear vision of future military requirements.

Senior military leaders should also realize that the service secretaries play a key role in dealing with Congress. As representatives of the Administration, service secretaries are responsible to the Secretary of Defense and act as a buffer between the military priorities of the men and women in uniform and the political priorities of members of Congress. The service secretaries, along with the Secretary of Defense, constantly interact with Congress and bear much of the burden of sweetening the bitter news of base closures and production cutbacks. Their insight and political savvy allow military leaders to concentrate on recommending the most appropriate military course of action while the secretaries, who are political appointees, weigh the political considerations.

Complex issues are never black and white. The stationing of newly formed divisions or the homeporting of naval vessels carries significant economic benefits to a region. Typically any number of locations could be acceptable from a military perspective. But demographic, economic, or political factors will favor one region over another. The balancing act of competing priorities lies within the secretaries' responsibilities.

Negotiating the Political Minefield

No one in Washington or among the American public wants officers to become political animals. Nothing could be more disastrous for the nation than for uniformed military leaders to make recommendations based on political expediency. But a willingness to appreciate conflicting interests, to compromise, and to understand the legislative process will allow the senior officer to help shape national policy more effectively. Further, uniformed leaders must resist

the temptation to make a moral issue of what may simply be a complex problem. Whether an officer is assigned to the nation's capital or to a less visible post, he or she will eventually come in contact with members of Congress and their staffs. As senior officers develop their ability to participate in national policymaking, the following deceptively basic concepts may be useful.

• *Keep the military-political relationship in perspective.* Legislators may make statements for the benefit of their constituents regardless of their personal beliefs. Public servants, such as we in the military, periodically become convenient whipping boys for national problems. After all is said and done, however, today's armed forces are better equipped, manned, and supported than at any other time in US history; and we must remember that it was Congress that appropriated the money. One Hill staffer with 12 years in the land systems procurement business put it this way: "Over the past several years, the Army has received 98 percent of everything it asked for." A quick check of the major defense programs in the 1990 budget reveals that the services indeed got pretty much what they wanted. Out of 35 major programs, the Defense Department received at least 90 percent of funds requested for 24 programs. An additional four projects received appropriated monies that were not requested.[46]

• *Be open and professional in personal dealings with legislators.* While the task of daily contact with the Hill staff and elected officials rests with each service's legislative liaison division, institutional attitudes make a big difference in lawmakers' perceptions of the military. Representative Dave McCurdy from Oklahoma, in a recent compliment to Secretary Cheney, described the qualities that lawmakers look for in the defense community. "In politics," McCurdy asserted, "perception is 99 percent of reality and Dick is the ultimate perception of reasonableness: controlled, paced, rational."[47] Uniformed leaders might well emulate that ideal. Military commanders must realize that military authorizations and appropriations are no longer controlled by a handful of senior conservative legislators. Defense issues interest all elected officials. Whether officers are dealing with the chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee or a junior representative's staff member, he should give them the courteous, frank, and strictly professional advice they deserve.

• *Understand the legislative process.* Other than the knowledge gained from civics classes and a course in American history, many officers remain blissfully unaware of the military's role in the legislative process. Regardless of where they serve, it is imperative that they understand the constitutional responsibilities of the Congress. Senior service schools should stress the constitutional fundamentals of civil-military relations. Senior leaders should also encourage their subordinates to learn about the government, and to write or visit their representatives about service issues that affect them. Numerous improvements in the quality of life for service members, such as day-care construction and

variable housing allowances, have resulted from the personal involvement of soldiers and their families with legislators.

• *Maintain a complementary relationship between Congress and the Defense Department.* The task of consensus-building is not limited to the halls of Congress. The wheels of government turn more smoothly when each part of the machine moves in concert with the others. There are good reasons why Presidents often choose prominent legislators to assume key posts in the Defense Department. One is that these lawmakers normally bring their personal staff members across the Potomac with them. Retired military officers, meanwhile, have found employment on the Hill either as legislative assistants or professional staff members. In either case, public servants who have worked both sides of an issue can more easily appreciate all its ramifications and, one hopes, cooperate to achieve the best results. An obstacle to this practice is legislation that prohibits regular officers from drawing full retirement pay if they work for Congress. While we should be taking advantage of the experience and knowledge of retired officers, our "double-dipper" laws often drive them into the private sector or early retirement.

Few decades in American history will match the challenges of the 1990s. A diminishing threat from the Soviet Union, emerging democracies in eastern Europe, and instability in other parts of the world will combine with pressing domestic needs to alter the profile of America's fighting forces. As military officers rise in rank and assume greater responsibility for the national defense, they cannot allow cynicism, ignorance, or naïveté to hinder their cooperation with the nation's legislators. The two groups share a common and sacred mission.

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A Twenty-First Century Army

WALLACE J. THIES

C rises are like searchlights cutting through the fog of international politics, revealing in an instant details of the landscape that had previously been lost from view. During the year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, debates about American defense policy dealt for the most part with whether the force structure should be cut by one-fourth or one-half. All of the services were slashing recruiting quotas, closing officer training programs, and pushing thousands of officers out of the ranks.[1] Almost every major procurement program was being looked at skeptically in Congress, and officials in the Bush Administration were scrambling to scale down requests for future spending before Congress did it for them.

Since the Iraqi invasion of its southern neighbor, the speed with which American military personnel arrived in Saudi Arabia was exceeded only by the speed with which Congress and the Bush Administration reversed course on the future of the military establishment. Almost overnight, euphoric judgments about the end of the Cold War and the triumph of democracy were replaced by warnings about appeasing dictators and analogies to the 1930s. The Bush Administration, which only a few months ago was mired in internal squabbles over which units to deactivate and which bases to close, called up the reserves to sustain a deployment that even in its early stages imposed enormous strains on all three services.[2] And the Congress, which just recently was complaining that the Administration was not moving fast enough to cut the force structure, responded with House and Senate resolutions authorizing the use of American force if Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait by the UN deadline.

This article attempts to look beyond the short-term perspectives that have dominated debates about American defense policy in recent years. The past 18 months are not the first time that the defense budget has offered a

tempting target to those who believed that capable armed forces had been rendered superfluous by changes in the climate of international affairs. The deployment to Saudi Arabia is merely the latest instance in which policy has been reversed in response to threatening developments overseas. It is useful to recall past efforts to carve a peace dividend out of the defense budget, because the consequences have not always been happy ones.

Peace Dividends of the Past

Between the end of the Second World War and the summer of 1947 total American active-duty forces declined from just over 12 million to roughly 1.5 million. Despite the decline in personnel strength, there was no corresponding reduction in the armed forces' responsibilities. On the eve of the Korean War, Army units were deployed in Europe, Japan and Okinawa, Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama, as well as in the continental United States. Many of the problems that were the product of the penurious budgets of the postwar years were particularly apparent in General Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command.

On paper, MacArthur's forces looked impressive: three infantry divisions, one cavalry division, a regimental combat team, and nine antiaircraft battalions. By 1950, however, four years of sharply curtailed budgets had left those forces ill-prepared for anything but occupation duty. Far East Command had declined from 300,000 in January 1947 to 108,500 by June 1950. Since the administrative requirements of the occupation of Japan had continued or even increased, MacArthur and his subordinate commanders had attempted to compensate for the decline in manpower by transferring personnel from combat units to administrative positions. To maintain a four-division structure despite the personnel shortage, some elements of each division were simply eliminated. Infantry divisions had only a tank company instead of a tank battalion and an antiaircraft battery instead of an antiaircraft battalion. Infantry regiments had only two battalions instead of three and were missing their tank company as well; artillery battalions had only two batteries instead of three. Support elements were so inadequate that more than 150,000 Japanese civilians were employed in roles normally filled by service troops.[3]

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Not only were MacArthur's forces far below wartime strength, they were also badly equipped. Army procurement after the Second World War was limited mostly to food, clothing, and medical supplies. Billions of dollars of equipment had been left to rust in the supply pipeline or to disintegrate on storage fields, but as of June 1950 MacArthur's forces had received no new vehicles or tanks since the end of World War II. Almost 90 percent of the armaments and 75 percent of the automotive equipment in the Eighth Army was derived from a program to reclaim surplus equipment left over from World War II.[4]

There was a price to be paid for the corners that were cut during the postwar years, and it was paid most heavily by the men rushed into combat during June and July 1950. The three divisions from Far East Command that were the first to reach Korea suffered heavy casualties, many of which might have been avoided in a less austere budgetary climate. The scarcity of training facilities in crowded Japan and the lack of sufficient funds to support realistic field exercises meant that MacArthur's forces were seriously deficient in critical combat skills and unit cohesion.[5] Regimental commanders whose previous experience had been with full-strength rather than stripped-down units were forced to improvise defensive tactics against a foe able "to envelope the understrength American units almost at will."[6] Vehicles broke down quickly, radios were often inoperable, and certain types of ammunition were in critically short supply.[7]

As it became clear that MacArthur's forces were inadequate to halt the North Korean advance, Army planners were faced with two problems: increasing the strength of MacArthur's units to wartime levels, and creating additional units which could be used to reinforce MacArthur and rebuild the general reserve in the United States. The first of these was accomplished by stripping Army units in the United States of infantry battalions and artillery batteries. Only the 82d Airborne Division and the infantry units of the 2d Armored Division were left untouched, although the latter contributed artillery batteries. MacArthur's needs were so great that the general reserve was left with only one completely manned unit for last-resort operations, the 82d Airborne.[8]

To generate additional divisions for the Far East and to rebuild the general reserve, a combination of activating reserve components and greatly increasing draft calls was employed. The Army Reserve contributed 244,300 officers and men. Four National Guard divisions also were called to active duty during the summer of 1950, and four more after the Chinese entered the war. Two of these, augmented by draftees, were sent to Korea; two were sent to Germany; four remained in the United States to reconstitute the training base and the general reserve. Three Guard regiments and more than 700 smaller units were also called up, for a total of 138,600 personnel.[9]

The effect of these measures on the size of the armed forces was nothing short of dramatic. By June 1951 the armed forces had more than doubled

in size while defense spending had increased from about $13 billion during fiscal 1950 to about $50.4 billion during fiscal 1953. In 1950, defense consumed about 5.4 percent of the gross national product; by 1952 the United States was devoting about 14.9 percent of a greatly expanded GNP to defense.[10]

The attempt to simultaneously fight in Korea, reinforce Europe, and rebuild the general reserve entailed the allocation of so much money to defense during the first two years of the Korean War that it was difficult to negotiate in timely fashion all the contracts needed to turn appropriations into weapons and equipment.[11] As the amount of undelegated funds increased, a countervailing pressure for sharp cuts in the defense budget began to build. Congress cut $4.3 billion from President Truman's $50.9 billion defense budget for fiscal 1953, "absolutely and proportionately the largest congressional cut in the military budget between 1946 and 1961."[12] From 1953 to 1960 the American defense effort as measured by the share of GNP allocated to defense fell by about one-third, from 14.7 percent in 1953 to 9.7 percent in 1960. Total active-duty forces fell from roughly 3.5 million in 1953 to 2.5 million in 1960.[13]

The Eisenhower Administration encouraged these cuts, on the grounds that defense expenditures should be reduced to a level the economy could support without undue strain over the long haul. The budget cuts necessary to eliminate the deficit inherited from the Truman Administration could be achieved only by significant reductions in defense spending, which required deep cuts in the number of military personnel. Manpower reductions would be offset by increased reliance on firepower in the form of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. The doctrinal basis for these changes was provided by NSC 162/2, approved by Eisenhower in October 1953, which rejected the assumption that a general war or even a large-scale limited war could be fought without nuclear weapons.[14]

NSC 162/2 authorized the services to plan to employ nuclear weapons in any conflict in which their use would be militarily advantageous, but two of the more significant military actions undertaken during Eisenhower's presidency—the threatened intervention in Jordan in April 1957 and the introduction of American troops into Lebanon in July 1958—were ones in which nuclear weapons could hardly have been less relevant. In April 1957, the Eisenhower Administration threatened to intervene if foreign "volunteers" or Syrian forces already inside Jordan went into action in support of rebellious Palestinians seeking to overthrow King Hussein.[15] Where might the necessary forces have come from? There were about 1800 Marines and 50 ships with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, but the former were too few to pacify a country as large as Jordan and the latter did not run on wheels. The question took on more than academic interest in July 1958 when American forces were dispatched to Lebanon to shore up the government of Camille Chamoun.

Eisenhower was reportedly astounded at the leisurely manner in which the Anglo/French expedition to capture the Suez Canal had unfolded in 1956, but the American landing in Lebanon two years later was hardly a model of swift and decisive action to secure important political objectives.[16] Eisenhower told the NSC on 14 July, "We're going to send in everything we've got, and this thing will be over in 48 hours if we do."[17] One consequence of the budgetary and manpower reductions of Eisenhower's first term was that "everything we've got" proved to be not very much, and the movement of forces to Lebanon was measured in weeks rather than days.

Eisenhower announced his decision to commit American forces in support of Chamoun's government to an NSC meeting on 14 July, at which time there were three Marine battalions afloat in the Mediterranean. The first landed on 15 July, the second on 16 July, and the third on 18 July. The first Army units—the 187th and 503d Airborne Battle Groups—did not arrive until 19 July.[18] Most of the Army units committed to Lebanon arrived only in early August, and it was not until 8 August that American forces ashore reached their peak strength of just over 14,000.[19]

The slow pace of the Lebanon operation was not for lack of advance warning. Chamoun had inquired of the US Ambassador on 11 May what the American response would be if he were to ask for help to quell the riots aimed at toppling his government. Shortly thereafter, the Marine contingent in the Mediterranean was doubled in strength, transport aircraft were sent to Germany, and 22 Army units in Europe were placed on alert for possible deployment to Lebanon.[20] Even so, it took roughly three weeks to move about 14,000 troops to Lebanon, despite the absence of any organized resistance there.

Eisenhower subsequently claimed that the buildup in Lebanon "could have been even faster had there been a necessity."[21] Arguing about what might have been is itself a perilous enterprise, but a close look at certain oft-neglected details of the Lebanon case suggests that even a smattering of organized resistance might have resulted in substantial casualties for the units involved. As in the case of the Korean War, efforts to squeeze a peace dividend from the defense budget had left American forces ill-prepared for rapid deployment over long distances.

Military forces are most vulnerable during the early days of an operation, especially if they are small in number and committed in piecemeal fashion. The first unit ashore was a Marine battalion that was called on to secure a beachhead perimeter of over 9500 yards, as opposed to a normal battalion frontage of 600 to 1500 yards. The beach used for the initial landing would have proved a formidable obstacle had reinforcements been urgently required—it had very soft sand which few wheeled vehicles could negotiate, while a few hundred yards out to sea was a large sandbar. As soon as the second battalion arrived on the beachhead, the first formed into a column to

secure the dock area several miles to the north. For the first three days of the operation, forces ashore consisted of two Marine battalions which were themselves divided between the Beirut airport and the docks.[22]

Because of the vulnerable location of the airport, Army and Air Force units assigned to reinforce the Marines were staged through Adana in Turkey, causing serious congestion there. Aircraft were parked nose-to-tail and wing-to-wing on every foot of concrete and on the hard ground alongside the runways. Flight crews and paratroops slept beside or under aircraft surrounded by piles of ammunition and maintenance equipment. Shortages of water, food, and compressed oxygen developed as the number of US personnel on the base increased from 300 to 5000. Poor health discipline resulted in an unusually high incidence of dysentery among the units moved to Lebanon.[23]

The intervention in Lebanon should have been a reminder that major contingencies tend to occur in places where one is least prepared to respond quickly and effectively, because it is there that hostile forces have the greatest leeway to pursue outcomes inimical to American interests. Eisenhower himself conceded that the Lebanon operation demonstrated the "gigantic" costs and complications of major instantaneous deployments, but that was all he was willing to concede.[24] He was fortunate that his diplomatic representatives were able to rebuild the Lebanese house of cards before the American military contingent became involved in hostilities. Had there been fighting, the corners that had been cut during the years prior to the landing might have again resulted in avoidable casualties, and the Lebanon operation would be remembered today as a bitter pill instead of an unqualified success.[25]

The end of the Vietnam War and the American disengagement from Southeast Asia sparked yet another round of hopes of a substantial peace dividend. Measured in constant dollars, US defense spending declined at an average rate of 1.5 percent per year from 1970 to 1980, and personnel strength fell to about 2.1 million, about 25 percent less than the pre-Vietnam total.[26] The impact was particularly severe on the general purpose forces, which were cut across the board.

The effect of these cuts was to greatly reduce the ability of the United States to respond quickly to developments in distant but strategically vital parts of the world, an outcome that was deemed not especially worrisome at the time. The 1970s were the decade when academics and some government officials propagated the notion of a "new international order," in which military force would be less important than before.[27] Events at the end of the decade, however, suggested that capable armed forces remained very useful, provided they could move quickly when trouble arose.

In November 1979, after the US Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian radicals, it took the carrier *Midway* and its escorts roughly ten days to arrive on the scene, by which time there was little for them to do except

steam in circles in the Arabian Sea. The seizure of the embassy in Tehran was followed by the attempted seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca, attacks by mobs on the American embassies in Islamabad and Tripoli, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter Administration responded to these upheavals with a blizzard of optimistic estimates of how quickly a rapid deployment force could be dispatched to southwest Asia in the event of an emergency and of how much better we could do in the future if Congress would fund all the strategic mobility initiatives that suddenly appeared in the fiscal 1981 defense budget. Far more eloquent was the Administration's inability in the short term to do much more than talk about how it planned to restore American influence in a region of great strategic importance.

Like the Truman Administration in 1950, the Carter Administration responded to trouble overseas by increasing the defense budget. Like the Truman Administration 30 years earlier, the Carter Administration pointed with pride to the long list of activities it was engaged in to strengthen the ability of the armed forces to respond to threatening events overseas. Credit-claiming of this sort is a staple of American politics, but the very act of doing so is a tacit admission of failure. The value of military forces is often better measured in terms of what does not happen rather than what does. The most capable armed forces are those that prevent trouble from arising because they exist in sufficient number and quality to dissuade troublemakers from threatening American interests. The greatly expanded defense budgets of the early 1950s and the early 1980s were less a sign of strength than of short-sightedness.

The events of the past 45 years suggest that Americans as a people have a propensity for overdoing things—in both directions—when it comes to spending money on defense. The end of a war generates inflated expectations of the savings that can be achieved by cutting back on military spending. These in turn are justified by claims that force has become less useful or that we can safely prepare for one or a few kinds of conflicts and neglect the rest. The postwar years have thus been characterized by declining manpower levels and decreasing readiness, which has left the armed forces ill-prepared to respond to future challenges.

Past peace dividends have proven largely illusory, because the savings have come at the price of diminished readiness and combat capability at the start of the next conflict. Because these shortcomings must be rectified quickly, the cost of doing so is much higher than if a more patient approach had been taken. During the early 1950s and the early 1980s, the attempt to enlarge and modernize all three services at once was itself an important cause of the rapid increase in defense spending during those two periods, because the attempt to buy many kinds of sophisticated weaponry at the same time inevitably results in substantial increases in unit costs.

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Rapid increases in the defense budget, in turn, all but guarantee that the larger forces and greater combat capability purchased during a period of rapid buildup will not prove sustainable. The higher the costs incurred while rebuilding the armed forces, the higher the hopes for a peace dividend once the challenge that catalyzed the buildup has been removed. The more determined the efforts to wring such a payoff from the defense budget, the greater the decline in combat capability, thus setting the stage for the cycle to repeat itself.

Uncertainties—Present and Enduring

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has frequently been cited as a reminder of the virtues of preparedness despite the victory of the West in the Cold War. Reminders of this sort may be useful for accumulating debating points concerning the size and composition of next year's defense budget, but they beg the question of the longer-term relationship between military power and American foreign policy. It is folly to peg American defense policy to episodic disturbances such as the current turmoil in the Middle East. Once the Iraq-Kuwait situation has been sorted out, we are likely to witness renewed pressures to fund a peace dividend out of the defense budget. Indeed, the more costly the exertions required to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait, the greater the pressure likely to arise in favor of a substantial cut in defense spending once the troops have returned home.

Americans are frequently struck by the contemporary relevance of such defense-conscious thinkers as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli, yet they are also persistent discoverers of new eras in which force will be devalued and a state's influence will depend more on the strength of its economy than on the size and quality of its armed forces. Their optimism in this regard is resilient but misguided—the prevalence of alliances, imperialism, and war throughout recorded history suggests that dramatic turning points in the conduct of international affairs are quite rare. The Cold War may be over, but there are at least four reasons for believing that large and capable armed forces will remain vital to the kind of world order in which American values and institutions can survive and flourish.

First, the countries of eastern Europe have ousted their dictatorial rulers in favor of democratic governments, but their internal politics remain unsettled and the potential for instability and the emergence of long-suppressed regional tensions remains high. Instability in eastern Europe was the catalyst for the First World War and an underlying cause of the Second. Both of those wars occurred despite assiduous efforts by academic thinkers to identify reasons why war had become unthinkable and/or impractical.[28]

Second, the diffusion of modern military technology throughout the Middle East does not bode well for the future. The Israeli-Palestinian struggle is merely one of many Middle Eastern flashpoints. Numerous other states in the region are involved in rivalries that could explode into hostilities: Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait in 1961 and actually did so in 1990; Iran has made threatening statements concerning its neighbors across the Persian Gulf; Syria has had designs on Jordan and Lebanon; Libya has been involved in Tunisia, Chad, and the Sudan. The history of the 20th century has not been kind to monarchical regimes, especially those in and around the Middle East. The violent overthrow of the ruling families of Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Iran; past insurrections in Jordan and Oman; and the evident nervousness of the royal family in Saudi Arabia all suggest a considerable potential for intra- and inter-state violence in that part of the world.

Third, the possibility that legitimate government authority may disintegrate completely in countries racked by social revolution is likely to be with us for many years to come. Reasonable people can disagree about whether the government of Maurice Bishop in Grenada posed a clear and present danger to its Caribbean neighbors or whether there was an imminent danger to the lives of American students at the medical school there. Few, however, would argue that a government has the right to disintegrate into anarchic violence or that international norms proscribing intervention in the affairs of sovereign states compel nearby countries to do nothing while contending factions unleash mob violence against their political rivals and anyone else who gets in their way.

Finally, there is the Soviet Union. For centuries before the Bolshevik revolution, the Czars and their agents used territorial expansion as a means to compensate for Russia's poverty and backwardness. Territorial expansion was also encouraged by an unfavorable geographical location: vulnerable borders in the west, restricted access to the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean, tenuous lines of communication with the Asian part of the empire. The expansionist tendencies exhibited by the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the early Cold War had their roots in centuries of Russian history. It would seem unlikely that even a Soviet Union committed to internal reform would suddenly abandon foreign policy goals so deeply embedded in Russian history. Conversely, secessionist tendencies in the Soviet Union should be more a cause of alarm than of complacency in the West. A beleaguered Moscow leadership

may yet see no recourse other than force to assert control over territories that have been part of the Soviet Union for half a century or longer. In such a case, how would the United States and its European partners choose to react?

Preparing Sensibly for the Future

Even if we concede that international politics is unlikely to lose its competitive and strife-ridden character for a long time to come, there remains the question of what should the Army be doing to prepare for future conflicts? The Army faces a heavy burden in this regard because the tasks it will be called on to perform in support of American foreign policy toward Europe and the Third World are quite different. If the Army had access to unlimited funds for personnel and procurement, it would be possible and even preferable to fund what for all practical purposes would be several armies wearing the same uniform: armored and mechanized divisions for high-intensity conflicts, light infantry divisions for low-intensity conflicts, airborne divisions, Rangers, Special Forces, and so on. But budgets for personnel and procurement are not unlimited and will likely be subject to further erosion once the deployment to Saudi Arabia has been concluded. Choices will have to be made concerning how best to use the limited resources available in the face of seemingly endless federal budget deficits. The stakes involved include more than just money—one cannot help wondering how many of MacArthur's men died because neither they nor their units were adequately prepared for the intense combat they encountered during July and August 1950.

The ability of the Army to contribute to the goal of war-prevention in Europe will continue to be a function of the number and quality of the units that it stations there. While the United States will withdraw some forces from Europe, it is in no one's interest for the Army to withdraw entirely from the reunified Germany. Naval and air forces will not suffice in this regard; what will be required for many years to come is an American presence in the center of Europe. The purpose of such a presence is to reassure Europeans on both sides of the continent that the history of the first half of the 20th century will not be repeated. Paradoxically, complaints that there is no one in Europe to fight against should be taken as an indicator of the success of the policy of maintaining an American presence there. The louder those complaints grow, the more likely the policy is working.

Scenarios that unfold outside Europe pose a greater challenge, in part because there are so many to consider and in part because the Army is divided as to whether its mission is to deter wars or to fight them.[29] The debate over deterrence versus warfighting is one of those rare cases in which both sides have managed to miss the point. Winning wars is wonderful, preventing them is even better, but to prevent wars it is first necessary to be able to fight them. The most effective armed forces are those that are so well-prepared to fight

that potential opponents think long and hard before challenging them and then decide not to because of the costs and risks involved.

Crisis prevention and crisis management in scenarios that unfold outside of Europe will require an Army that can arrive on the scene *before* trouble gets out of hand and in sufficient numbers to prevail against those who would do harm to American interests. The faster the Army can arrive in numbers large enough to make a difference, the less likely it is that hostile states or revolutionary groups will take actions harmful to American interests. The standoff resulting from the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait and the American deployment to Saudi Arabia suggests that it is by far preferable to deter attacks on friendly states than to compel a predator to surrender its prize. Since there are many important states far from the United States but close to potential foes, the Army (and the Navy and Air Force as well) will need to work even harder in the coming years to improve our capability for rapid deployment over long distances. There are several steps that the Army can take in this regard.

One is to deploy troops and equipment closer to potential trouble spots. If the key to coping with future challenges is the ability to arrive on the scene quickly with forces large enough to give an opponent second thoughts about initiating hostilities, then the post-Cold War preoccupation with pulling forces back to the United States is misguided and inappropriate. Units based in the United States are so far removed from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Asia in general as to be of little use in the event of emergencies there. Our Korean experience suggests that the most expensive military forces are those that are not available when needed and thus must be rebuilt during the inflationary spiral that accompanies a major war. Units slated for withdrawal from Europe should be considered assets to be retained rather than burdens to be discarded, since maintaining them in the force structure will ultimately be less costly than recreating them under the strain of a future emergency. They should be relocated to bases outside the continental United States, such as Guam or Puerto Rico, rather than brought home and demobilized. It may even be that the present Iraqi-generated crisis will open the door politically for a semi-permanent US ground presence in the Gulf.

Basing considerations are also important in the case of the Army's light infantry divisions. These are supposed to be swiftly deployable to tropical or

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desert environments, yet two—the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Divisions—are permanently based in Alaska and upstate New York. The forces currently deployed to Saudi Arabia are learning first-hand the debilitating effects of heat, wind, and sand, but many of those units came from warm-weather climates such as Georgia, Texas, and southern California. Sudden changes of climate are even more debilitating for units moving from a cold-weather climate to the desert. The first time the Iraqis threatened to invade Kuwait, in 1961, ten percent of the British soldiers flown there directly from the United Kingdom were out of action from heat disorders during the first five days of the operation. The experience in Kuwait inspired a British army trial to compare the reactions to field exercises of a platoon flown from the UK to Aden with those of a platoon stationed in Bahrain during the previous nine months. The results showed that none of the troops from Bahrain suffered from severe heat illness and only a few from minor complaints. In contrast, one-fourth of the troops from the UK were ineffective within a few hours of arrival in Aden, and over the 12-day period of the trial the platoon from the UK became, for all practical purposes, ineffective for combat.[30]

Second, more needs to be done with respect to promoting interservice cooperation. Interservice cooperation is one of those subjects about which much is said and little is done, but treating it seriously for a change could do much to mitigate the adverse consequences of the austerity likely to be imposed once the troops come home from Saudi Arabia. It does little good to deploy Army units closer to potential trouble spots unless they are endowed in advance with the means of getting there. Instead of separate Army and Air Force installations, we should be thinking about collocating Army units and the Air Force transports that would carry them into action. Some of the equipment slated for withdrawal from Europe could usefully be stored aboard Navy vessels that could maintain an over-the-horizon presence near potential trouble spots. Eight fast sealift ships and nine maritime pre-positioning ships participated in Operation Desert Shield, but the pace of the deployment suggests that much more remains t be done.

The more of these combined units that can be deployed forward as a result of new basing arrangements and/or frequent and realistic exercises, the more visible their activities will be and thus the greater their ability to deter crises by dissuading hostile states from challenging American interests. The greater the number of combined units forward-deployed, the more rapid the Army's response to crisis situations and thus the more effective it can be in support of efforts to manage and defuse crises short of war.

Third, we need to think about re-equipping Army units to make it easier for them to move quickly across long distances. Army officers have talked for years about the advantages of equipment that would be easily air-transportable, but results have been sadly lacking. In December 1980, to

cite one example, Army officials were said to be thinking about a 22-ton tank that would be easier to transport over long distances than either the M1 or the M60,[31] but more than ten years later a scaled-down tank that can be moved relatively easily by air is still the subject of vague plans for the future.

Finally, it will be necessary to change the way in which the Army and indeed all the services respond to the prospect of declining budgets. Budgetary shortfalls have typically been met with cuts in the operations and maintenance account and stretch-outs of expensive procurement programs. The former produces an immediate decline in outlays (important to deficit-cutters) while the latter offers the hope of keeping production lines open until the purse strings loosen. A strong case can be made that this is the wrong way to respond to declining budgets, for two reasons.

First, cutting the operations and maintenance account reduces the visibility and efficacy of the Army's exercises and preparations for future conflicts, thereby diminishing its ability to contribute to the goals of crisis prevention and crisis management. Second, stretching out procurement plans has the effect of entangling the Army in a vicious cycle from which it has proven very difficult to break free.[32]

Production stretch-outs invariably raise unit costs, thereby reducing even further the number of items that can be bought for a given sum. More important, rising unit costs encourage the services to initiate elaborate research and development projects intended to produce new weapons that can do the work of several items in the current inventory (e.g. the LHX helicopter). Because the new systems are expected to perform several missions as well or better than the items they replace, they prove to be more complex than expected, thereby raising R&D costs and unit costs as well. The higher these costs prove to be, the more exaggerated the claims made on behalf of the new system, thereby inspiring skepticism among military reformers and Congressional critics. The greater the skepticism, the more the new system is called on to do in order to justify funds already committed and future spending authority that will be requested from Congress. As unit costs continue to climb, production rates are slowed even further and procurement plans stretched out over longer periods, thereby exacerbating the rise in unit costs. Alternatively, programs are canceled in favor of more exotic combinations of new technology (e.g. DIVAD and FAADS). In the meantime, troops in the field must continue to rely on the supposedly outdated or ineffective systems that inspired the search for an elaborate technological fix in the first place.

To Conclude

Four times since the end of the Second World War defense budgets in the United States have been cut in anticipation of changes in the international arena that would render capable armed forces less necessary and a

substantial peace dividend possible. These hopes have been repeatedly frustrated, but Americans have demonstrated an almost boundless capacity to believe that the future will be brighter than the past.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred at a time when the defense budget had already been declining for several years and the Bush Administration and the Congress were at odds over whether the force structure could safely be cut by one-fourth or one-half. It is instructive to ask what the outcome might have been had the attack on Kuwait occurred after the cuts under consideration had been carried out. Would the result have been another Korea, with understrength American brigades enveloped by a numerically superior foe while the nation rushed to rebuild the forces that it had recently discarded in a fit of absent-mindedness?

Americans combine a hard-headed determination not to back down from a challenge with an easy susceptibility for the notion that international politics has changed, that force has lost its utility, and that the defense budget can safely be cut. It is one of the more remarkable aspects of the American political scene that a people capable of the exertions required by the Second World War, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the Cold War could so easily convince themselves that the end of a war will bring fundamental changes in international affairs and that similar exertions will not be required in the future. Even more remarkable is the apparent ability of Americans to forget how these hopes have been dashed repeatedly in the past and to cling to the notion that this time things will really be different.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the UN response as manifested by Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm have temporarily side-tracked the latest round of hopes for fundamental change in the conduct of international affairs, but the history of the last 45 years suggests that it will be followed by renewed optimism that the elusive peace dividend will finally materialize. It behooves those concerned about the future of the armed forces to think carefully about what can be done—in the face of the inevitable pressures to the contrary—to ensure that the forces are well-suited to the challenges likely to arise during the 1990s and beyond. The Army of the 21st century is being built now.

NOTES

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3. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction, The First Year* (Washington. US Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), pp. 52-54.

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17. Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 532.

18. Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 273-76; William Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970," in Barry Blechman et al., *Force Without War* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 240-44. The two airborne units were drawn from American forces in West Germany.

19. Eisenhower, p. 286; Quandt, p. 246.

20. Quandt, p. 229-30, 237; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 88 (October 1962), 66ff.

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23. Brown, pp. 74-75.

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25. Ibid.; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1965), pp. 444-45, Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 97-104.

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28. See the discussion of the work of Norman Angell in Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York. Dell, 1963). See also E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Selig Adler, *The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 22ff.; and Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars* (New York: Norton, 1966), pp. 201-11

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30. Philip Darby, *British Defense Policy East of Suez* (London: Oxford Univ Press, 1973), p. 248; Brown, p. 93.

31 "Tank Designers Stress Technology Instead of More Weight," *The New York Times*, 19 December 1980, p. A16.

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US Arms Transfers:
New Rules, New Reasons

STEPHEN C. DAFFRON

R ecent events have raised a number of controversial questions about the costs and benefits of US arms transfer policy. The decision to enter into a codevelopment program with Japan for the FSX, the sale of the M1A2 tank to Saudi Arabia, and the raucous debate over the reallocation of military aid all revolved around the transfer of weaponry by the United States. Were these decisions based on US security interests or were they economically motivated? According to the State Department, the decision to sell the FSX to Japan was a matter of promoting strategic military interdependence—but the transfer was opposed and almost overridden by Congress based on the perception that it would have a detrimental effect on US competitiveness in the international aerospace market. The estimated $3.1 billion price tag for the Abrams tank and accompanying equipment, as well as the thousands of US jobs entailed, undoubtedly had something to do with the Saudi sale—but the transfer also demonstrated US evenhandedness and a commitment to moderate Arabs, even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The increase in military aid to Latin America promised by President Bush was aimed at reducing the drugs flowing into the United States— but the increase was opposed by some members of Congress because of its high cost in these times of budgetary crisis.

How did we reach this level of convoluted complexity? In the bad-old good-old days, US arms transfer policy was defined in the simple terms of the East-West political equation. Now questions of what the weapons cost and where they are made seem to weigh as heavily as whom they are meant to be used against. Part of the answer lies in the realization that US arms transfer policy is only one component in a not-so-simple equation called the international arms transfer regime.[1] This regime consists of rules and norms generated as a function of the political and economic interests of the the United States, its allies, and its clients. As those varied interests evolve,

so does the regime. The aim of this article is to trace the evolution of these rules and norms as reflected in US arms transfer policies over the past 30 years. Only if we know how we reached this point can American policymakers hope to shape the continuing evolution of the regime in the service of our national interests.

Vietnam and the Third World: An Old Weapon in a New Arena

The original postwar focus of the US-created arms transfer regime was to provide weapons to the states that served the preeminent goal of US foreign policy—the containment of the Soviet Union. The vast majority of US arms and assistance during the first 20 years following World War II was therefore lavished on Western Europe. Beginning with the success of Castro's revolution, however, the United States changed the geopolitical focus of the arms transfer regime from the developed to the developing world. While opposing Soviet expansion remained the theme, the principal arena for that expansion and the US response to it became the Third World (see Table 1, on the following page).

In an address before the Corps of Cadets at West Point in 1962, President John F. Kennedy identified the new challenge: "Subversive insurgency is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins. . . . It requires a whole new kind of strategy . . . a wholly different kind of force."[2] A large part of this new strategy revolved around the transfer of arms. The crucible for testing this new direction was Southeast Asia. By 1963, Vietnam dominated US foreign aid and defense spending. East Asia and the Pacific region ranked first throughout this period in terms of the funds expended under the Military Assistance Program, garnering more than $3.8 billion. Yet that sum was dwarfed by the $15 billion provided under the auspices of a special fund called the Military Assistance Service Fund, created for the purpose of supplying arms and military assistance to US allies in Southeast Asia.

Despite this huge outlay of funds, the results of military assistance in Vietnam were, to say the least, disappointing. These results led US policymakers to doubt the efficacy of military policies in general, and arms transfers in particular, in countering the threat posed by insurgencies in the Third

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Table 1: Regional Rankings of Recipients of US Arms
(millions of current US dollars)

Fiscal Years 1950-1963

Europe/Canada	18,400
East Asia/Pacific	8,970
Near East/South Asia	1,570
American Republics	600
Africa	93

Fiscal Years 1964-1973

East Asia/Pacific*	19,170
Europe/Canada	2,770
Near East/South Asia	582
American Republics	426

*All Military Assistance Service Fund appropriations are included in this regional total.

Source: *Defense Security Assistance Agency Annual Presentation to Congress, 1986.*

World. Even before the full effect of the larger political and military failures in Vietnam had become evident, the Johnson Administration began turning toward economic and social development as a complement to, if not an outright replacement for, military assistance. This development led the United States to reduce the numbers and sophistication of the weapons being offered to other Third World states. This new attitude was evident in the State Department's encouragement of Asian and Latin American military leaders to lend their managerial and technical assistance to civilian development efforts, accompanied by pointed suggestions that they reduce their requests for expensive weapons which would absorb funds and manpower needed for economic modernization.

Many Third World leaders, both military and civilian, deeply resented such thinly veiled paternalism. For example, when Peru decided in 1965 to replace its obsolete F-86 fighter-interceptors with a modern supersonic aircraft, the United States refused to allow the export of the Northrop F5A Freedom Fighter because the request represented "a prime example of wasteful military expenditures for unnecessarily sophisticated equipment . . . when generous US credits are being extended for economic development."[3] Angrily denouncing the US interference, the Peruvians turned to Europe to satisfy their demands, with the French only too happy to help. Other Latin American states quickly followed suit, and soon the British, Italians, and Germans, as well as the French, had reentered the Latin American market. The United States reacted strongly to such blatant violation of the rules of the

regime—at one point threatening to suspend all economic aid to Peru because of its ill-advised purchase. But the threat was never carried out. The rules of the regime had changed. Both "recipient" or "purchasing" states like Peru and allied supplier states like France had discovered that they could violate certain aspects of the US-defined rules with relative impunity.

The change in rules did not mean, however, that the regime was not worth maintaining—just that some of the rules were being rewritten. Even while the tragedy of Vietnam was still center stage, the Six Day War of 1967 highlighted the continuing utility of the arms transfer regime to both the subscribing states and the United States. The weapons transferred to Israel were focused directly on a regional conflict which was linked only indirectly to the larger East-West confrontation. The overwhelming success of the US-supplied Israeli military was seen by other recipient states as a revalidation of the essential rules of the regime—but without the overarching East-West political constraint. The memory of this third-party success in the closing days of the direct US involvement in Southeast Asia brought the changed norms into sharp focus and gave them de facto legitimacy.

Emergence of the Nixon Doctrine

In 1969, the United States made the changes official policy—christening them collectively the Nixon Doctrine. This new set of norms and rules recognized the limitation on the US use of force, and said that the United States, which could no longer act directly using its own military forces in the Third World, would instead act indirectly to achieve its security interests. This would be accomplished using the forces of friendly states, which would be generously armed and supplied by the United States. The subtext of the policy said that the absolute control previously exercised by the United States would now be tempered by US acceptance of its own limitations.

It is worthwhile noting that the new rules promulgated by the United States under this policy also included a sharply worded requirement for subscribing states to pay for, rather than receive as aid, the material assistance provided by the United States. This new encouragement of "self-sufficiency" was to be modified only as absolutely necessary, based on specific policy objectives of the United States in terms of access to bases and reinforcement of endangered allies.[4]

The most illustrative and famous example of the Nixon Doctrine was the relationship that developed between the United States and Iran. Iran had long been considered an important ally of the United States, but it took on even more prominence with the British announcement that the presence of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf would end in 1971. While British military forces in the Gulf were hardly awe-inspiring, the United States had generally relied on London to serve as the guardian of Western interests in that vital

region. With the British out of the picture, and the ability of the United States to use military force severely limited by its heavy commitments in Southeast Asia, a new strategy had to be developed. Henry Kissinger, then the National Security Advisor to President Nixon, ordered a review of the policy options. The results of this review as approved by Nixon were reflected in National Security Decision Memorandum Number 92 (NSDM-92), issued on 12 July 1969. The essence of this strategic decision was a formal application of the Nixon Doctrine to the Persian Gulf. The memorandum recognized the new limitations on American power and identified the corresponding requirement to bolster Iranian power in order to guard Western interests in the Gulf region.

This transformation led to a series of significant departures from the old rules of the regime. While the Shah was more than willing to serve as a regional gendarme, he fully expected to acquire the military resources befitting such a change in the rules of the regime. No longer would Iran simply accept the secondhand weapons supplied by the Military Assistance Program; it insisted on being supplied with the most sophisticated arms in the US arsenal. One of the first changes the Shah demanded was a complete upgrade of the Iranian air force with the Grumman F-14 Tomcat. This request was a shocking departure from the old rules. Never before had the United States transferred such an advanced weapon to a Third World nation, and never before had a Third World state been so adamant about its demands. The Shah himself stated the case clearly: "Western Europe, the United States, and Japan see the gulf as an integral part of their security, yet they are not in a position to ensure that security. That's why we're doing it for them."[5] When doubts surfaced in the Pentagon about the ability of Iran to safeguard the advanced technology contained in such weapons, the transfer of the Tomcat was delayed. The Shah reacted angrily to the delay, criticizing the US refusal to support him in his attempts to contain communism and protect Western interests in Southwest Asia.[6] President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger thereupon visited the Shah to soothe his ruffled feathers, following which the President directed that in the future "Iranian arms requests are not to be second-guessed."[7]

In the years following Nixon's carte blanche, Iran ordered staggering numbers of US weapons. The backlog of Iranian arms ordered but not delivered climbed from $500 million in 1972 to $2.2 billion in 1973 to $4.3 billion in 1974. Table 2, on the following page, lists the major weapons the United States agreed to supply to Iran during this period.[8]

By the mid-1970s, critics of the arms transfer regime within the United States were becoming much more vocal. Members of Congress and the press charged that the Nixon and the Ford Administrations had lost sight of the underlying logic for US arms transfers. Despite these complaints, the United States continued to expand its share of the international arms market.

Table 2: US-Iranian Arms Agreements 1972-1974

System	Number Ordered	Estimated Cost
F-14 Fighter	80	$2 billion
F5F Fighter-Interceptors	169	$480 million
F-4 Fighter-Bombers	209	$1 billion
F-16 Fighter	116	$3.2 billion
Helicopter Gunships	202	$367 million
Transport Helicopters	326	$496 million
Destroyers	4	$1.5 billion

Source: US Congress, Senate, *U S. Military Sales to Iran*, Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.

Kissinger, the architect of the policy, saw the economic situation and the post-Vietnam political imperatives as making these massive transfers more compelling than ever before.[9] The balance-of-payments problem was far larger than the paltry sums that had caused alarm during the Kennedy era, and it was being accelerated by the rapid increase in the price of oil. As the red ink mounted, the United States scrambled to recover as many of the hemorrhaging petrodollars as possible. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements testified before Congress that the arms transfers to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states strengthened "both free world security and the US balance of payments position."[10] Congress, however, was not convinced. In a much publicized report, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared bluntly that the executive branch had lost control of the arms being transferred to the Middle East and that US arms transfer policy in that region should be reevaluated.[11]

While the Middle East was the primary focus of the Nixon Doctrine, US sales to Europe had continued during this period. Unlike the early postwar years, however, the European aerospace industries—not only French and British but also Swedish, Dutch, Italian, and German—were unwilling to concede lucrative European sales to the American defense industry. Doling out promises of subcontracts, industrial offsets, and commercial spin-offs, European corporations like Dassault, Saab, Fokker, and Messerschmitt lobbied their governments for support and attempted to use that support to leverage other European governments. Dassault was undeniably the most aggressive in such efforts—though the French government needed little persuasion to see the benefits of a French-produced European fighter. By August 1974, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was calling the selection of a European aircraft "a test of political will for a united Europe."[12]

In the United States, General Dynamic's new lightweight fighter-interceptor, the F-16 Falcon, had won the Air Force's competition to supplement the heavier and more expensive F-15 Eagle, which was designed for the air superiority mission. The US Department of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, felt it was essential to standardize NATO fighters on the American model, thereby cutting per-unit F-16 procurement costs for the US Air Force. The Pentagon made no attempt to disguise its efforts to convince the European militaries that the F-16 should also be their choice. In an ironic bit of teamwork, congressional critics of increased defense spending were also aware of the increased cost of defending Europe and made pointed references in the American press to the dollars being wasted on the inefficient procurement projects necessary to arm NATO. Even President Ford got into the act by specifically addressing the question with Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans during a 1974 NATO summit.

At first, American pressure seemed to have no effect. Every American move was met by a series of European countermoves; by the spring of 1975, no European state had yet made a commitment to buy the F-16. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger then offered to sweeten the deal by arranging generous coproduction contracts and assuring the Europeans they could recoup their investment by selling additional planes to the Third World. Focusing on Belgium as the key state, he also offered to offset the cost by purchasing $30 million worth of Belgian machine guns. Apparently the sweeteners worked: at the Paris air show in June, the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, and Danes announced that they would buy the F-16 in what was called the "arms deal of the century" in *Newsweek*.[13]

Arms Transfers Reined In: Idealism and the Carter Era

By the last year of the Ford Administration, the executive branch's apparent loss of control over US arms transfers had led Congress to pass the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act over President Ford's veto.[14] This theme was seized upon up by Jimmy Carter in his campaign for the presidency. Addressing the Foreign Policy Association he said, "I am particularly concerned by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman. . . . [T]he United States cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war." Nor was his interest only a campaign issue. In one of his first actions following his inauguration in January 1977, President Carter ordered Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to review all aspects of US arms export policies and to develop recommendations for modifying these policies and practices. Four months later, after extensive bureaucratic negotiation involving the White House. the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Defense, the new guidelines were adopted as Presidential Directive Number 13 (PD-13).

These guidelines again altered the basic rules of the arms transfer regime. The changes ensued largely from the introduction of two basic assumptions reflective of Carter's skeptical view of arms transfers: first, that the spread of conventional weapons threatened international stability, and second, that the United States had a special responsibility as the world's leading military power to shape the regime so as to restrain arms transfers. According to Carter, this dual imperative meant that the United States would henceforth "view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests."[15]

The guidelines were immediately attacked from both sides. Arms exporters condemned the controls as unfair and too restrictive, while arms control proponents thought them too weak and too full of loopholes to have a significant effect. Both were right, to some extent. As the arms merchants and their lobbyists anticipated, the guidelines caused significant changes in the way the bureaucracy managed the export of arms, but loopholes permitted a selective application of the rules. The net effect was that the rate of US arms transfers was reduced in some regions of the world but continued to balloon elsewhere.

Carter's unilateral restriction had no noticeable effect on the arms transfers of US allies. European arms exporters simply were not interested in restricting arms exports. While they mouthed platitudes on restraint, they were also busily grabbing the sales no longer being pursued by the Americans. Citing the health of their arms industries and the necessity of maintaining their economic and political interests in the Third World, the French, British, Italians, and increasingly the Germans and Japanese actively competed for the newly available slice of the international arms market.[16] The marketing blitz mounted by these states made the US suggestion of multilateral restraints by Western producers look ridiculous. In their defense, the Europeans suggested to the Carter Administration that before the smaller exporters could begin effectively to restrict their arms exports, the superpowers must first come to some agreement on restricting their own arms exports.

Taking his cue from the Europeans, President Carter ordered discussions with the Soviets on the subject, prompting the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks of 1977. But the effort faltered. While the delegations met four times and it seemed initially that real progress was possible, the US delegation became embroiled in a bureaucratic dogfight and the talks soon broke down completely.[17]

Although never officially rescinded, the arms export guidelines were renounced de facto during the last two years of the Carter Administration. Secretary Vance later explained the Carter Administration's change of heart as a function of Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the Third World and the

cynical unwillingness of other nations to even attempt multilateral restraint of weapon sales.[18] The idealism of the Carter restraints on arms transfers had come in with a bang, but it went out with a whimper.

Reaganism, Pragmatism, and Changes in the Regime

The Reagan Administration approached arms transfers with a philosophy exactly opposite to President Carter's. During their first six months, the Reaganites abandoned nearly all the Carter initiatives and offered instead practices designed to facilitate the use of arms transfers as a foreign policy tool. US military and embassy staffs were instructed to provide all "courtesies and assistance to firms that have obtained licenses to market items on the United States Munitions List as they would to those marketing other US products."[19] In a speech to the Aerospace Industries Association, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley criticized Carter's arms transfer policy as having "substituted theology for a healthy sense of self-preservation." He pointed out the increase in military power of the Soviet Union relative to the United States which had occurred during the Carter presidency and indicated that the primary function of US arms transfer policy under the Reagan Administration would be an attempt to reverse that trend. This purpose, he explained, was obstructed by congessional limitations on arms transfers over concerns such as human rights violations or nuclear proliferation. "While these well-intentioned efforts have had little detectable impact on such behavior or intentions, they did lead at times to the awkward result of undercutting the capabilities of strategically located nations in whose ability to defend themselves we have the most immediate and urgent self-interest."

Reagan's guidelines were announced as formal policy on 8 July 1981 in a directive specifically superseding Carter's PD-13. Focusing on the "challenges and hostility toward fundamental US interests," the new guidance said the United States must "in today's world not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of security assistance." Noting the absence of interest in restraining arms on the part of other arms-producing countries, the directive declared, "The United States will not jeopardize its own security needs through a program of unilateral restraint." The

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The idealism of President Carter's restraints on arms transfers had come in with a bang, but it went out with a whimper.

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document listed in some detail the advantages that the Reagan Administration expected to derive from this change in policy, including helping to deter aggression, improving effectiveness of US armed forces, increasing interoperability and standardization of allied forces, demonstrating American commitment, fostering regional and international stability, and helping to "enhance US defense production capabilities and efficiency."[20] Citing realpolitik as the only significant justification for the arms transfer regime, Reagan's policy held that the only criterion to be uniformly applied was a transfer's "net contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense" of the United States.

The repeal of the Carter guidelines and the new strength of American defense spending presaged a surge in US arms transfers. All the bureaucratic signs pointed to increased support by the US government for military exports. Approvals that had been delayed for weeks under Carter were now approved in a day.[21] Even before the new policy was announced, the Reagan Administration had approved several weapon sales that had been repeatedly denied by the previous Administration. For example, Reagan offered Pakistan's General Zia the advanced version of the F-16, minimizing the nuclear proliferation problems attendant upon the sale. Completely reversing the refusal to sell sophisticated arms to Latin America, the United States also agreed to sell two squadrons of F-16s to Venezuela despite opposition within the Pentagon and the Organization of American States. Cobra helicopters with TOW antitank missiles were requested by Jordan's King Hussein and quickly approved for sale. M-60 tanks and anti-insurgency OV-10 planes were sold to Morocco to aid in its struggle against the Polisario in the Spanish Sahara. During his first three months in office, President Reagan offered more than $15 billion in weapon transfers to governments around the globe—a record that in constant dollars exceeds even the volume of contracts following Nixon's carte blanche to Iran. During Reagan's first two years in office, contracts negotiated under the Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Construction Sales programs grew from $7.6 billion in FY 1981 to $20.3 billion in FY 1982.[22]

One such decision proved to be the most politically controversial decision of the first Reagan Administration. In February 1980, Saudi Arabia formally requested permission to purchase the E-3 AWACS. The Reagan Administration agreed, deciding to offer the AWACS in a package that included Sidewinder missiles, long-range fuel tanks for the F-15, and aerial refueling tankers. The resulting firestorm of opposition from Congress, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, and the press initially blocked the transfer in the Senate. Only after an intense and politically costly lobbying campaign was the Administration able to uphold the sale on a narrow 52-48 vote.

Outside the Middle East, Reaganism opened up new markets for American arms. Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia contracted to buy the F-16, which had become the world's most popular fighter aircraft. In 1985,

> *During his first three months in office, President Reagan offered more than $15 billion in weapon transfers to governments around the globe.*

Algeria, a traditional customer of the French arms industry, after wooing by the Reagan Administration, requested permission to buy US arms. India, which had not purchased a major piece of US weaponry since 1965, signed an agreement in late 1985 to purchase US weapons.

The most significant of these new customers in terms of the old East-West rules was the People's Republic of China. In March 1980, soon after the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the Department of State officially sanctioned the export of certain non-lethal defense material to the PRC.[23] The liberalization process continued in 1981 when China was removed from the list of nations routinely denied US munitions exports and was instead classified as category V—covering nations that were not allies but were considered as "friendly to US national interests."

Dealing in a Buyer's Market

Despite these new customers, the total dollar value of US arms transfers fell following the initial burst of sales. This decline was not restricted to US arms transfers; the amount of weapons sold worldwide fell off by 28 percent in 1983. However, when the global level of arms transfers began to rise again in the middle of the decade, the US trend line remained relatively flat. The international market for US arms seemed to be drying up, especially in the Third World. Analysts pointed out the increasing awareness in these developing states of the link between their debt to Western banks and the weapons ordered from Western countries. The response of the arms exporting nations was to compete even more keenly for the sales that were still available.

Competition was especially fierce at the upper end of the technology scale—products such as aircraft, missiles, and avionics. Britain and France had long been powerful in this high-tech market; now other European states like Sweden and Italy expanded their capabilities so that they too could compete for the big prizes. At the lower end of the scale, newly industrializing states like Brazil and Spain began to make significant inroads in the international market. Brazil, in particular, became a global competitor in armored personnel carriers, military trucks, and medium tanks. The Brazilians also competed, with somewhat less success, in the global market for short-range missiles and trainer aircraft.

The US market share eroded as the competition heated up. From its peak of 36 percent in 1982, the US share dropped to less than 30 percent in 1987.[24] In a landmark deal, Saudi Arabia, America's premier cash customer in the Middle East, agreed in June 1988 to buy an estimated $10 billion in aircraft and military equipment from the British. While the loss of the Saudi sale was not in itself catastrophic, the implications of the loss of the Middle Eastern market are far from trivial. Paul Nisbet, an analyst for Prudential Bache, estimated in 1989 that the weapon orders shifting from US to European sources in the Middle East alone would total more than $100 billion over the following 12 to 15 years.[25]

To compete in this buyer's market, US defense exporters were forced to share more of the profits, jobs, and technology associated with the arms deals. The necessity to compete in terms of coproduction rights, financing, and technology transfer rather than just the capability of the weapons and the purchase price was a new and unpleasant experience for the American defense industry. American weapons had traditionally been the most sought-after in the world because of their reliability and the prestige associated with the American military. By the mid-1980s that was no longer the case. As the Defense Science Board concluded in a 1987 report: "For the past 40 years, America has assumed that globalization was a one-way street; we had the superior technology . . . [and] allies were expected to rely on our advanced systems for equipping their forces. Today, because of the evolution of the world economy, that is no longer true."[26]

Offsets have become another obstacle to traditional US transfers in this new, more complicated international arms market. Not content with simply acquiring the best weapon system at the best price, purchasing states, both developed and developing, insist that the cost of importing the weapon be offset by exports of its products or an accompanying transfusion of technology.[27] Direct offsets occur when the seller purchases something from the purchasing state which is used in the production of the weapon system. Indirect offsets are more complicated arrangements involving a reciprocal purchase of goods unrelated to the acquisition of the weapon system. In the case of indirect offsets, the US contractor must use or market the goods that it acquires as part of the deal. Barter or countertrade is simply that—acceptance of a quantity of some other good in exchange for an agreed-upon number of weapons.

While the US government refuses to become officially involved in negotiating offsets, most sales of American weapons during the Reagan era included some form of these agreements.[28] According to a study conducted by the Office of Management and Budget, $22.4 billion of military contracts between 1980 and 1984 included acknowledged offset agreements equaling $12.3 billion. While countertrade and barter agreements are generally associated with Third World sales, most direct and indirect offset agreements

by US defense exporters are with the more industrialized allies and involve primarily the transfer of technology in coproduction schemes. To compete successfully for the sale of the F/A-18 fighter in Switzerland, McDonnell Douglas negotiated an offset package that was actually larger than the $1.8 billion the Swiss agreed to pay for the aircraft. Likewise, Boeing's AWACS sale to Britain was closed only after the American corporation agreed to spend $1.30 in Britain for every $1 in revenue generated by the purchase of the surveillance aircraft. The debate over the sale of a modified form of the F-16 fighter to be produced in Japan (called the FSX project for Fighter Support Experimental) hinged primarily on questions of technology transfer and the long-term economic effect of the offset package. In each of these agreements the economics of the sale was considered more important than the political consequences as defined in terms of the then-prevailing East-West conflict.

Conclusion

When we look back on the evolution of the US arms transfer regime over the last 30 years, two trends stand out clearly. First, the rules and norms of the regime are no longer defined in Cold War terms, nor are they ordained solely or even primarily by the United States. Instead, the rules and norms of contemporary arms transfers are an amalgam of compromises among the political and economic interests of the United States, its allies who are also arms suppliers, and the purchasing states. The norms and rules of the Cold War arms transfer regime were composed primarily of political restrictions enforced and underwritten by the predominance of US economic and political power. The erosion of that predominance has led to changes which make the current regime seem more cooperative than hegemonic in nature. While the United States remains the strongest player in the arms transfer game, it can no longer make or change the rules on its own.

Second, the relative importance of politics and economics in the regime has changed. Before and during the Vietnam War, the United States transferred weapons in exchange for nothing more substantial than a clear signal of political allegiance in the East-West conflict. Today, the United States, while still supporting its indigent and oppressed allies with military aid, also seeks economic advantage from the transfer of its weapons. The heated competition for sales between the United States and its allies, the increasing importance of offsets and countertrade, and the relative decline of ideological commitment as the determining factor are indisputable evidence that the political allegiance of a state is no longer the last word in the arms it transfers or acquires. Arms deals between countries are no longer invariably seen as a clear signal of political obligation; they may indicate nothing more than a bargain price or an overstocked warehouse. This conclusion is not an argument for ignoring the security concerns which still form the basis for US

arms transfers, but an acknowledgment that those concerns are no longer definable in simple terms of political allegiance.

These are not unimportant trends. We live in a rapidly changing age when arms transfers—and the power and wealth that flow from them—significantly affect the security and welfare of the globe. The United States is, and is likely to remain, the premier arms supplier in the world. Arms transfers are an undeniable part of the US presence on the world stage in both its political and economic roles. Our provision or denial of military hardware and know-how affects the makeup of many governments, the course of our foreign policy, the strength of our alliances, and hence to a large degree the social and political climate in which a large part of the world's people live. It also affects billions of dollars in public spending every year and therefore the economic well-being of those same people.

An understanding by American policymakers of the complexity and importance of the current arms transfer regime is critical if we are to guide its continuing evolution in directions that serve American interests. We must deal with the complex, evolutionary nature of the arms transfer regime as it now exists: *The current demand for US weaponry is a function of complex calculations based on the interdependent economic and political interests of many states and not on simple ideological allegiance defined within a hegemonic structure.*

If we accept this conclusion, the philosophy and the process that have generated our current arms transfer policies need to be rectified. Despite recent changes, contemporary US arms transfer policies are still derived largely from the ideological alignment of purchasing states without regard for the changes in the rules of supply and demand which dominate the new regime. Given the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whatever residual East-West ideological rivalry that remains is certain to shrink even further. Purchasing states no longer seek arms based on simple ideological factors; accordingly, we should not be predisposed to supply them on that basis, nor should we expect our allies to do so. Arms transfers are a powerful political and economic tool in the foreign policy of the United States. In order to use that tool effectively, the United States must craft its policy in accordance with the factors that drive the supply and demand for weapons in the 1990s, not the 1960s.

NOTES

1. The term "regime" is used here in the sense of the larger "rules, norms, and decisionmaking procedures around which [international] actor expectations converge." Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), p. 4.

2. Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 632-33.

3. Luigi Einaudi e¹ al., *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Towards a Policy of Mutual Respect*, Rand Corporation Report R-1173 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1973), pp. 2-4.

4. Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Assistance* (Washington: GPO, 1986).

5. "'Being Strong and Being Wise,'" *Newsweek*, 21 May 1973, p. 44.

6. The strength of the Shah's hand in this negotiation can be seen in the clause in the delivery contract for the F-14s which said "technical improvements of the airframe, the avionics, and the missile system would continue until the date of delivery." The Shah would accept no obsolete technology. Anne Hessing Cahn et al., *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 31.

7. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 1264.

8. Secretary Kissinger also agreed during this period to sell Iran the nuclear-capable Pershing surface-to-surface missile but was subsequently dissuaded by the Department of Defense. Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), p. 48.

9. "State Department Doubts Arms Limit Success," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 4 October 1976, p. 16.

10. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on Mutual Development Act of 1973*, H.R. 13323, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February to 23 April 1973.

11. US Congress, Senate, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran*, Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976.

12. "A Test of Political Will," *Le Monde*, 24 August 1974.

13. "F-16: A $2 Billion Winner," *Newsweek*, 16 June 1975, pp. 66-67. *International Herald Tribune*, 7 August 1976.

14. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, Report on S.3439, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 14 May 1976, p. 10.

15. Congressional Research Service, *Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy* (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 122-23.

16. Lawrence Franko, "Restraining Arms Exports to the Third World, Will Europe Agree?" *Survival*, 21 (January-February 1979), 14-25.

17. While it is unfair to say that the failure of the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks was due solely to bureaucratic infighting, it is appropriate to note that the US negotiating position during the talks changed several times as a direct result of a "savage bureaucratic struggle" between Leslie Gelb, the US negotiator, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor. Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 286-90.

18. George C. Wilson, "President Calls Off Program to Trim Foreign Arms Sales," *The Washington Post*, 29 March 1980, p A4.

19. Ronald Reagan, "Arms Transfer Policy Directive." Office of the White House Press Secretary, 9 July 1981.

20. Congressional Research Service, *Changing Perspectives on U S Arms Transfer Policy* (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 127-28.

21. "Reduced Time for Export Approvals," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 29 June 1981, p. 29.

22. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs* (Washington: GPO, 1984).

23. Henry J. Kenny, "Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China," in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986* (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp. 39-40.

24. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, 1987* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press).

25. Interviews with Paul Nisbet, an analyst for Prudential Bache specializing in defense procurement and exports, 27 February 1989 and 5 September 1989.

26. Richard W. Stevenson, "No Longer the Only Game in Town," *The New York Times*, 4 December 1988, sect. 3, pp 1, 7.

27. While there are a number of names for this practice, offset is the broad generic term. For an explication of the terminology and practices of offsets and countertrade in the arms transfer regime, see Stephanie G. Neuman, "Coproduction, Barter, and Countertrade: Offsets in the International Arms Market," *Orbis*, 29 (Spring 1985), 183-213.

28. The government has not always refused to become involved in offset deals. Before 1978, DOD arranged all offset agreements connected with FMS contracts. In 1978 a document known as the Duncan Memorandum was passed by Congress reversing this policy. The Duncan Memorandum requires that DOD not be directly involved in offsets either as a participant or a guarantor, and that FMS credits not be used to directly finance coproduction or licensed production abroad. The corporations themselves thus became solely responsible for negotiating and executing the terms of the offset agreements with the purchasing state—a position that many defense companies says puts them at a distinct disadvantage.

Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis

JONATHAN M. HOUSE

Historians and political scientists continue to study the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as a pivotal example of crisis diplomacy and national decisionmaking. The conventional version of that crisis may be summarized as follows: although there were unconfirmed reports of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, the Kennedy Administration was surprised and shocked when a U-2 reconnaissance flight photographed medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba on 14 October 1962. After a week of secret deliberations in the White House, the President announced on the evening of 23 October both the existence of the Soviet threat and the imposition of a naval quarantine. Finally, after a further week of tension and several moments at the brink of war, Nikita Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba and (according to some accounts) an additional promise to remove missiles from Turkey.[1]

More recently, revisionists such as James G. Hershberg have suggested that long before the missiles were discovered, the Kennedy Administration was supporting a renewed effort by Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. Unlike the 1961 disaster at the Bay of Pigs, this 1962 plan, code-named "Mongoose," allegedly was to be accompanied by conventional American air and ground attacks on Cuba.[2]

Quite apart from the alleged Mongoose Plan, the crisis began much earlier for the Defense Department, and continued for at least a month *after* Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles. These prolonged and serious military preparations tend to support both Hershberg and the Soviet interpretation of a "Caribbean Crisis" that began with the Bay of Pigs invasion.[3] More important, however, the American contingency operation in connection with the Cuban missile crisis was the largest of the Cold War. As such, this incident illuminates continuing questions of joint operations and contingency planning.

Command and Control

To understand the planning and preparations for the invasion of Cuba, one must first review the command structure for American armed forces as it existed in 1962 (figure 1). In essence, the Army and Air Force units in the United States belonged to their own services for training and administration but to US Strike Command (STRICOM) for the process of deployment to reinforce the unified commanders. Once those forces were deployed, control would pass from STRICOM to the appropriate unified command, which planned and conducted actual operations. The service headquarters that controlled these forces were Continental Army Command (CONARC), for ground combat troops, and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), for fighter, reconnaissance, and selected airlift units. Both CONARC and TAC had administrative, training, and doctrinal responsibilities within their respective services, responsibilities that fell outside the joint authority given to STRICOM.

Once the forces deployed for actual hostilities in the Caribbean, operational control of CONARC and TAC would pass to the US Atlantic Command, or LANTCOM. Because LANTCOM lacked Army and Air Force component headquarters in peacetime, CONARC and TAC had to function as those headquarters in the event of hostilities in the LANTCOM area. Technically, CONARC and TAC would assume the titles of Army Component, Atlantic (ARLANT) and Air Force Component, Atlantic (AFLANT) when they passed under LANTCOM control.

Planning

In April 1961, the United States had sponsored the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was planned and carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency, but President Kennedy and his staff blamed the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a large measure of the Bay of Pigs failure, and excluded most professional soldiers from their councils in future crises. Only the soldier-intellectual General Maxwell Taylor had access to Kennedy, first as Military Assistant to the President and then in September 1962 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.[3]

Nevertheless, it was obvious to the Joint Chiefs and their planners . ..: the Administration remained unreconciled to the Castro regime in Cuba,

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
Figure 1. Chain of command, planned Cuban operations, as of 18 October 1962.

and therefore that military operations against Cuba remained a distinct possibility. In February 1962 the Joint Chiefs instructed the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), Admiral Robert L. Dennison, to make Cuban contingency plans his highest priority.

CINCLANT and his subordinate headquarters developed three basic operations plans, known as OPLAN 312, 314, and 316.[5] OPLAN 312 presented a variety of options for air strikes against Cuba, ranging up to an all-out campaign

to achieve air supremacy. The latter variant would have been executed before implementing either OPLAN 314 or 316.

Operations Plan 314 called for the deliberate, coordinated invasion of Cuba, with Marines landing in eastern Cuba, near Guantanamo, and the XVIII Airborne Corps seizing four airfields around Havana. The amphibious phase of the operation would be controlled by Headquarters, Second Fleet, acting as Joint Task Force (JTF) 122. Once the initial landings were completed, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, would become JTF Cuba to control all further operations. To facilitate the expected popular uprising against Castro, a separate Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic, would deploy Special Forces teams and other elements into Cuba.

OPLAN 316 followed virtually the same concept of operations as 314, except that it was to be accomplished on much shorter notice—five days of warning, versus 18 days for 314. Given such short notice, the Marines would be unable to load and deploy by sea, so the initial assault would be restricted to the XVIII Airborne Corps, supported by the few Marine units already at sea or at Guantanamo. CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison, stressed the development of OPLAN 314 because he believed that an airborne assault would prove inadequate against the growing strength of the Cuban army. His Army commanders, however, all objected to the long delays necessary for the Marine elements to prepare for OPLAN 314. They argued strongly that such a delay would not only endanger any hope of surprise, but also leave masses of Army and Marine troops in crowded staging areas where they might be lucrative targets for Soviet nuclear attack. After months of discussion and frequent changes in the two plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally directed a compromise on 17 October, by which OPLAN 316 would be revised as a simultaneous air and amphibious assault on seven days' warning.[6]

Regardless of which plan was executed, XVIII Airborne Corps intended to use all available airfields in Florida both to stage its troop transports during the assault and to provide a logistical base to support later operations. Throughout the summer of 1962, staff officers from Third US Army headquarters who were responsible for Army administration in the southeastern United States visited all the airbases in Florida, coordinated with local Air Force commanders for support, and planned a support structure of supply, communications, and medical units for the area.

Troops Available

Contingency plans mean nothing without the forces to execute those plans, and Third Army was hard-pressed to find the personnel for this elaborate support structure. Throughout the Cold War, the Army gave troop units in the continental United States lower priorities for personnel and equipment than units overseas, where a war might occur at any time. This shortage was

aggravated in 1962 by the beginning of conflict in Southeast Asia. In August 1962 the Army had released two National Guard divisions and 248 Army Reserve units of various sizes that had been called up for the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961. The Kennedy Administration would find it politically difficult to recall the Army Reserve and National Guard so soon after the previous mobilization.

As a result of all these factors, Continental Army Command was short-handed in terms both of available units and of the more specialized individuals within those units. The average deployable strength even in high-priority Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) units was only 80 percent of their authorized strength.

Moreover, some divisions were changing their basic organizational structure from Pentomic to Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). The 2d Armored Division, which was earmarked to provide the heavy forces for Cuba, was organized on the older Pentomic structure, as were similar divisions in Europe. By contrast, the 1st Armored Division—not originally slated for involvement in Cuba—was organized under ROAD. This difference prompted the CONARC commander, General Herbert Powell, to switch the assignments of the two divisions at the last moment. Unfortunately, the 1st had been reactivated only in February 1962, in order to replace a federalized National Guard division. As a result, the newly formed, poorly equipped 1st Armored Division found itself assigned as the mechanized force for the Cuban invasion virtually overnight. This, then, was the genesis of the confused troop deployments that occurred during the crisis.[7]

Reorganization was not the only distraction for Army units in 1962. On 1 October, the bulk of XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to Oxford, Mississippi, to support federal efforts to integrate the University of Mississippi. The Corps commander, Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, headed this operation until the situation relaxed on 10 October. This sudden deployment disrupted the Cuban planning of the XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units.[8]

Origin of the Crisis

For practical purposes, military operations for the Cuban crisis began with the US discovery of Soviet IL-28 medium bombers in Cuba on 30 September, and ended with the Soviet Union's announcement on 19 November that those aircraft would be withdrawn. Only then did Kennedy end the quarantine and allow the Defense Department to relax.[9]

On 1 October 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara held his weekly meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When informed of the presence of the bombers and the strong possibility of missiles in Cuba, McNamara told the Joint Chiefs to intensify both contingency planning and the readiness of forces not only for blockade, but also for air attack or invasion of Cuba. In a letter to General Taylor the next day, McNamara enumerated six possible circumstances

that would trigger US military action, including some—such as the positioning of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba and Cuban support of subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere—that had already occurred. The Joint Chiefs were therefore quite justified in considering invasion to be imminent. This memorandum explains why the military was thinking in terms of offensive action long after Kennedy's civilian advisors had rejected such extreme measures.[10]

In response to McNamara's guidance, on 1 October Admiral Dennison, the CINCLANT, directed his subordinate Army and Air Force headquarters to undertake all possible actions so as to be ready to execute the three operations plans at any time on or after 20 October. Thus, quite apart from any support for the Bay of Pigs sequel, Mongoose, the armed forces began preparations two weeks before missiles were actually sighted in Cuba on 14 October.

Joint Command Issues

This orderly preparation was disturbed on 19 October, when Admiral Dennison announced a major change in the command structure for OPLANs 314 and 316. He disestablished Joint Task Force 122 and announced that CINCLANT would control operations directly through his component headquarters, ARLANT (CONARC) and AFLANT (TAC). This change (figure 2) carried the seeds of disaster in case of war. It would have been a war fought by the individual components. There was no longer a joint commander on the scene to coordinate Navy and Air Force air strikes, Army paradrops, and Marine or Army amphibious landings. Dennison's reasons for this change in command structure are unclear, particularly his motive for trying to run a war in Cuba from his headquarters in Norfolk. However, by removing the JTF commander interposed between himself and the tactical units, he may have been reflecting the desires of the Kennedy Administration to maintain extremely tight, centralized control over all military operations.

In response to Admiral Dennison's decision, Continental Army Command improvised two new headquarters in Florida, one for operations (Army Component, Atlantic, or ARLANT Forward) and one for logistics (Peninsular Base Command). Both were composed of staff officers with little knowledge of previous plans. The additional burden of these two headquarters overwhelmed the makeshift communications arrangements in Florida.

At the same time, these new headquarters suffered because of belated changes in Air Force plans. Army planners had always viewed OPLAN 312 as a necessary prerequisite to execution of either OPLAN 314 or 316, but the TAC versions of these three plans had apparently been developed in isolation from each other. As a result, the Air Force bases in Florida lacked sufficient space for both fighter-bombers and troop transports. This forced recomputation of the entire plan for the airdrop, because of different flight times from alternate airbases in Florida to drop zones in Cuba.

Partial Execution

While all these military preparations occurred, the Executive Committee (an informal White House policy group) continued to develop American policy in response to the missiles. By the time President Kennedy announced that policy on 23 October, the armed forces needed to be poised to enforce it. In theory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would transfer operational control of the appropriate CONARC and TAC forces from STRICOM to LANTCOM when execution of the operations plans for Cuba appeared imminent. In practice, this transfer was neither smooth nor clear-cut.

The immediate problem was Exercise Three Pairs, a complex series of maneuvers scheduled to occur at Ft. Hood, Texas, between 18 and 28 October 1962. As Commander-In-Chief, STRICOM (CINCSTRIKE), General Paul D. Adams had invested enormous personal effort to lease enough land around Hood


Figure 2. Chain of command, planned Cuban operations, as of November 1962.

for this exercise. Adams was naturally reluctant to abandon the exercise unless war appeared inevitable. Moreover, he believed that cancellation of the highly publicized Three Pairs would telegraph American intentions to attack Cuba.

On 20 October, however, a JCS message specifically directed the release of OPLAN 316 units from Three Pairs, and the next day the Joint Chiefs formally transferred operational control of the units involved in all three Cuban OPLANs from CINCSTRIKE to CINCLANT. Faced with this massive change, General Adams concluded that the exercise could not be salvaged and canceled it despite General Taylor's desire to continue it as a deception operation.[11]

Even then, the transfer of control was not clear. On 21 October, the Joint Chiefs directed CINCSTRIKE to report on the status of movement and deployment of forces for OPLANs 312 and 316. This was a normal procedure when CINCSTRIKE transferred forces cleanly to an overseas unified command, but the situation here was fuzzied by the fact that CONARC/ARLANT and TAC/AFLANT were dual-hatted under CINCLANT, with five of the headquarters geographically collocated in the Ft. Monroe/Langley AFB/Norfolk area of Virginia, and with STRICOM in Florida. As a result, there was no clean break. CONARC and TAC continued to report to both STRICOM and LANTCOM as they struggled to prepare for war.

On the afternoon of 22 October, prior to the President's announcement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to bring the armed forces to Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3, an increased state of readiness, and to begin positioning ground forces for possible implementation of OPLAN 316. That night, General Powell directed the movement of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and the other elements of Task Force Charlie, the mechanized force for the invasion, from Ft. Hood and Ft. Benning to Ft. Stewart. The purpose of this movement was to locate the forces near the ports of Savannah, Georgia, and Everglades, Florida, from which Task Force Charlie would deploy.

The fledgling 1st Armored Division had difficulties in its move. Nevertheless, the first elements arrived at Ft. Stewart on 25 October and the movement was completed by 10 November. From the first, however, rail storage was a problem. Because the 1st Armored had to be ready to move on short notice, the vehicles were kept mounted on flatcars rather than offloading at Ft. Stewart. Unfortunately, Ft. Stewart did not have sufficient railroad siding space to park over 660 flatcars. Third Army transportation officers turned to the rail sidings at nearby Hunter Air Force Base, on the outskirts of Savannah. At the time, however, Hunter was a Strategic Air Command base, and the local commander would not accept Army railcars until the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Theodore W. Parker, appealed to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Thereafter Hunter provided extensive siding space.[12]

The final step was to load the first wave of Task Force Charlie aboard ships in Savannah and the Port of Everglades. In the process, staff officers

discovered numerous technical problems. For example, the two lower decks of the roll on/roll off ship USNS *Comet* lacked sufficient clearance to accommodate M48 tanks unless the commander's cupolas were removed. This same problem, on the same ship, had arisen during the 1958 deployment to Lebanon, but it had not subsequently been fixed.[13]

Despite all these obstacles and false starts, by early November the armed services were poised to invade Cuba. After eight days of loading ships, the II Marine Amphibious Force was aboard the largest collection of amphibious shipping assembled since the Korean War. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, from California, reinforced the 2d Marine Division by air and sea deployment. Seven hundred and fifty fighter-bombers waited on airfields and aircraft carriers. On 27 October President Kennedy approved McNamara's suggestion, calling to active duty 24 Air Force Reserve squadrons of troop-carrier aircraft. These aircraft made it possible to airlift the first wave of the airborne invasion, consisting of 34,800 paratroopers at Ft. Bragg and Ft. Campbell. They would be followed by surface movement of the 1st Armored Division, with elements of two infantry divisions designated for further reinforcement if necessary.[14]

At this point, the forces controlled by CINCLANT went into a kind of suspended animation, waiting for an execution order that never came. The

Port Everglades, Florida, 12 November 1962: Equipment of the 1st Armored Division is loaded aboard Navy ships for maneuvers during the Cuban missile crisis.

ur.its involved remained on alert throughout November, long after the public perception of a crisis had disappeared. This prolonged alert, like the prolonged preparation prior to the discovery of missiles, indicates the seriousness with which the Administration contemplated the possibility of attacking Cuba.

In effect, the US Army had prepared for a major war without mobilizing its reserve forces, an anomaly that presaged a similar situation during the Vietnam War. This high state of readiness was achieved only at substantial cost, both in dollars and in the long-term efficiency of the services.[15] The call for equipment and personnel to bring units up to strength seriously depleted the Army school system. The Army never received authority to extend soldier enlistments or recall reservists, although McNamara granted such authority to the Navy and Marines on 27 October.[16]

Without such mobilization measures, the Continental Army Command cannibalized its schools and support bases to meet the situation. In essence, the commanders and staff officers involved "ate the seed corn" for the sustained prosecution of the Cold War and for the approaching Vietnam conflict, although the schools eventually recovered.

During the period of sustained alert, General Powell as Commander of ARLANT asked Admiral Dennison to subordinate the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA) to ARLANT. Powell argued that the commander of the conventional invasion forces had to control the unconventional troops operating in his area. Admiral Dennison declined, instead retaining JUWTFA directly under CINCLANT control. He indicated, however, that unconventional warfare elements actually located in proximity to invasion forces could be subordinated to such forces on a case-by-case basis. Given the complexity of any airborne or amphibious invasion and the difficulties of special operations teams engaged in the enemy's rear, Dennison's compromise might well have proved unworkable.

Conclusion

President Kennedy ended the quarantine on 21 November 1962, and within a week the return of units to their home stations was in full swing. The crisis is justly regarded as a classic case of national decisionmaking during diplomatic confrontation. Yet historians and political scientists should not study it in isolation from the military aspects of the crisis, aspects which were highly visible to the Soviet leadership and which went far beyond a quarantine of Cuba.

Since no combat ensued, the American mobilization for the Cuban missile crisis is unfortunately all but forgotten. It shared many characteristics of previous and subsequent joint operations. Continental Army Command was caught between Strike Command, which controlled its assets in peacetime, and Atlantic Command, which assumed control to implement contingency plans. A complicated joint command structure was made more so by a last-minute change

that overcentralized authority in the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic; this change in turn required the ad hoc creation both of a joint staff at Norfolk and of service command and logistics headquarters in Florida. Coordination between the services, especially with regard to base usage in Florida, left much to be desired. The time lag required to deploy Marine amphibious units by sea when compared with the air deployment of paratroops fueled interservice rivalry. The problems of the Army in providing trained manpower for the operation clearly illustrated the importance of reserve components to conducting even limited warfare.

Those familiar with the joint command structure for the American interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) and in Grenada (1983) will instantly recognize the equivalent structure in 1962. Atlantic Command's decision to control the operation from Norfolk, without a joint task force headquarters on the scene, was potentially disastrous. More important, the absence of a joint land forces headquarters to coordinate Army and Marine elements from the start of the invasion would have posed insoluble difficulties in coordinating airspace management, fire support, and a host of similar matters. Fortunately, the crisis subsided before the command structure's flaws were revealed in battle.

NOTES

1. This paper is part of a larger study, *The U.S. Army In Joint Operations, 1950-1983* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, forthcoming.) For the standard interpretation of Cuba, see Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); David Detzer, *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979); and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987).

2. James G. Hershberg, "Before 'the Missiles of October,'" *Diplomatic History*, 14 (Spring 1990), 163-98.

3. Garthoff, p. 3.

4. See Jeffrey G. Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and His Joint Chiefs of Staff," Univ. of South Carolina Ph.D dissertation, 1981, pp. 164, 177-207; General George H. Decker, Senior Officer's Debriefing by Lieutenant Colonel Dan H. Ralls, 18 December 1972, p. 12 (transcript on file in US Army Military History Institute).

5. Headquarters, US Atlantic Command, *CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis - 1963* [sic] (U), typescript 29 April 1963, pp. 17-23 (sanitized 5 September 1986); and Jean R. Moenk, *USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis, 1962* (U), Headquarters, US Continental Army Command, October 1963 (declassified 11 October 1988), pp. 6-19.

6. Moenk, pp. 16-19; see also General Paul D. Adams, Senior Officer's Debriefing by Colonel Irving Monclova and Lieutenant Colonel Marlin Long, 8 May 1975, p. 12 (transcript on file at the Military History Institute).

7. Moenk, p. 115; Joseph R. Wisnack, "Old Ironsides' Response to the Cuban Crisis," *Army*, April 1963, pp. 26-30.

8. Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, "The Role of the 82d Airborne Division in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U)," typescript report, 12 April 1963, p. 5 (unclassified paragraphs only); Moenk, pp. 105-07.

9. Alan Yarmolinsky, "Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Missile Crisis," 13 February 1963, sanitized version edited by Dan Caldwell in *Naval War College Review*, 32 (June-July 1979), 84, 88

10. McNamara's 2 October memorandum is quoted in Joseph F. Bouchard, "Use of Naval Force in Crises: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Intervention," Stanford University Ph.D. dissertation, 1988, pp. 528-29.

11. Moenk, pp. 12, 108-11; Wisnack, pp. 27-30.

12. Headquarters, Third US Army, "Historical Narrative on the Cuban Crisis (U)," typescript dated 26 June 1963, p. 3 and Appendix 8 (Transportation) to Annex C (Logistics), p. 4; Moenck, pp. 120-21.

13. Moenk, pp. 129-34.

14. Yarmolinsky, pp. 88, 92; *CINCLANT Historical Account*, pp. 156-58.

15. Third Army, "Historical Narrative," Annex D (Comptroller), pp. 2-4; and Moenk, p. 122.

16. Yarmolinsky, pp. 97-98; Third Army, "Historical Narrative," Annex C (Logistics), p. 13; Moenk, p. 227.

Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence

VICTOR M. ROSELLO

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false,
and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false.[1]
— Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

T he latest intellectual revival of classical military thought (a trademark of
the US military in the post-Vietnam era) has brought a proverbial breath
of fresh air to our military literature. No doubt the establishment as a whole
is benefiting substantially from this vigorous infusion of timeless thinking.
The trend has raised the intellectual horizons of our profession and will
continue to set the pace for military theorizing and doctrinal development
through the next century.

During this current renaissance it is not at all unusual to find the
military theories of notable writers copiously referenced: Machiavelli, Jom-
ini, Du Picq, Mahan, Douhet, Fuller, and Liddell Hart routinely grace the
pages of professional military journals. But of the many classical writers
recently repopularized, the oft-quoted Carl von Clausewitz comes to mind as
the most widely read and most influential. The revived popularity of his great
treatise, *On War*, has generated healthy debates within the US military over
the utility of such Clausewitzian concepts as "centers of gravity," "culminat-
ing points," and "fog and friction."

One highly relevant—and controversial—Clausewitzian theme con-
cerns the subject of intelligence. A reading of his views leaves the unequivocal
impression that Clausewitz did not regard intelligence highly. His apparent
attitude is best summarized by the statement that introduced this article:
"Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and
most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false." Such a deliberate
and dogmatic statement by a reverenced authority, particularly a statement so

at odds with the instincts of serving soldiers, simply demands investigation. This article will thus attempt to answer the question: Why does Clausewitz seem to regard intelligence with such contempt?

Clausewitz on Intelligence: A Different Focus

Research into Clausewitz's notions on intelligence is certainly not a new endeavor and has been treated with some frequency in the past.[2] So why another article on this subject? A significant shortcoming with previous such investigations is a general lack of balance. Some writers are prone to validate Clausewitz by overstating "historical intelligence failures" and then subscribing to the notion that "the causes of these intelligence failures are the same as Clausewitz's reasons for distrusting intelligence."[3]

If scores were kept to measure success, however, then the trite historical examples of strategic intelligence failures that are always trotted out—Pearl Harbor, the Ardennes, the Yalu, Yom Kippur, etc.—would obviously be overshadowed by all the recorded successes of intelligence. The true test of Clausewitzian logic should be the ability of intelligence systems and organizations to produce worthwhile intelligence effectively over extended periods in support of day-to-day missions at all levels, in peace and war.

Another criticism of past examinations of Clausewitz vis-à-vis intelligence is the tendency of writers to allow themselves to be led down the metaphorical path of Clausewitzian fog-shrouded battlefields which defy attempts at penetration owing to insurmountable uncertainty. Thus writers correctly acknowledge that the pervasive Clausewitzian theme of the ascendancy of the moral domain had the most influence in Clausewitz's distrust of intelligence. These moral influences are the role of chance; the imponderables of fog and friction and their effects on the reliability of information; the limitation inherent in observation; the inability to penetrate the mind of the adversary; the dominance of preconception over fact; and the limitations of intelligence analysis.[4] Writers conclude by agreeing with Clausewitz because "in the larger picture . . . [Clausewitz's] views prevail. Intelligence can indeed magnify strength and improve command, but leaders do not always have it."[5]

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Clausewitz's observations are realistic if we accept without question that intelligence is not always available and that uncertainties are always present in any intelligence system or activity. The existence of limitations, however, does not invalidate the conceptual need and usefulness of intelligence. It is from this standpoint that Clausewitz may be criticized for displaying a shallow and one-sided view.

There is the final consideration that Clausewitz was after all a child of his times. His ideas were shaped by dramatic historical events that touched him personally and professionally. For Clausewitz, the transition in warfare created by the Napoleonic Wars served as the crucible in which the foundation of his concepts on military theory developed. The Napoleonic Wars have much to tell us about war, but not all.

The Sophistication of Napoleonic Intelligence

An extensive part of Clausewitz's writings in *On War* was based on personal observation and "an examination of the five wars in which he had served."[6] It is quite likely that his perceptions of the value of intelligence also evolved from actual combat experience. Unfortunately, his first exposure to Napoleonic battle, while serving as adjutant of a Prussian infantry battalion, resulted in the greatest defeat of the Prussian army at the hands of Napoleon. The battle of Auerstadt in 1806, and the subsequent pursuit and rout of Prussian forces by Napoleon's army, left a deeply etched impression on the young Clausewitz, particularly since the debacle resulted in his humiliating capture and imprisonment by the French. Contributing to the defeat was the failure of Prussian intelligence to quickly assess the situation which developed as Napoleon maneuvered seven corps against the defenders. Notwithstanding that Prussian cavalry units were assigned the mission of reconnoitering a still-undeveloped situation, the order for their departure was transmitted late. "There was no way of knowing what was happening; reports from the front were muddled and contradictory."[7] These intelligence failures, coupled with such other adverse factors as indecision and problems of command within the Prussian organization, were branded indelibly on the mind and memory of the future theorist.

The sad state of Prussian readiness, however, was only one side of the problem. An important factor which served to reinforce the notions of chance and uncertainty in the mind of Clausewitz was the nature of the enemy opposing him: the great Napoleon Bonaparte. Of the many accolades bestowed on Napoleon, one has particular relevance for us here: his mastery of deception and operations security:[8]

> Napoleon's strategic deployments were carefully planned to set the stage for the great and decisive battle. Even before hostilities had begun, the Emperor's intentions were carefully shrouded from the enemy. Newspapers were censored,

borders closed, travelers detained. Then, when the Grand Army moved, its advance was preceded by swarms of light cavalry, screening its line of advance, protecting its communications, and gathering intelligence about the location of the enemy.[9]

At the same time, according to David Chandler, "Elaborate deception schemes and secondary offensives would be devised and implemented to confuse the foe and place him off balance. All those common characteristics of twentieth-century military security were employed by Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth."[10]

Efforts by the opposing side to penetrate the fog of war proved inadequate. The deception plans and the priority given to operations security by Napoleon quite simply overwhelmed the existing and limited intelligence resources of his opponents:

> In the interests of security and deception, Napoleon was in the habit of continually altering the composition of his major formations . . . adding a division here, taking away a brigade there. . . . Even if . . . intelligence [of Napoleon's dispositions] was eventually discovered and digested by the enemy it was soon completely out of date. . . . Thus at no time could the foe rely on "accurate" information concerning the strength of their opponents or the placing of their units.[11]

The last line of this quotation is important because it characterizes in Clausewitz's eyes the plight of Napoleon's foes who attempted to gather information on his movements, strength, and intentions. For one facing an opponent of the caliber of Napoleon, the rudimentary level of information-gathering in practice could not effectively lower the veil of brilliantly designed deception plans inherent in Napoleon's operations. Not only were Napoleon's counterintelligence means effective, but his intelligence service has often been regarded one of the most efficient of the era, with the Emperor devoting considerable attention to the acquisition of intelligence:

> Indeed, if we accept Clausewitz's definition of "intelligence"—"every sort of information about the enemy and his country" that serves as the basis "of our own plans and operations"—then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Napoleon was well served by his ambassadors, his roving general aides, his chief of intelligence and the infamous Black Cabinet. In asserting that "most intelligence is false," Clausewitz reveals only that he was ignorant of this dimension of Napoleon's generalship.[12]

Napoleon's relative sophistication in intelligence matters is particularly impressive since formal intelligence organizations did not exist during his era.[13] The general staff of the Prussian army, well known to

Clausewitz, was exceptionally small—limited to approximately two dozen officers.[14] With staff officers at a premium, the formal identification of intelligence officers was nonexistent.[15] In most cases it was the supreme commander who acted as the overall intelligence analyst for the field army, choosing and discarding information as he saw fit. This rudimentary method was not limited to the Prussians, but appears also to have been a characteristic of most Napoleonic-era armies.

Owing to regular changes in Napoleon's headquarters organization, many variations of the basic organization evolved. It is generally accepted, however, that from 1805 on, Imperial Headquarters was composed of three parts: the Emperor's Personal Quarters ("Maison"), a General Staff, and an Administrative Headquarters.[16] Of relevance to our discussion is the location of those sections tasked with information-gathering. This function was directed by two staff sections: the Statistical Bureau, forming part of the "Maison," and the General Staff. An intelligence function of the Statistical Bureau was to obtain information at the strategic level for use by tactical units. Its missions were wide-ranging, involving the collection and translation of newspapers and the placement of agents in all important cities to obtain information of political and military character.[17]

Information of a tactical nature was handled by the General Staff. Observation reports from the corps' cavalry patrols and interrogation reports obtained from enemy deserters and prisoners of war were passed to Napoleon through this section. Additionally, Napoleon supplemented information from the General Staff by incorporating special staff officers for missions he specifically assigned.[18] When compared with that of his adversaries, the Emperor's intelligence arm provided an appreciably more systematic and effective approach to exploiting the existing information resources, thus dispelling some of the fog of war.

The Weaknesses of Napoleonic Intelligence

Napoleon's intelligence system should not be overrated. By modern standards, Napoleon's organization had serious flaws. Although highly advanced for the period, it is evident that the French intelligence organization suffered from inadequate coordination and lack of a centralized analytical facility.[19] The various sections operated independently so that collection was not coordinated among them. And as to a central analytical center receiving the raw data, Napoleon chose to fulfill this role himself, thereby preventing a methodical effort fully dedicated to collecting, evaluating, interpreting, and transforming raw information into intelligence. This mode of operation ensured more timely decisions by Napoleon by eliminating intermediate staff layers, but it also increased the odds for making a poor decision based on incomplete assessments of the enemy situation.[20]

Of note, Napoleon's British rival at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington, used a similar system during his earlier years, and, like Napoleon, was his own intelligence officer:

> All intelligence came to Wellington and . . . the appraisal of it was his and his alone. . . . It is not surprising that all reports of enemy movements, no matter what source they came from, whether from the outposts, the divisional or allied commanders, or officers on detached service and the rest, were brought to him as well. Nor do these reports appear to have been summarized, abstracted, or collected before they reached him, but were taken before him as they stood. What collating was done was almost certainly done by himself.[21]

By the latter stages of the war, however, Wellington was allowing his intelligence department, the Quartermaster General, the latitude of handling most of his intelligence functions.[22]

The strengths and weaknesses within the respective quasi-intelligence organizations of the Napoleonic era are relevant to the study of Clausewitz and intelligence. A thorough exploitation of enemy information was largely precluded owing to the lack of a coordinated intelligence effort and the preference of the individual commanders to act as arbiters of truth. Consequently, Clausewitz's evaluation of intelligence may be interpreted as criticism of what he perceived to be the existing and dismal state of organizational and technical incapability to penetrate the fog of war, rather than a denial of the usefulness or general need for intelligence.

Clausewitz's primary perceptual disadvantage, however, was that he fought on the wrong side of the war. Clausewitz may simply not have been aware of the qualitative edge that intelligence gave Napoleon.[23] If he had been, Clausewitz's notions of intelligence would doubtless have developed differently, perhaps along the lines of his contemporary, Jomini.

Jomini on Intelligence

The Swiss military writer Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) firmly believed in the merits of intelligence. He served under Napoleon and thus "had a better appreciation for Napoleon's use of intelligence. He would argue that the role of intelligence 'is one of the chief causes of the great difference between theory and the practice of war.'"[24]

As he did with most of his treatment of the subject of war, Jomini attempted to reduce intelligence to a science which was prescriptive in its form and technique. In contrast to Clausewitz, Jomini attempted to abstract war from its political and social context by describing it in terms of rules and principles. To his credit, his writings have endured and are still studied and discussed today.[25]

> *Clausewitz's primary perceptual disadvantage*
> *was that he fought on the wrong side. . . .*
> *He may simply not have been aware of the*
> *qualitative edge that intelligence gave Napoleon.*

Jomini's treatment of intelligence in his classic work, *The Art of War*, was limited to one subsection under the chapter heading of "Logistics." Unlike Clausewitz, whose cursory three-paragraph coverage of intelligence devolves to a negative handwringing account of why intelligence doesn't work, Jomini's discussion of intelligence presents a more positive outlook, accurately assessing the important role of intelligence and sketching in the intelligence sources available to the commander.

Jomini recognized the shortfalls as well as the advantages of intelligence. Like Clausewitz, he understood that uncertainty was always present on the battlefield ("uncertainty results . . . from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans").[26] However, Jomini was sufficiently astute to realize that despite difficulties and the almost impossible task of eliminating fog, intelligence has to be aggressively gathered so as to increase the commander's success on the battlefield by helping eliminate some of this uncertainty:

> One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can a man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility.[27]

As with Clausewitz, Jomini accepts that not all reports are reliable. For this reason he stresses the need to use multidimensional information systems, in a sense making him a progenitor of modern all-source intelligence:

> A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnaissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. . . . Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.[28]

Jomini also notes that intelligence collection alone does not hold the key to success. Good intelligence analysis must then occur so that the information can be used to form "hypotheses of probabilities." These are

something akin to modern predictive intelligence or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield:

> As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art.[29]

Jomini understood that Napoleon's revolution in warfare (the organization of the Army into self-contained, mission-oriented, corps-size units and a command and control system to orchestrate it)[30] created new problems which complicated the ways in which the old intelligence systems worked:

> When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the enemy's operations was certain because reconnoitering parties could be thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into corps d'armee which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to learn anything about them.[31]

Rather than turning his back on the complications created by these changes (as Clausewitz may be accused of doing), Jomini chose to confront the problem by emphasizing the need to develop a workable intelligence apparatus to better serve the commander, thereby elevating the overall importance of intelligence.

Clausewitzian Intelligence or Information?

To move now from the historical context of our discussion, a controversial question develops over the issue of "intelligence" versus "information." Was Clausewitz's criticism in fact aimed at the poor quality of combat information as opposed to combat intelligence? To the casual observer this point may appear to be hair-splitting, but members of the intelligence community today are quick to recognize that this distinction is indeed important.

> Information is unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, communications, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources from which intelligence is produced. Information itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent or impertinent, positive or negative. "Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of information.[32]

The stroke of a translator's pen not in tune with these nuances could be at the heart of some of the controversy regarding Clausewitzian notions of intelligence. For example, in the problematic chapter where Clausewitz addresses intelligence (Chapter Six, Book One, titled "*Nachrichten Im Kriege*" in the German

text), the term *Nachrichten* is a focal point of debate because it may be translated variously as "intelligence," "information," "reports," or even "news." Similarly, the word *Kenntnis* may be translated as either "information" or "knowledge."[33]

In the excellent and most recent (1984) edition of *On War*, the distinguished military historians Michael Howard and Peter Paret translated the German opening line from Chapter Six, Book One, in a manner that has come to be widely accepted by most US military readers: "By intelligence" [i.e. *Nachrichten*] we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country."[34]

Should this construction be considered the final word? An editors' note in the 1984 edition states:

> We have attempted to present Clausewitz's ideas as accurately as possible, while remaining as close to his style and vocabulary as modern English usage would permit. *But we have not hesitated to translate the same term in different ways if the context seemed to demand it.*[35] (Emphasis added.)

Howard and Paret chose to interpret *Nachrichten* as "intelligence." The two previous English translations of *On War*, however, construed it simply as "information." More specifically, in both the 1909 and 1943 editions the opening line previously referenced reads: "By the word 'information' we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country."[36]

According to Dr. Paret, during Clausewitz's times the modern distinction between intelligence and information did not exist. The decision to translate *Nachrichten* as "intelligence" was based on the determination that "it is most appropriate because it is the closest modern equivalent to what Clausewitz was referring to: information on the enemy and his country." In Dr. Paret's opinion, the previous translations were too literal, failing to capture the essence of Clausewitzian thought.[37]

Howard and Paret's decision becomes especially critical for modern readers of Clausewitz when they attempt to come to terms with his unflattering appraisal of intelligence as quoted in the epigraph of this article. To recall, the 1984 edition translation is as follows:

> Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false.[38]

The 1909 and 1943 versions of this same line read:

> A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful. . . . In a few words, most reports are false.[39]

These translations convey significantly different meanings. Unfortunately, the 1984 edition (currently the most widely read) suggests that

Clausewitz was critical of intelligence per se rather than of the confusing flow of information and reports from which intelligence must be distilled. To reiterate, it is essential to recognize that today intelligence professionals clearly distinguish between the two. The decision to regard intelligence as simply information on the enemy might be a purely academic argument, but in light of today's tendency to quote Clausewitz as an authority on modern military matters, the issue transcends academic boundaries. To accept the 1984 edition's translation of *Nachrichten* as "intelligence" is to imply that Napoleonic armies were knowingly producing the equivalent of what we today call intelligence. Such was just not the case.

Put in its proper historical context, then, Clausewitz's disparagement in *On War* of what Howard and Paret label as "intelligence" was actually directed at the raw flux of undigested "information" emanating from the theater of war. It can even be argued that because of the primitive approach to gathering and processing data in the Napoleonic era, Clausewitz never witnessed the production of true intelligence. With operational as well as intelligence problems to solve, it is no wonder that battlefield commanders serving as their own intelligence officers were habituated to false, incomplete, or misleading data on the enemy. From Clausewitz's perspective, contradiction, chance, and uncertainty were the hallmarks of battlefield information, and he was correct in taking a dim view of the prevailing state of affairs.

Concluding Thoughts

On War continues to be read, interpreted, and debated among the present generation of military professionals, just as it was debated by past generations. To reap maximum benefits from this great work, it is advisable to maintain an open mind and curb the tendency to make hasty judgments about those bold positions of Clausewitz that jar the modern sensibility. His treatment of intelligence is a perfect case in point.

Intelligence today is far from being a perfect science. Imperfect or not, however, it continues to fulfill a necessary function which encompasses provision of strategic indications and warning down through tactical support of the combat arms. The intelligence community strives to "minimize uncertainty" concerning the enemy through the scientific processing and weighing of multiple sources of data.[40] "Minimizing uncertainty" is a respectable and practical standard to pursue—one fully recognizing that the Clausewitzian concepts of chance, friction, and the fog of war are still very much a part of modern conflict.

Of course, intelligence failures will never be eliminated. But for every intelligence failure there are scores of important counterintelligence and intelligence-based operational successes. The failures neither invalidate

the conceptual usefulness of intelligence nor validate Clausewitz's skepticism concerning reportage on the enemy.

Observers point out the great strides that technology has made in the intelligence field, implying that technology alone is what readily distinguishes past from present intelligence.[1] In reality, the important advancements have been more fundamental. The establishment of intelligence as a formal discipline and the creation of intelligence staffs at major combat unit levels—staffs exclusively dedicated to the collection, collation, and analysis of information—are the two most revolutionary advances in the entire intelligence endeavor. Deficiencies in these areas were the crippling weaknesses of intelligence efforts during the Napoleonic era.

Like the nations and armies that fell before Napoleon's revolutionary warfighting methods, the quasi-intelligence organizations of his era failed to keep pace with the changing nature of war. Master deception and counterintelligence executed by ensuing great captains strained an antiquated and outmoded organization already incapable of consistently and systematically producing reliable intelligence.

In writing from his personal observations, Clausewitz attempted to capture the state of the art of intelligence. But, as we have seen, warfare was in transition. Advances were required in several functional areas, to include intelligence. Systems and methods had yet to catch up with operational advances on the battlefield. A glaring mismatch between ends, ways, and means came to develop. Clausewitz recognized the intelligence shortfalls and reported what he saw. To a point, he was correct. Advances in intelligence would later be made, but not during his lifetime.

If Clausewitz can be faulted, the reason may be simply that his statements on intelligence violated his own injunctions with regard to the best approach to a theory of war. He had desired to create a non-prescriptive way of thinking. By alleging flatly that "most intelligence is false," he lapsed into the very dogmatism he elsewhere abjured. Certainly he demonstrated a lack of vision in failing to foresee that the wild'y confused and confusing combat information reportage of his time—as frustrating as it was—would one day be largely harnessed by the scientific method. Lacking such foresight in this instance, he could hardly have recognized that the wretched *Nachrichten* about which he complained so sorely would ultimately metamorphose into what we today call "intelligence," a sine qua non for success in war.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 117
2. David Kahn, "Clausewitz and Intelligence," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 117-26.
3 Ibid., p. 125.

4. Ibid., p. 118-20.

5. Ibid., p. 125.

6. Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 61.

7. Roger Parkinson, *Clausewitz A Biography* (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), p. 310.

8. David G Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 146.

9. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978), p. 147.

10. Chandler, p. 146.

11. Ibid., p. 147.

12. Jay Luvaas, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence· The Jena Campaign of 1805," *Leaders and Intelligence*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 52.

13. Telephonic interview with Dr. Peter Paret, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., 5 January 1989.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), p. 65.

17. Ibid., p. 66.

18. Ibid., p. 67.

19. John Elting, *Swords Around a Throne* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. 116.

20. Van Creveld, p. 68.

21. S. G. P. Ward, *Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 119-20.

22. Ibid., p. 120.

23. Luvaas, p. 52.

24. Ibid

25. John Shy, "Jomini." in *Makers of Modern Strategy· From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret with Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 144.

26. Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 197.

27. Ibid., p. 269.

28. Ibid., p. 274

29. Ibid.

30. Van Creveld, p. 97.

31. Jomini, p. 270.

32. Direct quotation from superseded US Army Field Manual 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1973, p. 2-1. A point of interest is that this manual's definition of "information" closely matches Clausewitz's ideas of the uncertain nature of most reports. See also US Army Field Manual 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, July 1987, pp. 2-8, 2-13; US Army Field Manual 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, January 1986, p. 1-1; and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C., 1 June 1987, pp 184, 188, for definitions of a similar nature.

33. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980), p. 258. "Mit dem Worte Nachrichten bezeichen wir die ganze Kenntnis. welche man von dem Feinde und seinem Lande hat . . . ."

34. Clausewitz (Howard and Paret), p. 117.

35. Ibid., p. xi.

36 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1909), p 75; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950; reprinted from 1943 Random House edition), p 51.

37. Telephonic interview.

38. Clausewitz (Howard and Paret), p. 117. The German original is as follows· "Ein grosser Teil der Nachrichten, die man im Kriege bekommt. ist widerspechend, ein noch grosserer ist falsch und bei weitem der grosste einer ziemlichen Ungewissheit unterworfen. Mit kurzen Worten: die meisten Nachrichten sind falsch" (Hahlweg, pp. 258-59).

39. Clausewitz (Graham), pp. 75-76; and Clausewitz (Jolles), p. 51.

40. FM 30-5, p. 2-1. and FM 34-3, p. 1-1, also refer to the role of the intelligence analyst in reducing uncertainty.

41 Kahn, pp. 123-24.

Commentary & Reply

"LEADERSHIP POLICY AND PRACTICE..."
A ROLE FOR SUBORDINATES?

To the Editor:

Lieutenant Colonel Faris Kirkland's article, "The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective," in the September 1990 issue of *Parameters* gets to the heart of many of our Army's leadership dilemmas. His survey of concepts from 1778 to the present and his explanation of the diversity of response to those concepts by leaders make a real contribution to continuing discussions of leadership as a cornerstone of combat power. We have no fundamental flaws in leadership doctrine. What we need, and soon, are some significant fixes to the lingering problem of erratic selection and development of Army leaders.

Most of us who have been or are close to the US Army are rightfully proud of today's organization. But within that organization, regardless of what our official leadership doctrine would dictate, a few rise to high rank without possessing the requisite concern for subordinates. Even these few are too many. We have some bad ones in this respect at most every grade, their impact growing as they climb up the ladder. Our Army today pays dearly for the inability of that few to gain the trust and commitment of their troops.

There is little doubt that ineffective leaders can be identified—and either developed or weeded out—long before they are picked for brigade or division command. The solution has to start at the top in any large hierarchical organization. Change is always a challenge, even when most of the participants in the process are convinced of the need. Change that involves new approaches to selecting leaders quickly digs into the emotional and spiritual fabric of the institution.

The fact of the matter is that poor leaders are well known to subordinates. The solution to the problem must start with the top team recognizing the basic flaw in our system and generating the determination to make a bold change. Our traditional top-down rating system must be supplemented (*not* replaced, but supplemented!) by an evaluation by subordinates. This can be done in such a way as to both enhance leader development and provide the necessary weeding out. Initially, properly packaged feedback abstracted from subordinates' ratings would be sent directly to the rated officer himself, thus assisting him in making needed leadership improvements in an environment free of embarrassment or fear. Later, after a sufficient period for him to take advantage of this input, additional subordinates' ratings would be made available to promotion boards—when being considered for selection to lieutenant colonel and battalion-level command, for example. Such a system would be a fair and straightforward way of doing justice to the developing leader while doing justice to the soldiers he will lead.

Design and testing of subordinate ratings are not without precedent, nor are peer ratings always out of place. Many in and out of the Army have recognized that it takes more than a top-down view of behavior and short-term results to get a valid

look at a person's deeper character. (There have been some subordinate and peer ratings among general officers in recent years in association with command selection. No results of this program have been made public, but this method of augmenting top-down observations has been applauded by many senior officers.)

Implementing a subordinate rating system will initially be time-consuming, somewhat exhausting, and undoubtedly painful. But a thoughtful use of input from subordinates will ultimately be threatening only to those who cannot gain the troop respect and trust needed to support present warfighting doctrine. Getting such a program started for the entire Army will be a tough chore. Tough but indispensable.

Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., USA Ret.
President, Center for Creative Leadership
Greensboro, N.C.

Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen, Jr., USA Ret.
West Point, N.Y.

The Author Replies:

Bottom-up ratings of leaders by their subordinates offer the leaders' bosses valuable information on how leaders achieve results. The accuracy and utility of such ratings depend on a military culture in which leaders believe that they have the trust, respect, and support of their commanders. Our research indicates that in the Army today many leaders perceive themselves as caught between fear of their bosses' evaluations and fear that their subordinates may let them down—usually as a result of demand overload, but sometimes as a result of the subordinates' sloth or malice. In such a climate, bottom-up ratings might exacerbate fear of subordinates and make leaders reluctant to impose the standards necessary for success in combat and for the soldiers' own survival.

Senior command could prepare the way for implementation of Ulmer and Bahnsen's proposal by emphasizing, through example and training, the old Army principles that commanders support their subordinate leaders, take responsibility for setting priorities (rather than automatically passing all taskings down), and make a habit of talking to junior personnel in their commands. The latter, an informal mode of subordinate rating with which many leaders are comfortable, if applied generally could reduce the resistance to a formal bottom-up rating system.

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, USA Ret.
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

Book Reviews

Hitler's Generals. Edited by Correlli Barnett. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989. 497 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by Martin van Creveld**, author of *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945*.

To judge by the list of contributors, this ought to be a blockbuster of a book. The editor, Correlli Barnett, needs no introduction; for three decades now we have enjoyed his superb works on World War II, World War I, British military history, Marlborough, Napoleon, and many other subjects. To have brought together Robert O'Neill, Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Brian Bond, Barry Leach, Walter Görlitz, Earl Ziemke, Field Marshal Lord Carver, Samuel Mitcham, Shelford Bidwell, Martin Blumenson, Carlo d'Este, Martin Middlebrook, Ferdinand and Stefan von Senger und Etterlin, Richard Lamb, Franz Kurowski, Kenneth Macksey, and General Sir John Hackett in a single volume is an achievement in itself. All these men (in these days of supposed equality between the sexes, the absence of even one woman among the contributors is remarkable; perhaps it is a tribute to women's intelligence that they refuse to be associated with a book of this kind) are first-rate experts on their subjects. All of them have written about World War II, often long ago and at great length. This may be why, in spite of the authors' competence and the high quality of the individual essays, the book as a whole can only be called a disappointment.

As these lines are being written, the world order which was first created at Tehran in 1943 and cemented at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 is visibly crumbling. With the Cold War a thing of the past, already we are beginning to wonder how it could have happened and what it was all about. Germany, the focus of that war during much of its course, has become a united country once again. Overshadowed by nuclear weapons on one end of the scale, and undercut by terrorism on the other, large-scale conventional war of the kind that Hitler's generals specialized in has almost disappeared; notwithstanding the current Gulf crisis, scarcely a day passes which does not bring additional proof that the days of conventional armed forces, too, are numbered. Admittedly, these events do not, and ought not, affect the "objective" history of World War II; however, they can and should call for a reassessment of the relative importance of the elements which make up that history. For example, now is the time to ask whether the picture of World War II as a conventional conflict between regular, state-owned, and general-ridden armed forces has not been mistaken or at least overdrawn. Looking back, is it not possible to see its real significance in the rise of resistance movements in every occupied country, given that those movements were later to serve as the example for over three quarters of all the wars that have been waged since 1945?

Insofar as *Hitler's Generals* totally ignores this need for reappraisal, it could equally well have been published during the 1960s or 1970s; and indeed if it *had* been published during the '60s or '70s in all probability it would have received much better reviews. As it is, we are merely treated to the umpteenth account of the upbringing of the Prussian-German officer corps, the rigors of its training, and its outlook upon life.

The relations that developed between individual officers and Hitler, their victories. their defeats, and their ultimate fates—which ranged from the scaffold to high positions in NATO—are subjected to close scrutiny. In between, we are presented with detailed chronological tables from which it is possible to learn—should anyone really want to—just when Halder became a captain and when Warlimont's sentence was reduced. As officers are promoted or demoted and campaigns won or lost, very little that is new emerges. By and large the contributors' treatment of the German commanders is sympathetic, perhaps more so than many of them deserve. But about the only general insight which the book has to offer is Barnett's assertion (pp. 14-15) that military professionalism and technical brilliance cannot substitute for a wider sense of political and social (read moral) responsibility—a point that has been made many, many times before.

This having been said, perhaps the real value of the volume is to remind us that a new era has dawned. Its very shortcomings serve as the strongest possible proof that writing history—including, not least, military history—is, or at any rate should be, an ever-changing, dynamic process. Forty-five years after the guns fell silent, a reappraisal of World War II from a late 20th-century, post-Cold War standpoint is urgently needed. The task is huge, the difficulties immense; and it is only to be hoped that some among the contributors to this volume will one day direct their great talents to that end.

Making Defense Reform Work. By James Blackwell and Barry Blechman. Washington: Brassey's, 1990. 278 pages. $30.00. **Reviewed by Lawrence J. Korb**, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics, and coauthor of *American National Security. Policy and Process.*

For the Department of Defense, the decade of the 1980s may be divided into two distinct phases: rearm and reform. In the first half of the decade, DOD succeeded in rearming America by doubling the size of its annual budget, from $140 to $280 billion. In the second half, DOD was asked to become more effective and efficient in spending this huge cache of funds by implementing the reforms mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), whose work was also completed in 1986.

In 1987, the Foreign Policy Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies established the Project on Monitoring Defense Reorganization to review DOD's progress in implementing the reforms of 1986. The joint project was co-chaired by two former Secretaries of Defense, Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, with an executive committee composed of 39 well-known individuals from Congress, the defense industry, academia, and DOD alumni. The volume under review is the comprehensive report of the project. It is composed of nine research papers commissioned for the project and an introduction and conclusion by the project directors, James Blackwell and Barry Blechman.

The volume reviews progress in implementing defense reforms in five areas, assesses the impact of changes made by mid-1988, and determines whether continued implementation would be appropriate in particular areas. The five areas examined were congressional oversight; organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); military operations; planning, programming, and budgeting (PPBS); and acquisition.

Taken singly, each of the individual chapters in the book is interesting and informative, and in one form or another they address each of the five areas. (The essays by former DOD officials Walt Slocombe and Russ Murray are particularly good.) However, neither the project directors (editors?) nor the individual authors refer to, let alone build on, each other. What the reader is left with is a disjointed series of essays about such areas as reform, biennial budgeting, PPBS, the JCS, the Joint Staff, and military operations. Moreover, the observations and recommendations of the essays are often redundant and in places contradictory. *Making Defense Reform Work* reminds me of the yearly Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) submitted by the services to OSD in the early 1980s. The individual POMs were fine, but it was never clear how they related to each other. Just as service POMs do not constitute a strategy, 11 disconnected chapters do not constitute a book.

In the opening chapter, Blackwell and Blechman tell us why reform was needed and what progress had been made by 1988; in the concluding chapter they explain why continued reform is hard to implement. However, they make no attempt to show how the individual essays fit into or impact upon their thesis. In fact, Blackwell and Blechman never even mention their nine contributors. Nor do they mention how their analysis or those of the contributors compare to the views of the Brown-Schlesinger group which presumably provided oversight for the project.

The organization and management of DOD will continue to be a subject of critical importance in the 1990s as the United States moves from containing communism to creating a new world order. The reforms brought about by Goldwater-Nichols and Packard should help DOD make that transition efficiently and effectively. However, this disjointed book does little to show how this will or should occur. And that is too bad because each of the 11 contributors has said something significant about reform. It's unfortunate that the project directors did not function as editors and integrate their contributors' thoughts.

The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. By Robert A. Doughty. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1990. 374 pages. $39.50.
Reviewed by Douglas Porch, author of *The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914.*

For a half century, historians have raked the ashes of France's 1940 collapse in search of clues to explain that disaster. In the process, the stinging indictment of the Third Republic leveled by Marc Bloch's powerful *Strange Defeat* written in the immediate aftermath of the debacle has been blunted if not entirely discredited. The conclusion has been that the Third Republic by no means limped toward Sedan a spiritual invalid, having to fight with an outgunned army whose morale had bottomed out. The question has become, if the French defeat was a military one, then what went wrong?

Robert Doughty's contributions to this continuing debate have counted among the most original and thoughtful. His widely acclaimed *Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939* portrayed a French army that was far from decadent, demoralized, or content to rest on the reputation gained in World War I as the world's premier army. Rather, it struggled manfully in the interwar years to reconcile the "lessons" of 1914-1918 with the realities of motorized warfare.

French doctrine, which emphasized "methodical battle" and firepower, accorded perfectly with her plans for a war of "*longue durée.*"

The Breaking Point is in many respects a logical sequel to Colonel Doughty's earlier work—having defined the French doctrine, he sets out to show how disastrous were its consequences in the face of a German command philosophy that emphasized mobility, flexibility, and offensive power. Using both French and German sources, he chronicles with clarity and detail the crumbling of the French forces around Sedan before the onslaught of the XIXth Panzer Corps between 10 and 16 May 1940. In the process, he emphasizes that many of the myths of blitzkrieg warfare were merely that: That the breakthrough at Sedan was achieved by a coordinated effort of artillery, air power, and infantry, not by tanks alone; that the destructive capacities of the German dive bombers were vastly overrated by contemporaries and historians, though the terror they inspired caused French gunners to cease firing at critical moments during the German attack; and that French materiel was not necessarily inferior to that of the Germans. And while these conclusions are hardly new, he includes at the same time much interesting information on the weaknesses of French tanks, the lack of mines, and the debilitating effects upon morale of the French preference to confine troops to bunkers, which were often abandoned in panic when the Stukas appeared overhead.

Colonel Doughty's purpose is to show how the different approach of French and German armies toward questions of leadership, tactics, operations, and strategy—as well as doctrine—affected the outcome of the campaign. That the German army was a better trained and led force than that of France is beyond dispute, although it is often forgotten that German commanders were also concerned about the poor quality of their reserve units and about the abilities of their heavily horse-dependent logistical system to support the blitzkrieg. But one can ask two questions of his approach. The first is, is it not dangerous to draw general conclusions about systemic failures in the French army from a contest which pitted the best units in the German army against third echelon French forces such as those stationed around Sedan? The brunt of the German attack was borne by the hapless 55th division, a half-trained and poorly led amalgamation of older reservists deficient in both morale and fighting spirit placed at Sedan precisely because that is where the French command thought the German attack least likely to fall. Their defeat appears less the result of a defective doctrine than of muddle and panic—in other words, the absence of doctrine or at least of its application. What would have happened had the XIXth Panzer Corps run up against French units better able to defend themselves as did German forces in Belgium where French units more than held their own? What would have happened had the German attack, having achieved the breakthrough, then swung behind the Maginot Line as the French command expected, rather than race west away from the French blocking force? Then French doctrine, tactics, and leadership might have proved adequate to blunt a German attack as it had in 1914, and the French strategy of seizing forward positions in Belgium and digging in for a long war a perfectly reasonable one.

A second question is, would the German doctrine of flexibility, mobility, and offensive power have worked for the French army? In other words, operational doctrines like strategy are not created in a politico-military vacuum, as Colonel Doughty so ably demonstrated with respect to France in his earlier work. If French officers adopted a "controlled battle" concept, they had obviously concluded that it best fitted the diplomatic goals and strategic culture of Republican France as well as

the capabilities of their army. Therefore, the reader needs to be told what forces, pressures, and perceptions shaped and fueled the creation of that doctrine. Campaigns are seldom fought on a level playing field. Without a knowledge of the historical context in which French and German strategies and operational and tactical doctrines developed, an attempt to draw abstract "lessons" from this campaign, if that is a temptation, may produce misleading results.

Four Stars. By Mark Perry. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989.
344 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by John G. Kester**, formerly Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army and the Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense.

A successful military operation in Panama and a spectacular deployment to Saudi Arabia have revived confidence in the ability of the US military establishment to apply its expensive forces toward the implementation of national policy. The blame for previous mishaps was laid partly—and rightly—on the country's highest operational staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so it is only fair to credit the current JCS with excellent work, and to wonder what may have caused the change.

Surely some difference was made by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, which for the first time gave real power to the JCS Chairman to override service bickering. There is in office a confident Chairman, General Colin L. Powell, who has not been reluctant to exercise his office and who is trusted personally at the White House, where he once was the President's National Security Adviser. Further, the incumbent President and Secretary of Defense have had the good judgment to avoid the naive incrementalism of the McNamara years and the occasional bumbling of some of the Carter and Reagan excursions.

Have changes in the JCS—either in organization or in personalities—had much to do with what seems to be an improvement in results? How exactly have the Joint Chiefs functioned in the years since the World War II ad hoc JCS was formalized by law in 1947 as a committee to serve as the highest military staff? How have the Chiefs handled the built-in conflict between their individual service interests and the need to serve a unified national policy?

In *Four Stars*, journalist Mark Perry catches sight of such issues but proves unable to capture them with much understanding. Not surprisingly for a journalist, he turns out to be a storyteller rather than an analyst. And the stories he tells consist too often of snippets from interviews with anonymous sources, and citations of ruminations by other journalists. The result is a sometimes repetitious collection of assertions and anecdotes, some of which may be true, and most of which carry the journalist's customary overemphasis on personalities and conflict. The reader gains little understanding of the JCS as an institution and how it really works in relation to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the military services.

The book's dust jacket promises "the inside story" of a supposed "forty year battle" between the JCS and civilian authorities. The author sees, or so he thinks, a struggle in which the JCS sought a greater role in making foreign policy decisions. The reality has hardly been that. For 40 years the problem was to get the JCS to make a useful contribution to foreign policy formulation at all. The struggle usually was not with civilian leaders, but rather with the four individual military services, who until

recently kept the JCS from making anything but ineffective compromise recommendations on major issues. Of course there have been differences of opinion among the Chiefs and Presidents and Secretaries of Defense—there are bound to be—but these have hardly taken on the apocalyptic dimensions this book tries to portray.

Careless exaggeration and imprecision unfortunately are hallmarks of *Four Stars*. For example, the author casually describes Douglas MacArthur as "perhaps the greatest military hero ever produced by the nation [who] might well be considered the greatest general in American history." Greater than Washington? Grant? Lee? Eisenhower? Patton? Measured how? Watergate he calls "perhaps the most critical constitutional struggle in [the country's] history." Some might have instead applied such terms to the Civil War. General Earle Wheeler is "perhaps the most legendary JCS chairman." Does he overshadow, to cite a single example, Omar Bradley? General John Vessey fought at Anzio, but did he really have, as this book claims, "one of the most colorful military careers in recent JCS history"? Is John Paul Vann really "the best-known [lieutenant] colonel in American history"? Did he have his face on T-shirts, like Ollie North?

Confidence in the author's understanding of his subject is constantly shaken by his inability to use important words accurately and to distinguish among official positions. David Packard, once the Deputy Secretary of Defense and number two in the department, he twice demotes to an "assistant secretary of defense," i.e. one of eight or so officials a layer below. General Bruce Palmer is described as an "aide" to General William C. Westmoreland when Palmer was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Officers are described as serving on the JCS when they were simply assigned to the Joint Staff as part of the hundreds of officers who serve the JCS (and now serve the Chairman). Time and again the author refers to the Joint Chiefs as "commanders" exercising "the JCS's power to command." If he does not understand that, as Eisenhower often reiterated, the JCS is a staff body without command authority, then he does not understand a fundamental fact about the military organization and civilian-military relations in the United States.

The tales and gossip that fill the latter part of *Four Stars* are troubling because so many of the statements, including dozens of supposed quotations, are either attributed to anonymous sources or published on no authority at all. That may be the way to get a story onto the front page of a newspaper, but it is not reliable or fair history, and it leaves the reader without any basis to evaluate the biases or competence of the source. The book asserts, for example, that "Westmoreland didn't like Palmer"; for the curious reader, the only authority cited is an "interview with a retired JCS Army staff officer." General Wheeler, it says, looked over his glasses in moments of tension; for this there is no authority cited at all.

Some of the peculiar assessments tossed off in *Four Stars* might at least have been documented. General Maxwell Taylor, whose judgments may indeed be open to question, is described, with attribution to an undisclosed source, both as "America's greatest general" and as "talented though hardly brilliant." Yet JCS Chairman General George S. Brown, a decent man with loose lips, is called "one of the most intelligent leaders to have served on the JCS" and, with attribution to an interview with an Air Force general, "a genius."

Many of the book's assertions of fact are simply wrong. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, whom President Lyndon B. Johnson tricked into quitting the Supreme

Court, was hardly one of Johnson's "most trusted aides." McNamara's "whiz kids" did not come from the Ford Motor Company. Admiral David L. McDonald was not a "combat commander" when he had the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, unless there was a war nobody knows about. The book says that the Marine Commandant was made a JCS member in "the 1969 Defense Reorganization Act." The Commandant, although attending meetings, did not become a member until 1978, and there is no such thing as a "1969 Defense Reorganization Act." The REFORGER training deployments to Germany did not begin in 1978, as the book asserts, but years before that. The troubled Americal Division in Vietnam is called in *Four Stars* the "American" Division. The photo captioned "the Carter Chiefs" is instead the JCS under President Ford.

Some of the book's comments are downright silly. For instance, it says that Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson once went to the White House "outfitted in his full service uniform." What would one expect him to wear? His BVDs? It says JCS meetings "are rarely attended by civilian officials"; they have been attended weekly by Secretaries of Defense for about 30 years. It claims "the tank," where the Joint Chiefs meet, is "large"; it is a rather small and utterly ordinary conference room. Former Chairman General David C. Jones is indeed a handsome fellow, but does even his wife believe that he is, as this book tells the reader, "a dead ringer for Burt Lancaster"?

Other errors reveal lack of basic understanding. Totally confused, the book says that there was controversy in 1986 over whether the Chairman of the JCS should attend National Security Council meetings. The Chairman has always attended and participated in such meetings; the only argument was whether he should be made a member (he was not). The Goldwater-Nichols law is described as "certainly a victory for the JCS," when it was enacted over the JCS's dead body. The author completely misses the key role of Senator Sam Nunn, who cared more about getting the law passed than taking credit for it. The author credits Jimmy Carter with a tough military stance, failing to perceive Carter's personal antipathy to the senior military, and the role played by Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski in preventing huge budget cuts. The author calls the Chiefs' discussion of resignation over Vietnam policy in 1967 a potential "mutiny," not understanding that resignation is an utterly honorable alternative, if not indeed a duty, when an official is asked to carry out a decision he believes deeply and importantly wrong.

Although it contains some enlightening comments, mainly from the interviewees who were forthright enough to speak for the record, the book betrays misunderstanding of what it says is its central subject. It asserts that the JCS in 1967 decided to try to obtain "a role in determining US foreign policy," and that was "an unprecedented break in American military tradition." Nonsense. Since at least 1947, the Joint Chiefs have routinely been expected, along with others, to help shape US foreign policy, but because of conflicting service agendas could seldom get their act together well enough to do so. That issue the book scarcely notices.

Some other fundamental questions are not explored. *Four Stars* offers little insight into how officers rise to become Chiefs, and into the complex selection process that involves the services, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Chiefs themselves. It barely mentions the primordial roles-and-missions issue concerning which the Army, in order to forgo calling on the Air Force for close air support, has utterly contorted its battlefield tactics.

The thesis of *Four Stars*, if it has any, seems to be that the Joint Chiefs have had lots of disagreements with civilians over the years, and also a good amount of internal bickering. Surely this is so, but it is hardly unexpected. One institution of the government, with its own particular makeup, duties, and constituencies, will naturally on occasion differ with another that has a different role. The significant story of the JCS's first 40 years is not that it was in so much bureaucratic conflict or that its members (sometimes correctly) disagreed with some civilians, but rather that service domination left the JCS so supine and ineffective that it often got bypassed in the policymaking process. With the benefit of Goldwater-Nichols, that situation now appears to be changing. And it was the civilians in Congress who forced the change.

The reader who wants to understand how the JCS system formerly worked, or failed to work, might well scan the excellent volumes prepared by the House and Senate staffs that led up to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and the readable memoirs of some former JCS members. For occasional entertainment but only minimal enlightenment, he might try *Four Stars*. Mark Perry's book is to military history and analysis what *People* magazine is to *Parameters*. It can be bought or left alone on that basis.

Command, Control, and the Common Defense. By C. Kenneth Allard. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1990. 317 pages. $25.00. **Reviewed by Carl H. Builder**, author of *The Masks of War*.

Ken Allard has cut a new and revealing slice out of the defense planning pie with *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. The slice doesn't quite correspond to his title for the book, but it is so meaty that few will be disappointed in the differences between the menu and the meal. The book is more about American military organizational, intellectual, and cultural history than about command and control, but Allard builds his arguments clearly and steadily from one to the other, from the first to last chapter.

Allard traces the origins of service autonomy in American political history and its reinforcement in the classical theories or paradigms of war, sea power, and eventually air power. With remarkable evenhandedness, he shows how service autonomy both served and confounded American development and use of its armed forces over two centuries. Neither an apologist nor reformer, Allard sees the services as having been trapped into their deep differences, first by the political views and concerns of the Founding Fathers, and later by the paradigms of war that attached to their separate media of operations. Nowhere does he offer any hint that those deep differences, like fences between neighbors, have taken on a value of their own in serving powerful bureaucratic imperatives—to maintain independence, to protect turf, and to retain control.

Although Allard sees the necessity for, and even some benefits from, service autonomy, he believes that modern warfare and the information revolution have now brought us to the point where jointness in military developments and operations is not something we can any longer afford to ad hoc. The increasing importance of modern command and control systems makes them both a driver and a driven in this collision between technology and service autonomy. To illustrate both the potentials and the problems attending the collision, Allard describes in some detail one of the accident victims, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS. Allard handles the technical details quickly and clearly, focusing instead on the pathology of bureaucratic trauma inflicted on JTIDS in his postmortem examination.

Allard concludes with a provocative challenge that clicks neatly into his analysis as the logical missing piece: the need for an inclusive joint paradigm to cap the separate service paradigms, one that would motivate joint solutions without denying the need or utility of separate services. Whether such a paradigm, if found, would really serve his purpose depends on how one sees their use: Are they the instigators of, or the explanations for, actions taken? Clearly, Allard sees them as instigators, but one service looking at another's paradigm might be more inclined to call it an explanation for existence or autonomy. Would they be more or less charitable with a joint paradigm?

Ken Allard's book is an original and unorthodox entry in a crowded field because he has cut across some of the traditional furrows. It is to be hoped that his efforts will encourage others to take orthogonal cuts into defense planning, looking backward in history and across the relevant disciplines for insight, as he has. His followers will probably challenge some history that Allard seems often to have accepted on its face; it is to be hoped that they may find and pull together some important threads he has missed, and they may help us by looking beyond the American experience for additional insights. But Allard has certainly staked out a worthwhile area and style for the next stage of inquiry.

Feast of Bones. By Daniel Bolger. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990. 357 pages. $19.95. **Reviewed by Captain(P) Ralph Peters,** author of the novel *Red Army.*

Dan Bolger has written an entertaining, extremely well-researched novel. *Feast of Bones* follows the career of Dimitry Donskov, a Soviet airborne officer, through the mid-1980s, offering the reader not only an extraordinarily accurate and instructive look at Soviet elite force operations in Afghanistan but also a Soviet adviser's-eye view of our own action in Grenada. Handsomely written, this novel is just plain fun to read—a classic can't-put-it-down military procedural. Yet, it is also far more than the typical shopping-mall thriller for voyeurs who have never laced up a combat boot—it is the heartfelt attempt of our finest young author in Army green to expand his range and get inside the warrior's mind.

Bolger had previously published two first-rate nonfiction books—*Dragons at War*, which took an uncompromising look at a maneuver unit's ordeal at the National Training Center (and which has become something of a cult book), and *Americans at War*, a wide-ranging, startlingly intelligent, and constructive critique of US military operations in the wake of Vietnam. With his latest book—a move into the realm of fiction—he continues to ask hard fundamental questions: Why do men fight? What makes them fight well or badly? What does training mean when you finally get behind the slogans and statistics? What happens when opposing systems and cultures collide? Even in a rocket-fast read like *Feast of Bones*, Bolger cannot help being a writer of conscience and profound inquisitiveness. Reading his books in succession, one has the feeling of watching a first-rate intelligence develop, and, further, that his best work is still ahead of him. Today, Dan Bolger is an important writer to the US Army. In the future, he's our best bet to be an important writer, period.

An added bonus for the reader of *Feast of Bones* is its acute look at the *desantniki*—Soviet airborne forces. Although fiction, the book rings absolutely true on the professional level, making it a superb introduction to an element of the Soviet

military the importance of which is increasing almost daily. Soviet airborne divisions are drawn from the very best manpower available in terms of physical strength and ethnic and political reliability. Such divisions are extremely well trained and are better equipped in terms of sheer firepower than are the airborne forces of any other country. Afghanistan confronted the *desantniki* with unanticipated challenges, and, unlike so many other Soviet service arms, the airborne soldiers largely overcame their tactical and operational difficulties. In a multipolar world where military might will increasingly be measured in terms of a nation's ability to swiftly project conventional forces, the Soviet Union's pocketful of airborne divisions is perfectly suited.

Perhaps even more important for the Soviet Union, the airborne forces have always been something of a praetorian guard—and can be expected to play that vital role on a stage where the script is changing with almost anarchic speed. Although the Soviet army does not desire employment as a force charged with maintaining internal order—preferring to relegate that role to the troops of the Interior Ministry and KGB—the central government has already been forced to deploy airborne forces to internal trouble spots, and we can fully expect more such deployments in the future. Only the airborne forces ultimately have the manpower, training, motivation, leadership, and mobility to face up to a real crisis—and even then their success in stopping an incipient civil war anywhere in the Soviet empire is not a foregone conclusion. Further, the role of the *desantniki* as a praetorian guard in the more odious sense of the term—the men who impose or depose Caesar—cannot be ruled out. In times of collapse, the toughest and best organized, those possessed of strength of muscle and strength of will, tend to make the new rules. While many questions remain as to loyalties, cohesiveness, command and control, and the myriad of checks and balances built into the Soviet military and paramilitary systems, the brotherhood of the airborne forces cannot be ruled out as a political player, even if only one among many.

Bolger touches on this possible role in the conclusion of *Feast Of Bones*. Although his ending is pure fiction of the sort designed to tickle the reader's intelligence with unexplored possibilities that may or may not seem plausible, it nonetheless sends up a warning flare as to yet another possible scenario for that most troubled of empires. The reader would do well to consider the future before dismissing Bolger's attempt to have a little fun with the recent past.

This novel is exciting, quick-paced, and thoughtful—and unexpectedly informative. Enjoy it. And keep an eye out for Dan Bolger's next surprise.

1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign. By Richard K. Riehn. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. 525 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by John R. Elting**, author of *Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée.*

This is an odd book, hard to review, at once useful and tricky, informative and grossly slanted. Its overall description of the 1812 campaign does not contain a great deal really new to competent scholars. What it does offer is a description of it from an intensely *German* viewpoint.

Richard Riehn grew up in Hitler's Third Reich. A candidate for its naval academy (so he told this reviewer), he was shoved into the 1945 battle of Berlin armed with an "American Springfield '03 with twenty cartridges." His sources are almost entirely German or German translations of Russian works, their core being instructional

material used in the former Prussian War Academy. (He did attempt to consult Gabriel J. Fabry's essential *Campagne de Russe [1812]*, but the one set he found was—as usual—disintegrating.)

The story of the actual operations occupies barely half of this book. Ninety-five pages are filled with detailed orders of battle, many of which—given the growing confusion in both armies—can be little better than horse-back estimates. Most, however, can be used as general guides; some provide new information on the Russian forces.

Thirty-three pages of introduction take us into a never-never land wherein dwells lovable, liberal Tsar Alexander, intent only on Higher Things—until outraged by the unprovoked aggression of conquest-mad Napoleon! There is precious little acknowledgment of the wars that Russia launched against France in 1799-1800, 1805, and 1806-1807. The only mention of Alexander's continual assaults against his neighbors is his 1809 seizure of Finland—which Riehn excuses, practically in Stalin's words, as essential to Russia's security. Alexander's equally constant attempts to ingest what remained of Poland are passed over gently and very quickly, including his calculated failure in 1809 to honor his alliance with Napoleon and support the Poles against an Austrian invasion. This nakedly fraudulent scene-setting, however, does include a thorough review of the Russian planning in all its convolutions.

Thirty-four pages describe the opposing armies. Riehn's picture of the Russians is best described as optimistic. He does not mention the volunteer *Opolcheni* and the local guerrilla bands that undoubtedly did the *Grande Armée* much more harm than the vaunted Cossacks. His description of the French is a wondrous collection of errors. He says, for example, that French units in 1812 were mostly conscripts; their light cavalry could not face the Russians, even with superior numbers; Napoleon's infantry "never had any real firepower"; even Davout's could not attack in line. (Most readers will miss the jest that the book's jacket—showing the battle of Borodino as painted by Louis Lejeune, who was there—shows them doing just that.) His claim that Napoleon's revival of regimental cannon companies "fragmented the French artillery" is amazing, it being common knowledge that these were *additional* cannon, manned by infantrymen. Apparently Riehn's knowledge of the French language is limited; plentiful mistranslations include rusk/zwiebaçk for double-baked campaign *pain biscuite*. Strange outfits such as "marine labor companies" wander past, and the infantry regiment is described as a "brigade of five battalions." Riehn stresses Russian toughness, citing an incident during 1799 to imply the French rather feared them. He almost ignores the fact that the French had routed them in 1799, 1805, and 1806-07, and expected to do it again. Otherwise Napoleon would not have invaded Russia.

After this "description" of the armies come 45 pages on "New Ways of War," a prolix consideration of changes in that art from Alexander to Napoleon. It is uneven in value; Riehn extols Frederick the Great's system and most things Prussian, even to giving us two unnecessary pages on their 1812 method of forming troops into column. He does not give us the one best test between the Prussian and Napoleonic systems—Auerstadt (1806), where Davout's outnumbered (26,000 to 63,500), outgunned (44 to 230) dogfaces shot the guts out of the main Prussian army and whipped it from the field.

The 18 pages on logistics are better, if padded with as much past history as pertinent information. Typically, the portion on Frederick the Great has no echo of his instructions on foraging—which could be rough on the civilians!

Riehn's description of the actual campaign has two major characteristics. The first is both its principal strength and a grave source of distortions. Riehn stresses the German (he considers Swiss to be "Germans") contribution, never missing a detached company or isolated deed of valor. Most victories, especially in cavalry actions, are credited to Germans—with emphasis on the Prussians. Had Riehn been able to use Fabry he would have found tough General Montbrun having difficulty getting his German cavalry to charge. At times this book seems to be the story of how Napoleon's valiant German allies alone took him to Moscow.

The second characteristic—and principal weakness—is Riehn's simple faith in Russian after-action reports. Granted that the French too lied enthusiastically, never retiring unless overwhelmed by immensely superior numbers, weakened by exhaustion and hunger, etc., etc. But the Russians, no matter how sore beset, retreated only on orders. Then, gripped by a seizure of "that scorn for danger found only in Russians" (taken from Bagration's alibi after his defeat at Mogilev), they surged back to retake their lost positions, slew new hecatombs of Frenchmen—and ended unexplained miles to the rear! Thus he accepts Bagration's claim that Davout lost three men to Bagration's one at Mogilev, even though Bagration left that field much too hurriedly to conduct a body count. He also often fails to reckon that Russian armies might be as hungry, ragged, and exhausted as the French, and as plagued with desertion.

In summation Riehn plainly has undertaken a labor of love—a broad, approving description of German valor and fortunes of war, to include also certain German patriots and the many German mercenaries who served the Tsar. If he frequently throws himself into the saddle of his hobbyhorse with such enthusiasm that he lands on his face on the far side of his intended mount, he *has* collected some new material, writes rather sensibly concerning enlisted men at war, and does present 1812 from a new aspect. His book is a dangerous reference for the beginning historian, but should be valuable to old hands who know what to use and what to ignore.

The Hollow Army: How the U.S. Army is Oversold and Under-manned. By William Darryl Henderson. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990. 154 pages. $39.95. **Reviewed by Colonel John W. Mountcastle,** who completed his tour as Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, last fall and is now on the staff of the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

This is not a long book, but it is an important book. Retired Army Colonel Darryl Henderson has pared down what is clearly a mountain of data from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, his last assignment before retiring, into nine well-organized chapters. There are no pictures but some pretty interesting charts and graphs—most of them from official Army studies on soldier performance. Military sociologist Charles Moskos provides a foreword that well summarizes Henderson's gut concerns. In Moskos's words, the Army today is beset by a series of interrelated problems:

No constituency for manpower, personnel, and training in the Army's budget fights; an inability to mass adequate "trigger-pulling" combat soldiers; training that does not build on past lessons; high personnel turnover in all units; low

cohesion in combat units; a concentration of less than competent sergeants in combat units; a promotion system that drives good sergeants out of the Army; and a low evaluation of the combat role despite lip service to the contrary.

Darryl Henderson commanded a rifle company in Vietnam, and later commanded a battalion. He has produced books based on his profession (soldier) and his education (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh). He has served in Korea and in Europe, in a number of Defense and Army staff jobs, and as a senior advisor to an Army Reserve Command. He is a graduate of the National War College. I mention all this so you will know that Henderson has been around and that he is not some pointy-headed intellectual who knows nothing about field soldiering. He does, and a lot of what he has to say is couched in terms that most officers understand and can relate to. Who is going to argue with this statement: "The bedrock foundation upon which cohesive units must be built is unit integrity and stability. The human potential of an Army can only be maximized through units that bend the soldier, through his leaders, to dominant group norms that result in individual commitment, values, and behavior that promote unit and Army goals." These are the same sentiments, albeit in different words, that you hear some nights outside the barracks windows of good units—little expressions of solidarity like, "We can whip you guys from Alpha Company any day!" or "Yeah, well maybe he is screwed up and an SOB, but he's our SOB so lay off of him!"

Henderson devotes one of his chapters to personnel turbulence, that bane of the otherwise trained, cohesive, competent unit. If you've been with troops recently, you'll read this chapter and look at his graphs and charts and you will acknowledge that what he's saying is right. He says that NCOs and officers generally get better at their job with practice, especially in demanding training arenas like the National Training Center or Combat Maneuver Training Center Hohenfels. Tank commanders and gunners who work together in the Unit Conduct-of-Fire Trainer and learn to compensate for each other's little quirks and eccentricities nearly always shoot better on Tank Table VIII than those tank commander/gunner combinations just thrown together to make up a crew for gunnery. This analogy is probably even more true for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle's commanders and gunners.

Henderson has a particularly good chapter titled "Small-unit Leaders Should Be War Winners." I don't happen to agree with him when he says that "the US Army [is] seriously outclassed in the human element of warfighting, especially in small unit leadership." But, then, I have recently had the advantage of witnessing the dissolution of the once highly touted East German army while serving as a Brigade Commander who took his soldiers to two gunnery exercises at Grafenwoehr, a REFORGER, and two rotations through the Combat Maneuver Training Center in less than a year. We did well. Soldiers soldiered, their NCOs and officers led (with humor, toughness, skill, and incredible stamina), and we felt proud.

We're probably never going to be as good as we want to be or as we truly should be. It's true that we don't have enough of our best and brightest NCOs in tank turrets, infantry squads, and howitzer sections (another Henderson plaint). Despite the fact that we're probably much better off than any potential enemy, we have a lot of room for improvement. We must, I think, find some way to challenge really great NCOs so they'll want to stay with the dog-faced soldiers through repetitive tours in

combat outfits rather than escape to man the coffee pot in the Brigade S3 Shop or serve as NCOIC of the Driver Testing Station in some Bavarian caserne.

In his final chapter, Colonel Henderson says, "The mediocre to average unit performance and the discouragingly low numbers of combat troops that characterize today's Army are a direct result of deeply rooted organizational inefficiencies that are apparent in the Army's manpower, personnel, and training organization and policies." Here, he's really hitting pretty close to home. A number of senior leaders could take umbrage at that characterization of their Army as "mediocre." A good guess is that they'll put his statement down to sour grapes or something worse. But I don't think he's taking an unfair shot at the Army he served and that served him. I think he's simply sounding a note of discord in the hallelujah chorus that too many of us have been singing for the past few years. You know, the one that goes, "We're the best that we can be, doo-dah, doo-dah. We could live on MREs, all the live-long day!"

There should be time for every one of us who proudly follows the flag in an Army uniform to read this book. It really made me think. It made me angry and a little defensive, too. Mostly, though, it fanned up that spark of professional interest that needs to be nurtured if one is to really get the most out of what he's doing as a soldier. I think *you* ought to read this book too. When you're finished reading it, give it to your Sergeant Major. See what he says about it.

Off the Press . . .

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From the Archives

The Perfumed Soldier

The French have a phrase for it—*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*—the more things change, the more they stay the same. Nowhere is this homely truth more true than in the military profession. Despite the unending blur of technological progress and the whizbang tactical terms and innovations that accompany it, war at the human level has remained pretty much the same from Homer to Tom Clancy. Take the timeless theme of the tension between the frontline soldier, who braves the daily hardships and dangers of the fighting, and the staff officer from higher headquarters, who is quartered in comparative luxury far from the din of battle.

Shakespeare's Hotspur, a fighting soldier, described the visiting staffer thus:

> But I remember, when the fight was done
> When I was dry with rage and extreme toil,
> Breathless and faint, leaning upon my sword,
> Came there a certain lord, neat, and trimly dressed,
> Fresh as a bridegroom, and his chin new-reaped
> Showed like a stubble land at harvest home.
> He was perfumed like a milliner . . . .
> And still he smiled and talked,
> And as the soldiers bore dead bodies by,
> He called them untaught knaves, unmannerly,
> To bring a slovenly unhandsome corse
> Betwixt the wind and his nobility.
> With many holiday and lady terms
> He questioned me . . . .
> I then, all smarting with my wounds being cold,
> To be so pestered with a popinjay,
> Out of my grief and my impatience
> Answered neglectingly . . . for he made me mad
> To see him shine so brisk, and smell so sweet,
> And talk so like a waiting gentlewoman
> Of guns and drums and wounds.

Compare Hotspur's sentiment with the comment last fall of General Norman Schwarzkopf, another fighting soldier, commander of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia:

> Listen, when I was a battalion commander with my battalion deployed out on the field, in battle, the division staff was back at the rear eating off white tablecloths, being served by soldiers, and having tea dances on Sunday afternoons with the Red Cross girls. I gotta tell you, that is not going to happen on Desert Shield. I can guarantee it better not happen on Desert Shield.

Sources. William Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part I*, I, iii, 30-56; David Martin interview of General Norman Schwarzkopf, "60 Minutes," CBS News, 9 September 1990.